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On 12 March 2024, the European Parliament adopted in first reading the Product Liability Directive, adding substantial amendments to the European Commission's proposal of 2022. The aim of the reform is to adapt the famous 1985 Product Liability Directive to the digital age and make it easier for consumers to enforce their rights in court. It notably introduces a duty of disclosure and various alleviations of the burden of proof. The present paper describes the proposed rules on disclosure of evidence and presumptions, charts the changes between the Commission's proposal in 2022 and the Parliament's adoption in 2024, and attempts to assess whether the new product liability regime will meet the challenges of its time and be a game changer in helping consumers enforce their rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on enforcing compliance with the European Union's (EU's) rule of law value has focused on the roles of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU. However, the Council of the EU has attracted less attention. Existing scholarship has convincingly established that the rotating Presidency can crucially influence the functioning of the Council, and, accordingly, this paper examines the discretionary impact the Presidencies have towards Art.7 procedures. Drawing on official documents and statements, this paper compares how the various Presidencies from 2018 to 2022 have used their privileged position on the Council's agenda to decide whether to move forward with hearings. In doing so, they selected appropriate agenda‐shaping strategies, shaped the Commission's perceived opportunities to exercise its agenda prerogatives, avoided compromises on the trios' agendas and, sometimes, benefited from not dealing with Art.7 to pursue other agenda priorities. The Presidency's wide room for manoeuvre hinders the Council's activity in scrutinising backsliding governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the narratives of the European Council, European Commission, and European Parliament regarding the European refugee crisis. Although the relevant scholarly research suggests that the EU Institutions held different perspectives about the refugee crisis, this paper argues that there was no such a clash of perspectives. This paper builds on the Copenhagen School's securitization framework as complemented with subsequent methodological tools to support the author's arguments. The findings suggest that despite the similarity in the views held by the main EU Institutions considering the refugees' influx, there was a variation in the intensity of their securitizing narratives. Theoretically, this study develops an understanding of the importance of the securitization narratives' intensity. Methodologically, this study introduces the Securitization Narratives Continuum, a research tool that facilitates the assessment of securitization. Empirically, this is the first study to interview and take into account the opinions of the securitizing actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the pervasive digitalisation of industry, the disruption of global supply chains during the COVID-19 pandemic, and a geopolitical race for the development of artificial intelligence models, the European Union has pivoted towards promoting 'digital sovereignty' across the technological stack. The paper looks more specifically at the cloud layer and analyses the draft European Union Cloud Services Scheme (EUCS) launched by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity in December 2020. While EUCS is a highly technical scheme, the attempt to include digital sovereignty provisions in it provoked unexpected controversies around who pushes for 'digital sovereignty', why, and how feasible it is. The paper argues, first, that distributive conflicts between member states have led to strong objections towards including digital sovereignty provisions in EUCS. Second, diverging national preferences have also played out in horizontal inter-institutional conflicts around competences between the European Commission and the European Parliament. All in all, the paper makes a novel empirical contribution by studying the overlooked case of EUCS. Theoretically, it bridges the growing literature on digital sovereignty with classic theories of EU integration to identify key factors hindering the translation of digital sovereignty discourses into policy within a broader context of limited technological capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EFSA was asked by the European Parliament to provide a scientific opinion on the analysis by the French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety (ANSES) of Annex I of the European Commission proposal for a regulation 'on plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques (NGTs) and their food and feed, and amending regulation (EU) 2017/625'. The Panel on genetically modified organisms (GMO) assessed the opinion published by ANSES, which focuses on (i) the need to clarify the definitions and scope, (ii) the scientific basis for the equivalence criteria and (iii) the need to take potential risks from category 1 NGT plants into account. The EFSA GMO Panel considered the ANSES analysis and comments on various terms used in the criteria in Annex I of the European Commission proposal and discussed definitions based on previous EFSA GMO Panel opinions. The EFSA GMO Panel concluded that the available scientific literature shows that plants containing the types and numbers of genetic modifications used as criteria to identify category 1 NGT plants in the European Commission proposal do exist as the result of spontaneous mutations or random mutagenesis. Therefore, it is scientifically justified to consider category 1 NGT