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After sharply declining in the first half of 2015, world trade began to grow, albeit at a slow pace. Preliminary data indicate that merchandise import growth was 1.7 percent in 2015, down from 3 percent in 2014. Recent trade developments should be seen in the context of a deceleration in trade growth since the early 2000s, and particularly since the global financial crisis. These developments reflected a combination of old and new cyclical factors as well as enduring structural determinants, such as the maturation of global value chains and the slower pace of trade liberalization. In particular, trade developments in Latin America and Eastern Europe and Central Asia mostly reflected lower imports of recession hit commodity exporters such as Brazil and Russia. Latin America contributed 6 percent to the downward pull in global imports in 2015. Except for Japan, imports and exports of advanced economies did not show signs of a significant downturn, but were sluggish. Lower commodity prices have reduced real incomes in commodity producers and led to a contraction in their imports from all regions, including China. At the same time, the gradual shift from investment to consumption in China, and the more significant contraction in its industrial production seen in early 2015, have reduced its imports from other regions, including commodity producers.

Cross-country panel data are used to assess the effect of free-trade agreements on flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Free-trade agreements are found to have a significant positive effect on FDI flows, and free-trade agreements are found to matter more for the smaller members of the agreement. For example, the North American Free-Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) effect on FDI flows into Mexico is much larger than its effect on flows into the United States. These cross country results are used to assess NAFTA's effect on FDI flows into Mexico. After controlling for a set of other factors such as an increase in worldwide FDI flows the trade agreement is found to generate FDI flows nearly 60 percent higher than they would have been without the agreement.

The approach taken in this report reflects the view of the collaborating international organizations that price volatility and its effects on food security is a complex issue with many dimensions, agricultural and non-agricultural, short and long-term, with highly differentiated impacts on consumers and producers in developed and developing countries. The report begins with a discussion of volatility and of the ways in which volatility affects countries, businesses, consumers and farmers. Lessons learned from recent experiences are briefly reviewed as well as the factors determining likely levels of volatility in future. This report offers suggestions for a systematic and internationally coordinated response building on the lessons learned as a result of the 2007-2008crisis. It is important to distinguish between policy options designed to prevent or reduce price volatility and those designed to mitigate its consequences. Both types of intervention are explored in detail. Scope is identified for actions at individual, national, regional and international level. Some would help to avert a threat; others are in the nature of contingency plans to improve readiness, while still others address long-term issues of resilience. Finally, the report explores mechanisms of international cooperation to implement this report's recommendations and to monitor progress.

Many countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, especially in South America, fared well during the global crisis and are now on a strong growth path. The region s recession in 2009 was relatively short lived and, with the notable exception of Mexico, remarkably mild. The current pace of economic recovery is exceeding expectations, with gross domestic product (GDP) projected to grow in the 5-6 percent range in 2010. This report discusses LAC's newfound resilience in the midst of financial globalization, examining key features of the cyclical behavior of LAC economies in comparison to other emerging economies and to its own past. Resilience is defined throughout this report in a broad sense to denote the ability of an economy to navigate with minimum disturbances through shocks, cushioning their negative spillovers in bad times, and recovering fast after a downturn. The report is structured as follows: first, it evaluates the relative performance of LAC countries during the contractionary period generated by the recent global crisis, to shed light on LAC's ability to shield its economies or soften the blow of a large external shock. Second, a similar exercise is conducted for the recovery phase of the cycle, when in the aftermath of an external shock more resilient countries will be expected to have a faster and more robust recovery. Third, it takes a deeper look at the different driving forces behind the recovery, including the role of domestic demand, commodity prices, and the connection to emerging Asia. Fourth, it provides evidence of the ability of different countries in LAC to conduct counter-cyclical policies in response to the global financial crisis. Lastly, a concluding section warns about the main macro-financial tensions and challenges lying ahead for the region.

This paper analyzes the economic effects of agricultural price and merchandise trade policies around the world as of 2004 on global markets, net farm incomes, and national and regional economic welfare and poverty, using the global economy wide Linkage model, new estimates of agricultural price distortions for developing countries, and poverty elasticity's approach. It addresses two questions: to what extent are policies as of 2004 still reducing rewards from farming in developing countries and thereby adding to inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they depressing value added more in primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries, and earnings of unskilled workers more than of owners of other factors of production, thereby potentially contributing to inequality and poverty within developing countries (given that farm incomes are well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries and that agriculture there is intensive in the use of unskilled labor)? Results are presented for the key countries and regions of the world and for the world as a whole. They reveal that, by moving to free markets, income inequality between countries will be reduced at least slightly, all but one-sixth of the gains to developing countries will come from agricultural policy reform, unskilled workers in developing countries the majority of whom work on farms will benefit most from reform, net farm incomes in developing countries will rise by 6 percent compared with 2 percent for non-agricultural value added, and the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day will drop 3 percent globally.

This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting imports of manufactures. Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries' agricultural price and international trade policies. The authors summarize these and realted stylized facts that can be drawn from a new World Bank database that is worthy of the attention of political economy theorists, historians and econometricians. These indicators can be helpful in addressing such questions as the following: where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some developing-country food producers are now being protected from import competition along the lines of the examples of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political economy forces behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in less-successful countries where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? And what explains the pattern of distortions across not only countries but also industries and in the choice of support or tax instruments within the agricultural sector of each country?

Earnings from farming in many developing countries have been depressed by a pro-urban bias in own-country policies as well as by governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Both sets of policies, which reduce national and global economic welfare and contribute to global inequality and poverty, have been undergoing reform since the 1980s. Using the linkage model of the global economy and modifications to the pre-release of version 7 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) protection database for 2004, this paper seeks to compare the effect of those reforms to date with those that would come from removing remaining agricultural and trade policies. Two sets of results are thus presented: one showing the effects of policy reforms between 1980-84 and 2004, the other showing what the removal of remaining distortions as of 2004 could be. Both sets of results indicate improvements in the real value of agricultural output and exports, the real returns to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes in most developing country regions despite the adverse effect on the international terms of trade for some developing countries that are net food importers or are enjoying preferential access to agricultural markets of high-income countries. Landowners in those high-income countries still offering their farmers price supports could readily afford to compensate them from the benefits of removing remaining agricultural protectionism.