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It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is also presented. Therefore, no reason to reject evidentialism arises in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the approach to evidentialism, role of non-epistemic commitments, and transparency. Topics discussed by the author include reliability of a method which determines justification, normative legitimacy of friendship which is important to a good life, and introduction of radical pragmatism which leads to disruptive influence of friendship for the re-evaluation of ones character.