plants as equivalent to conventionally bred plants with respect to the similarity of genetic modifications and the similarity of potential risks. The EFSA GMO Panel did not identify any additional hazards and risks associated with the use of NGTs compared to conventional breeding techniques in its previous Opinions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition is a research institute within the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science. The Institute is committed to fundamental legal and economic research on processes of innovation and competition and their regulation. Its research focus is on the incentives, determinants and implications of innovation. The Institute informs and guides legal and economic discourse on an impartial basis. It hereby presents its position on the European Commission's proposal of 27 April 2023 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standard essential patents and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission has presented a draft for a comprehensive reform of pharmaceutical law in order to promote innovation and access to medicines. However, the reform is facing criticism from the innovative pharmaceutical industry, which is concerned that the new rules could jeopardize Europe's competitiveness as a research location. In particular, the planned weakening of data protection is seen as innovation-hostile. The European Parliament has adopted its position on the EU Pharma Package and partially withdrawn some planned changes, but industry criticism remains. The article deals with the European Commission's proposal to shorten data protection for medicines. The proposal suggests shortening data protection from six to two years, followed by a two-year market protection. Critics argue that it is not possible in many countries to obtain a decision on the reimbursement eligibility of a medicine within two years. The European Parliament proposes a data protection period of seven and a half years, followed by a two-year market protection. The extension of data protection for products marketed in all member states is seen as an insurmountable hurdle for many companies. There is also discussion of extending data protection by six months for medicines that fill a medical supply gap. However, critics argue that the definition of "medical supply gap" is too narrow. The article describes the proposed changes in EU pharmaceutical law. The European Parliament has proposed extending data protection for medicines by twelve months, while market protection can only be granted once. It is also proposed to shorten market exclusivity for medicines for rare diseases from ten to nine years, with the possibility of an extension to eleven years in the case of a "major medical supply gap". Measures to address medicine shortages are also proposed, such as the introduction of an EU-wide list of critical medicines and the tightening of obligations for marketing authorization holders and wholesalers. The Parliament has largely supported the Commission's proposal but has tightened the obligations related to supply shortages. The article describes the proposed regulations for addressing medicine shortages in the EU. Marketing authorization holders must explain reasons for interruptions or suspensions of supply and report them at least six months in advance. Wholesalers must report shortages and provide information on available stocks. The European Commission has proposed measures to strengthen supply chains and minimize supply interruptions. An alliance for critical medicines is also being created to develop coordinated actions against the shortage of critical medicines. The industry has positively evaluated the proposed measures. [Extracted from the article]

During the last 20 years, the European Union has been mired in crisis after crisis. At the same time, the number of infringement procedures, the formal requests from the European Commission to member states for compliance, decreased dramatically, despite the addition of 10 member states in 2004. Yet, the link between crises and Commission enforcement activity has not been systematically examined. In this article, I theorize about the role of time, and demonstrate that crises limit the Commission's ability to act as guardian of the treaties. However, crises are not deterministic in nature – the European Parliament and European Union citizens can alter the costs of Commission enforcement. I find that as Euroscepticism increases, the Commission's demand for compliance decreases, in part due to the steep reputational costs to the Commission when member states refuse compliance, especially after sanctions. The number of infringements is also positively correlated with European Parliament action, suggesting that even without formal sanctioning power, the European Parliament plays a role in European Union law enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Nachhaltigkeitsrecht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nachhaltigkeitsrecht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study investigates how nationality and partisanship, two personal attributes of Commissioners, influence member states' bargaining success in EU law making. Building on principal-agent theory, it is expected that countries with close national and political linkages to the Commissioner responsible for negotiating a proposal are more successful in attaining their preferred outcomes. The hypotheses are tested using a linear regression model on the DEUIII dataset. Overall, the analysis demonstrates that a state has more bargaining success when the responsible Commissioner comes from that state or is affiliated with the same European Parliament party group as one of the governing parties in that state. Moreover, shared national ties moderate the