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A family physician managing a 54-year-old patient with a past cranio-cerebral trauma in his medical history, followed by an intracerebral hematoma in the right frontal lobe, with secondary posttraumatic epilepsy, repeatedly prescribed anti-epileptic drugs (recommended by a consulting neurologist) and described in the patient's medical records frequent generalized seizures as reported by the patient and his wife. The doctor himself witnessed the patient driving a car, despite the fact that he received a disability pension resulting from frequent epileptic seizures. According to the doctor, he was "shocked" by the patient driving a car and felt obliged to report the matter to the Transport Division Administration, suggesting that the driving license should be revoked. The patient's driving license had been withdrawn, what caused considerable resentment in the individual, who, in turn, filed a suit against the physician for violating professional medical secrecy by informing the Transport Division Administration about his suffering from epilepsy. The described situations point to the necessity of: 1) striving for the highest possible objectivity of diagnosing epilepsy, and 2) standardization of criteria for certification of epilepsy.

The percentage of cases, in which devisors were unable to devise properly was high, what was mostly associated with the frequent drawing up of testaments by chronically ill individuals immediately before death. Grounds for pronouncing the devisor lacking in testamentary capacity were observed in 46.6% of cases, while 39.7% of devisors were found to lack free expression of will. Medical records were available in all the cases, including psychiatric records in 20.5% of cases and neurological records in 20.5%. In the majority of instances, the low quality of medical records hindered formulating expert opinions. The fact that in the majority of cases, the testimonies of witnesses were highly divergent indicated that they were either unable to assess the mental state of the devisor or else were themselves interested in the settlement of the case. Frequently, attending physicians from non-psychiatric wards were unable to answer questions on the mental state of the devisor, what resulted from their focusing on the somatic cause of hospitalization and the fact that their contact with the patient was very limited in time. Problems with certification on the basis of medical records were mainly associated with lacking psychiatric or neurological consults performed at the time the testament was drawn up; in some instances, the entire medical records from that period were missing. For this reason, individuals desiring to prepare a last will should be advised to undergo voluntary psychiatric assessment in this period. Medico-legal opinions in testament cases are difficult and time-consuming, but pleading one's case before the court is even more tedious and difficult.

A very important issue in preparing medico-legal opinions is the establishment whether the devisor had the ability to bequeath at the date of preparing a testament. The subsequent loss of the ability of bequeathing does not have any impact on execution of the previously prepared testament. Experts who pass opinions in testament cases evaluate: 1) the testament itself and the circumstances of its preparation, excluding, however, the reliability of records, 2) statements obtained while interrogating witnesses (descriptions of daily life, motivation to bequeath), 3) medical records (files, case histories, discharge records). The investigative material consisted of judicial files in 73 testament cases referred to the Chair and Department of Forensic Medicine (CDFM), University of Medical Sciences, Poznań, by courts from all over Poland in the period 1990-2005 for formulation of medico-legal opinions based on these documents. In 63.0% of cases, CDFM in Poznań was the first opinionating institution; in the remaining instances, previous medico-legal opinions had been given elsewhere; in six cases they were antagonistic. The investigative material included a predominant percentage (75.2%) of ordinary testaments (made before a notary and oligraphic) as opposed to 22% of informal testaments (oral only). Although in the majority of cases (67.2%) only one testament was drawn up, there were also instances (2.7%) where the devisor prepared as many as five testaments. The length of devisors survival following the drawing up of the final testament was generally short. In total, testaments not only in the oral form, but also made before a notary, were prepared by chronically ill individuals presenting with marked clinical symptoms, what was perceived by their family and caregivers as a sign of the imminent death. Hence, the testaments were often drawn up in a hospital room or in a notary office where the patient was taken between consecutive hospitalizations.

The sequelae of traffic accidents affect not only the victims, but may also affect members of their families, who have not been involved in the accident but, nevertheless, in association with the demise of their close relative, they suffer from adaptive (reactive) disturbances which, in their opinion, provide grounds for litigation for their permanent loss of health resulting from the accident. Such opinionating problems are encountered with increasing frequency by insurance companies, when families of the victims killed in traffic accidents demand recuperation for the loss of health, developed due to the traumatizing experiences. The paper presents two cases of such litigation, filed by family members of deceased victims of traffic accidents.

The report presents the problem of a diagnostic error consisting in abusing the diagnosis of cerebro-cranial injuries, and especially cerebral concussion. Diagnoses of cerebro-cranial injuries, including brain concussion established by physicians, including specialists, are often inappropriate in view of the medical history, clinical manifestations and laboratory findings. There are several reasons for the misdiagnoses (diagnostic abuse), but most commonly they result from an inappropriately taken medical history, excessive trust in the patient, and willingness to help the patient in receiving higher compensation. Overdiagnosing is also caused by the conviction shared by physicians that a diagnostic error lies in non-detection of a disease or injury rather than in overdiagnosing the patient in order to avoid subsequent charges. This is why proceedings at law against physicians who have overdiagnosed injuries occur only sporadically.