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China has enacted the dual credit policy to enhance electric vehicle (EV) diffusion, and the impact of information transmission on manufacturers' decisions has not been well considered under the policy compliance pressure. We developed a complex network-based evolutionary game model to study the proliferation of EVs under the dual credit policy and explore the impact of different information transmission mechanisms. Our results suggest that stricter enforcement of corporate average fuel consumption credit requirements can promote the effective diffusion of EVs. Surprisingly, increasing the EV credit ratio requirement does not significantly promote the EV proliferation. Credit prices play a crucial role in policy effectiveness. Furthermore, our study highlights the heterogeneous effect of information transmission on policy effectiveness, which indicates a dual effect of industry information. Mixed information transmission can combine the advantages of both modes, avoiding crowding-out effects while reducing volatility and maximizing the benefits of information transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peer enterprises face similar market environment and development prospects. For the purpose of economic rationality and avoiding risks, enterprises imitate and learn from peer enterprises' green innovation decisions. However, few studies focus on the relationship between peer effect and government policies. In order to fill the gap, an evolutionary game model based on complex network is built, and different information interaction mechanisms are constructed to study the dynamic impact of government policies on the diffusion of green innovation among peer enterprises. The results show that: (1) based on peer effect, green innovation incentive, environmental protection tax and innovation subsidy are effective policy tools to promote green innovation diffusion. (2) green innovation incentive and innovation subsidy have the best policy effect threshold. Peer alliances invalidate further incentives for generosity. (3) Increasing the intensity of environmental tax will first promote and then inhibit the diffusion of green innovation. (4) Different information interaction mechanisms of peer effect significantly impact the effectiveness of policies, and there are differences. Compared with the positive information, enterprises are more vulnerable to the negative information of the industry. This reflects the conservative attitude of enterprises. The conclusions provide a multi perspective reference for the implementation of government policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the practice of COVID-19 prevention and control in China, the home quarantine policy directly connects and manages the residents, which plays a significant role in preventing the spread of the epi-demic in the community. We evaluate the effectiveness of current home quarantine policy in the actual execution process based on the evolutionary game relationship between the community and res-idents. This paper establishes a double-layer coupled complex network game model, and uses the multi-agent modeling method to study the game relationship between the community and residents in the context of home quarantine policies. The results show that initial strategy of the community with strict supervision and reasonable government reward allocation will increase the proportion of the residents complying with the quarantine rule. When 80% of the communities chose to supervise strictly at the beginning, people are more likely to follow the rules. While when the residents can only get 20% of the government's reward, the proportion of choosing to violate the quarantine rules is much higher than that when they can get 80% of the reward. Besides, the structure of small-world network and environmental noise will also affect the residents' strategy. As the probability of reconnection of the small-world network rises from 0.2 to 0.8, the proportion of residents who choose to comply with the strategy becomes much higher. When the environmental noise reaches 0.5, the ratio of residents who choose to violate the strategy is higher than the ratio of complianc. The study is helpful to provide the basis for the government to formulate the quarantine policy and propose an optimization for making effective quarantine measures. In this way, the government can adjust the parameters to make residents achieve the possible level of compliance with quarantine policies as high as possible to contain the spread of the epidemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The construction of charging infrastructure needs to keep pace with the rapid growth of electric vehicle sales. In contrast to the increased focus and growth of public charging stations, installing private chargers remains a big challenge. We develop an evolutionary game model from the perspective of the vehicle owners and the property companies based on prospect theory to solve this dilemma. The system dynamics is innovatively utilized to investigate the mutations in evolution, and a specific incentive mechanism is further designed. The results show that: (1) installing private chargers is difficult due to the conflict of interest between the vehicle owners and property companies. The solution to this problem is to increase the property companies' support proportion; (2) dynamic incentives for the property companies can keep the proportion of positive strategies adopted by both parties at a high level. The earlier the intervention, the faster the stability is reached; (3) property management cost and loss of safety hazards are essential factors that must be kept within reasonable limits to prevent them from negatively impacting the incentive effect; (4) amplifying subjects' perceived value of losses and lowering their risk preference can achieve a better incentive effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]