detrimental effect of preference disagreements with the Commission on states' success. The study contributes to the literature by showing that Commissioners are not independent but political actors who can act autonomously and successfully pursue the preferences of their home countries and parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 23 July 2023, the European Commission concluded a 'Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic and Global Partnership with Tunisia' (MoU), mainly aimed at stemming migration in exchange for strengthened cooperation in other policy areas. The MoU was met with strong criticism from both civil society and institutional bodies such as the European Parliament, the European Ombudsman, and several Member States. Critics fear complicity in the fundamental rights violations of migrants and denounced the informal and opaque approach by the European Commission, while formal avenues were at hand. This article reassesses the conclusion of the MoU and draws an analysis of the MoU from the perspective of human rights compliance as well as democratic and judicial control, while also examining compliance with the European Commission's obligations. Furthermore, the article puts the MoU in the context of the EU policy trend of externalising migration control through partnerships with third countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bulletin of Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL: Series 'International Relations & Regional Studies' is the property of Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations & World Languages and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the EU Directive (EC) No 128/2009 (SUD) was approved by the European Parliament, the establishment of a general framework aimed at securing the sustainable use of pesticides was laid down, and European Union (EU) Member States adopted National Action Plans in accordance with this Directive. Specifically, for EU Member States, pesticides, objectives and quantitative targets were created. Therefore, the EU Commission provided a methodology for risk assessment as the derivation of two harmonised risk indicators: HRI_1 and HRI_2. The present study focuses on HRI_1, as this can be implemented at the country level. Each EU Member State delivers annual harmonised risk indicators values to the Commission based on calculations using their own data and results. However, only the EU Commission can derive this HRI_1 (concatenated) indicator at the EU level. Therefore, the present study is an attempt to shed some light on the modus operandi used by the EU Commission to compile this HRI_1, and it also aims to clarify these calculations. Data originating from twenty-seven EU Member States were analysed. These data were compared to data published on the EU Commission website over time. Possible virtual developments including the modification and evolution of active substance statuses are envisaged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recovery and resilience dialogues were introduced by the regulation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, and the first of such dialogues took place in May 2021. The European Parliament invites the Commission, approximately every two months, to exchange views on matters relating to the national recovery and resilience plans and progress in their implementation. Through an analysis of an original dataset composed of the questions asked by the MEPs in the 10 dialogues held between May 2021 and April 2023, this article provides a systematic empirical assessment of the European Parliament’s capacity to hold the Commission accountable. Drawing on the literature on the economic and monetary dialogues and adapting the operationalisation of key variables to the new instrument, this article shows that the recovery and resilience dialogues are an effective instrument for information exchange and debate, but they serve as a weak instrument of political accountability. Additionally, it casts new light on significant differences between MEPs: South and East European members are considerably more active than members from Northern Europe. At the same time, parliamentarians only occasionally ask questions targeting other member states.

The division of powers in the federally structured European Union, the lack of fixed political coalitions, the absence of effective control of voting behaviour in the European Parliament by parliamentary group leaderships and the structure of European political parties as alliances of national parties make European elections systemically specific. In the 2024 European elections, the lead candidate system for the President of the European Commission is back. This may contribute to increased voter participation and be successful if the informal preconditions for the candidates are met during nomination. During the phase leading up to the election of the President of the Commission, the Parliament achieves maximum leverage. Political forces that endanger the existing conditions of the system itself, should be categorized as extreme and be opposed by the political mainstream. