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Die Euro- und Finanzkrise stellt den Erhalt der Europäischen Währungsunion in Frage. Dirk Meyer, Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg, sieht in der Einführung von temporären nationalen Parallelwährungen einen Weg für die schwächeren Eurostaaten, rechtzeitig auf Fehlentwicklungen ihrer Volkswirtschaften zu reagieren bei gleichzeitigem Verbleib in der EWU. Für Michael Vogelsang, Bundesverband mittelständische Wirtschaft, ist das Hauptargument für eine Doppelwährung die dadurch gegebene Möglichkeit der Nachbildung der Abwertungsfunktion bei flexiblen Wechselkursen. Eine temporäre oder dauerhafte Einführung einer Parallelwährung – neben einer europäischen Geldwährung (Euro) –, in der z.B. Gehälter, Renten, staatliche Leistungen und immobile Güter bemessen werden und die einem wechselkursartigen Regelmechanismus unterliegt, könnte nach Ansicht von Anton Beer, Initiative www.rettet-die-eu.de, und auch von André ten Dam helfen, die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der schwächeren Euroländer wiederherzustellen.

This paper suggests that the dollar is not threatened as the hegemonic international currency, and that most analysts are incapable of understanding the resilience of the dollar, not only because they ignore the theories of monetary hegemonic stability or what, more recently, has been termed the geography of money; but also as a result of an incomplete understanding of what a monetary hegemon does. The hegemon is not required to maintain credible macroeconomic policies (i.e., fiscally contractionary policies to maintain the value of the currency), but rather to provide an asset free of the risk of default. It is argued that the current crisis in Europe illustrates why the euro is not a real contender for hegemony in the near future.

This paper assesses whether the international monetary system is already tripolar and centred around the US dollar, the euro and the Chinese renminbi (RMB). It focuses on what we call China’s “dominance hypothesis”, i.e. whether the renminbi is already the dominant currency in Asia, exerting a large influence on exchange rate and monetary policies in the region, a direct reference to the old “German dominance hypothesis” which ascribed to the German mark a dominant role in Europe in the 1980s-1990s. Using a global factor model of exchange rates and a complementary event study, we find evidence that the RMB has become a key driver of currency movements in emerging Asia since the mid-2000s, and even more so since the global financial crisis. These results are consistent with China’s dominance hypothesis and with the view that the international monetary system is already tri-polar. However, we also find that China’s currency movements are to some extent affected by those in the rest of Asia.

After a thirty-year pause, discussions on the future of the international monetary system (IMS) have restarted. This is partly due to the fact that the IMS has facilitated, or at least not prevented, the economic and financial imbalances that led to the recent crisis. This paper argues that the international position of the US dollar is likely to erode in the coming years, though the speed of the process is uncertain. This will create a demand for other currencies to be used internationally as means of payment and store of value. The most likely candidates for filling the partial vacuum created by the dollar’s decline are the euro and the Chinese renminbi. The probability that the renminbi will eventually become one of the world’s key currencies is very high, but the speed of the process is uncertain. As far as the euro is concerned, much will depend on if and how the sovereign debt crisis is resolved. Our view is that the crisis will be dealt with and that it will result in radical steps towards fiscal and financial integration. If such steps are taken, the euro will secure both internal stabilisation and a growing international role.

This paper investigates bond issuance of non-financial corporations in advanced economies during the period 1999-2003, attempting to understand motives for issuing in foreign currency, and determinants for the choice of currency. We consider the following influences on the currency choice when issuing foreign currency denominated debt: the microeconomic characteristics of the firm, the macroeconomic institutional environment and the financial particularities of the bond issue. We find that in addition to cost minimisation, hedging motives and the desire to establish an investor base influences the choice of currency. At the same time, market conventions and regulation also affect the choice.

Might the dollar eventually follow the precedent of the pound and cede its status as leading international reserve currency? Unlike the last time this question was prominently discussed, ten years ago, there now exists a credible competitor: the euro. This paper econometrically estimates determinants of the shares of major currencies in the reserve holdings of the world's central banks. Significant factors include: size of the home country, inflation rate (or lagged depreciation trend), exchange rate variability, and size of the relevant home financial center (as measured by the turnover in its foreign exchange market). We have not found that net international debt position is an important determinant. Network externality theories would predict a tipping phenomenon. Indeed we find that the relationship between currency shares and their determinants is nonlinear (which we try to capture with a logistic function, or else with a dummy leader” variable for the largest country). But changes are felt only with a long lag (we estimate a weight on the preceding year's currency share around 0.9). The advent of the euro interrupts the continuity of the historical data set. So we estimate parameters on pre-1999 data, and then use them to forecast the EMU era. The equation correctly predicts a (small) narrowing in the gap between the dollar and euro over the period 1999-2004. Whether the euro might in the future rival or surpass the dollar as the world's leading international reserve currency appears to depend on two things: (1) do enough other EU members join euroland so that it becomes larger than the US economy, and (2) does US macroeconomic policy eventually undermine confidence in the value of the dollar, in the form of inflation and depreciation. What we learn about functional form and parameter values helps us forecast, contingent on these two developments, how quickly the euro might rise to challenge the dollar. Under two important scenarios the remaining EU members, including the UK, join EMU by 2020 or else the recent depreciation trend of the dollar persists into the future the euro may surpass the dollar as leading international reserve currency by 2022.

Countries aspiring to join the euro area—the so-called accession countries—are increasingly binding their economic activity, external and internal, to the euro-area countries. This phenomenon is observed in the currency invoicing of international trade transactions, where accession countries have reduced their use of the U.S. dollar in invoicing such transactions. According to theory, the optimal invoicing choice for an accession country depends on its composition of exports and imports and on the macroeconomic fluctuations faced by its trade partners, with both factors bearing out the role of herding and hedging considerations within exporter profitability. These considerations yield country-specific estimates of the optimal degree of euro-denominated invoicing of exports. I find that the exporters in some accession countries might be pricing too much of their trade in euros rather than in U.S. dollars, even in their trade transactions with the euro-area and other European Union countries, and thus may be taking on excessive risk in international markets.