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On June 22, 2022, the European Commission proposed a nature restoration regulation with the aim of restoring degraded ecosystems across the EU by 2050. Under the proposal, Member States must prepare national restoration plans to meet various ecosystem-specific targets and obligations. Controversial is the non-deterioration obligation that will apply in areas where restoration measures are taken and in areas where certain habitat types occur. After the European Parliament (EP) and the European (Environment) Council had both adopted positions that include significant amendments of the non-deterioration provisions, in November 2023 the Council announced a compromise text as the result of the trilogue. This contribution assesses how the compromise text of the non-deterioration obligation addresses drawbacks from the previous proposals, identifies associated questions and offers some suggestions for the interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brussels is the lobbying capital of Europe. And so it is not difficult to understand why, big companies, industry interest groups, lobbying consultants and law firms spend hundreds of millions of euros every year to ensure that EU policy meets the needs of "big companies"… and their efforts very often they are crowned with success! It is estimated that more than 25,000 lobbyists work in the European Quarter, most of them serving businesses and their interest groups. Every time the European Commission proposes a regulation, or when the European Parliament votes on a new directive, corporate lobbyists are present, far more numerous than the groups that defend the public interest and equipped with much more significant financial resources. On certain issues, the imbalance is staggering: thus, in the case of European financial regulation, the lobbying costs incurred by the banking sector are thirty times higher than those of NGOs, trade unions and other interest groups. This imbalance and the opportunities for corruption were even greater before the Lobbying Transparency Register was enacted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recovery and resilience dialogues were introduced by the regulation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, and the first of such dialogues took place in May 2021. The European Parliament invites the Commission, approximately every two months, to exchange views on matters relating to the national recovery and resilience plans and progress in their implementation. Through an analysis of an original dataset composed of the questions asked by the MEPs in the 10 dialogues held between May 2021 and April 2023, this article provides a systematic empirical assessment of the European Parliament's capacity to hold the Commission accountable. Drawing on the literature on the economic and monetary dialogues and adapting the operationalisation of key variables to the new instrument, this article shows that the recovery and resilience dialogues are an effective instrument for information exchange and debate, but they serve as a weak instrument of political accountability. Additionally, it casts new light on significant differences between MEPs: South and East European members are considerably more active than members from Northern Europe. At the same time, parliamentarians only occasionally ask questions targeting other member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economic value of all projects is well known nationally and internationally, yet many economic actors fail to give enough voice to project experts at the strategic level. The climate emergency, the global pandemic, the decisions of the European Commission and the European Parliament, and the post-Brexit environment have created a perfect storm when companies plan their mid- and long-term strategies. For this competition, ADI ITI Danube Delta built the first national strategy development tool. Under the motto of this mechanism, below I present the methodology of knowledge management and the projects developed in the ITI Danube Delta region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Association of Nuclear Medicine (EANM) is advocating for the inclusion of nuclear medicine advancements in the revision of the European Union Pharmaceutical Framework. The current legislation does not adequately address the use of radiopharmaceuticals for diagnosis and treatment. The EANM has provided feedback to the European Commission, but their suggestions were not included in the legislative proposal. They are now working with other stakeholders to have a stronger impact on the ongoing debates. The EANM is proposing changes to regulations surrounding the availability and preparation of radiopharmaceuticals, including restricting the need for marketing authorization and aligning with radiation protection standards. The proposed changes are currently being examined by the European Parliament and Council, and stakeholders can provide feedback during the legislative process. [Extracted from the article]

This article analyses the process and outcome of the review and recast of the EU Dual-use Regulation which concluded in 2020. The recast was dominated by conflicts both among EU member states and between the European Council, European Commission and European Parliament about the interlinked issues of expanding the range of human rights states should consider when implementing the Regulation and controlling exports of "cyber-surveillance items". The processes through which states individually and collectively determine their content of their export controls are often portrayed as a zero-sum contest between "norms" and "interests". This article argues that the recast can be better understood if it is viewed as a competition between different constitutive and regulative norms grounded in humanitarian, economic and national security concerns. The article also argues that the outcome of the recast can be better understood if we apply Brunsson's concept of "organized hypocrisy" and view it as a set of compromises which sought to address several competing norms. The article concludes by reflecting on the potential wider application of the "competing norms" and "organized hypocrisy" frameworks for other studies of states' export controls and export control regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU has always struggled to convince its member states for more security powers. The European Commission Presidents often use the State of the Union address to build a narrative on the need for the European Union to become a security player. The State of the Union address was established with the Lisbon Treaty and serves to highlight the priorities of the Commission. This makes it one of the most important addresses in political terms. Such a speech draws attention to the function of narratives and their role in shaping human communication which can be used by politicians to transfer ideologies, beliefs and information to a wider audience [Shenhav, S. R. (2005). Concise narratives: A structural analysis of political discourse. Discourse Studies, 7 (3), 315–335. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461445605052189; Della Sala, V. (2018). Narrating Europe: The EU's ontological security dilemma. European Security, 27(3), 266–279. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2018.1497978]. This paper will evaluate issues of security as tackled in the State of the Union addresses from the first delivered by Jose Manuel Barroso in 2010 to the last speech delivered by Ursula von der Leyen in 2021. This will serve to evaluate the evolving narrative concerning European Security as the Commission attempted to build a stronger case for transforming the EU into a security player. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present article analyses the main legal features of the EU Data Act, identifying some innovative aspects and shortcomings. Moving from the general approach elaborated by the Union towards data governance—a value-based approach flowing from the idea of enforcing the strategic autonomy of the Union—the article considers first the most relevant piece of legislation that complements the DA, that is, the EU Data Governance Act, and then assesses the DA in light of both the original proposal of the European Commission and the position adopted by the two EU co-legislatures—the European Parliament and the Council. An overview of the major competitive legal approaches to the governance of IoT data (namely, the USA and Chinese approaches) is also discussed, stressing possible synergies and conflicts with the EU's approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Learning to learn (LtL) is a key competence that the European Commission has identified for education systems (Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on key competences for lifelong learning; Council Recommendation of 22 May 2018 on key competences for lifelong learning). It is usually assumed that students will already handle it well when they start university and that their use of it will improve during their university studies, but this assumption needs testing. The aim of this article is to establish the level of management of this competence as well as possible profiles of how university students use it and their relationship to academic achievement. To this end, we worked with a sample of 1,234 students from three universities in Valencia (Spain) in different study years and study areas, applying the QELtLCUS questionnaire, which evaluates the competence. We performed descriptive analyses, cluster analysis, analyses of differences, and multiple linear regression analyses. The sample subjects displayed an acceptable level of management, albeit with low scores in some important dimensions of LtL. We found two groups with two management profiles: one with a high competence level and another with a lower competence level. The students in the first group had better scores than those in the second group, with statistically significant results. We also found differences that were not statistically significant by gender, with a higher level of competence in women, with those relating to year and study area being larger. We believe that this research provides relevant data that may be of interest to researchers. It also includes guidance to help teachers work on this competence in university studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent times, the European Commission has shown to have increasing difficulty keeping up its central position in trade diplomacy towards China, in the face of a growing wariness and assertiveness of the member states. In this article, we observe a changing balance, a development from EU diplomacy towards European diplomacy, meaning a growing influence of EU member states in the process. We call this the "Europeanisation" of EU economic diplomacy. This is not limited to China and reflects a broader development, as is visible in the politicisation of the negotiation processes towards the (failed) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the (provisionally applied) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, and also in the trend towards mixed agreements that require member state ratification. However, it was particularly in the relations with China that such trends became visible for the first time and have continued to manifest themselves throughout the years. Apart from the member states assembled in the Council, also the European Parliament has strengthened its position in the process at the expense of the Commission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports on a political game played between November 2021 and February 2022 at a European university in the frame of an elective course open to students from all disciplines. It started from a scenario that combined a real and ongoing innovation process—the use of CRISPR/Cas9 technology to introduce specific genes from unfrozen mammoths onto an elephant species to make it more resistant to cold—with a fictive joint project between a US-based company and the Russian government to release those mammoths on an island in the North-West of Russia. Almost no rules were given, and the students were distributed in nine groups to represent different actors deemed relevant to the scenario. These groups were the national governments of (1) Russia, (2) close neighboring states, (3) European countries farther away from the project location; (4) the company working on the innovation, dubbed HELIOS; (5) other market actors; civil society organizations concerned with (6) animal rights and (7) the environment; (8) the European Commission and the EU Parliament; and (9) media. The game was led by the course teacher and two student volunteers. Based on the results of both qualitative and quantitative forms of ex-post evaluation, we assess whether the Mammoth game meets the expectations that guided the game design process. Furthermore, we discuss whether the Mammoth game had a positive effect on students' abilities to think about the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What drives the behaviour of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in legislative oversight? In this article, we explore the interplay between the ideology and nationality of MEPs in policy fields where the two dimensions are likely to come into conflict. Focusing on EU socio‐economic governance, we collect an original dataset of parliamentary questions asked during the Economic Dialogues with the European Commission (2012–2019). By means of content analysis, we detect variation in MEPs' preferences relating to two dimensions central to this field, that is, economic effectiveness and social inequality. We argue that the variation in MEPs' concerns can be explained to different degrees by their ideology and nationality. We find that ideology plays a highly significant role in shaping the type of questions posed in legislative oversight; however, the nationality of MEPs is also an important driver of behaviour, especially when a member state is disproportionately affected by EU measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Croatian & Comparative Public Administration is the property of Institut za Javnu Upravu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Space & Society / Tér és Társadalom is the property of Centre for Economic & Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ten years before the European Parliament adopted the Gender-neutral language in the European Parliament multilingual guidelines (2008), the European Commission's Directorate-General for Translation had already included a section on this subject in the third edition of its English Style Guide (1998). The original text was later reproduced in other European Union's style guides, namely the Interinstitutional Style Guide, the European Commission Style Guide and the ephemeral European Commission Guidelines for Inclusive Communication, withdrawn shortly after publication due to political and religious complaints. After a quarter of a century, the guidelines have drifted apart through their respective updates. What are the exact inconsistencies of the current style guides? How do the changes reflect developments in the field of inclusive language? And do the guidelines include gendered terms and expressions relevant for EU linguists? A unified EU policy on linguistic sexism across its languages and institutions expressed in a set of relevant and coherent language guidelines seems vital to enabling and fostering the implementation of non-sexist language as a gender mainstreaming tool in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review focuses on analysing the strategy and aspirations of the European Union within the hydrogen sector. This aim is achieved through the examination of the European Parliament's hydrogen strategy, allowing for a study of actions and projects in hydrogen technologies. The Parliament's hydrogen strategy is the document that provides the guideline of how the EU intends to function in the hydrogen sector and manages to cover a wide range of topics, all of them significant to represent the entirety of the hydrogen sector. It touches on subjects such as hydrogen demand, infrastructure, research, and standards, among others. The review discusses also the aspect that the EU intends to be a leader in the hydrogen sector, including the large-scale industrialization of key elements such as electrolysers, and this purpose is corroborated by the large number of associations, strategies, plans, and projects that are being established and developed by the European Union. The most important conclusions to learn from this analysis are that hydrogen has many of the right characteristics to make it the key to decarbonisation, especially in hard-to-abate sectors, and that it is bound to be one of the main actors in the imminent green transition. Moreover, hydrogen seems to be having its breakthrough, and this field's development can have benefits not only from an environmental perspective but also from an economical one, enabling the way into the green transition and the fight against climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU institutions – led by the Commission, Parliament and European Council, along with the Council of the EU – are determined to make this the union's “digital decade”. It is time for Europe to consolidate its digital development and set rules in line with its moral and cultural principles, instead of following those of external actors like China and the United States, as well as focussing on data, technology and infrastructure. This paper examines the EU’s digital development from the perspectives and positions of the abovementioned institutions, which show divergences, albeit within a common framework. Based on three theoretical currents (neofunctionalism, federalism and intergovernmentalism), it applies a critical perspective to analyse the impact (positive and/or negative) on European citizens of the institutions’ actions in this field.

The use of social media, especially Twitter, has become part of the political communication strategies of parties and candidates. Reaching young voters and reducing their historical abstention has become a challenge, even more for candidates standing for the European Parliament, elections that have traditionally witnessed a much smaller turnout. To find out if the main six candidates in the 2019 European Parliament election campaign (10–26 May), called to occupy the presidency of the European Commission, connected with younger voters, this research applies the multiple-case study based on the analysis of their Twitter posts. The results show that candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) preferred to talk about tops such as territory, vote appeal, and their parties' alliances above the topics that most interest young people: climate change and environment, education, poverty and inequalities, unemployment, human rights and democracy and health. Better political social media communication is needed to make candidates' communication strategies more consistent and to promote voters' participation, especially among youth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While feeling rules have been found to be highly relevant in social research and international relations, little is known about their role in European policy‐making. This article explores how emotions have been understood by Commission and Council officials and by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) across policy areas over a long time period (1999–2014). Qualitative content analysis reveals the existence of feeling rules and that the appropriateness of emotions has been contested. Many policy‐makers, placing emotions in opposition to rationality, have claimed that policy‐making should be devoid of emotions, especially in policy areas such as public health, energy, and the environment. In contrast, in policy areas such as foreign policy and home affairs, emotions are often considered to be appropriate. This article also reflects on the role of feeling rules in constraining and enabling the policy process, uncovering subtle power dynamics. Data analysed include the European Parliament (EP) database (1999–2014) and the EUSpeech database (2007–2015). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has demonstrated how the European Parliament has expanded its powers vis-à-vis other EU institutions by strategically exploiting powers it already holds and appealing to its contribution to democratic legitimacy. However, established theories are challenged by the failure of the EP to secure the election of a so-called Spitzenkandidat to the post of European Commission President in 2019. Was this failure an incidental set-back or does it point to a structural limit to the EP's ability to expand its powers? Exploring the latter option, this article proposes that the 2019 events warrant the revision of the EP-centred parliamentarisation thesis that dominates our understanding of EU inter-institutional politics. Instead, it develops an alternative theory that departs from the conception of the EU as a demoi-cracy. Using the events in 2014 and 2019, the article constructs analytical narratives for both theoretical positions. Reading the 2019 case through the demoi-cratic perspective suggests that national leaders are unlikely to allow the EP to reclaim the Spitzenkandidaten-process. More generally, it follows from this perspective that the EP can only successfully get the member states to share powers, not to cede them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Policy Analysis is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The crisis in Ukraine between February 24, 2022, and December 24, 2022, drastically altered the way that European public institutions and NATO used Twitter to communicate with the public. In response to the political, economic, and military escalation in Ukraine, European public institutions and NATO used Twitter to disseminate information to the public about their diplomatic efforts in the region, as well as to discuss potential solutions and strategies for deescalation and long-term resolution of the crisis. Through Twitter, European public institutions and NATO were also able to communicate their concerns about regional stability and the potential implications of the crisis for the entire European continent. Twitter proved to be an invaluable tool for European public institutions and NATO in their efforts to keep the public informed and to potentially influence the political dynamics of the crisis in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the process of European integration, citizens and organisations can participate through specialised bodies such as political parties, but also interest groups (Aron, 2020; Dür, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015). This article shows how lobbies are using political communication tools to influence public institutions. This proposal aims to analyse the communication strategies of lobbies in Europe and which institutions they focus their activities on, the European Commission or the European Parliament. The aim is to find out the audiences with which they establish relations in their communication activities, to analyse which countries and which types of lobbies have the greatest presence in the register of interest groups, and how they manage their communication tools. To carry out this study, two research techniques were chosen, content analysis and survey, for which a stratified probabilistic sampling was carried out using the organisational typologies contemplated in the European Union Transparency Register as a stratum, obtaining 363 interest groups. Subsequently, for the content analysis, all registered lobbies related to both European institutions were chosen. The main findings reveal that the European Parliament is the main target of NGOs, trade union associations and companies, while employers' and academic associations focus their efforts on the European Commission. Business and employers' organisations have a stronger presence and influence in the European institutions than self-employed and faith-based organisations. Belgium is the country with the most registered lobbies. The lobbying sector is dominated by middle-aged men with legal training and professional experience who prefer direct lobbying and make marginal use of indirect lobbying tools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 28 September 2022, long years of preparation in the European Commission have finally materialized in the publication of a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on liability for defective products, which should replace the currently effective Directive 85/374/EEC. The revised rules are intended to provide victims with a high level of protection in today's world, not only by adapting the instrument to new technologies and new business models, but also by strengthening their position in court proceedings. All this without disrupting the balance with the legitimate interests of producers. This paper introduces the reader to the main changes brought about by the proposal and highlights some of the provisions whose development in the European legislative process might be worth following. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Safety & Fire Technology (2657-8808) is the property of Centrum Naukowo-Badawcze Ochrony Przeciwpozarowej and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Pravnik is the property of Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of State & Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of UFITA - Archiv für Medienrecht & Medienwissenschaft is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)