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Increasingly, social media has become a major source of fake news, with disinformation used as a tool in manipulating public opinion and delegitimizing opposing voices. This study explores the influence of the content of social media on traditional media, and the proliferation of disinformation in the context of elections and accountability in Nigeria. Data were collected from 60 interviews and 18 focus group discussions with key stakeholders across Nigeria’s geo-political zones. The result shows the content of social media as shaping traditional media in addition to exacerbating pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions. The study recommends strengthening the positive elements of social media to weaken the threat posed by digital disinformation.

Growing misuse of social media calls for an urgent move towards greater legal regulation to control the menace of fake news, hate speech and disinformation among democracies. Online interactions have undergone an evolution that threatens not only free speech, privacy, data protection, national security but democracy as a whole. The subject matter assumes significance, in a democracy like India, which has recently notified a new regulatory regime - Information Technology Rules, 2021, that has fundamentally changed the regulation of online content in India. This development warrants revisiting the prior regulatory regimes to analyse the new rules and guidelines and their impact on public sphere. The fact-finding review paper aims at mapping the evolution of laws governing online content in India. The study is based on reviewing existing laws, regulations, policies, research papers, media reports and articles. It also seeks to explore the linkages between the legislative regulatory gaps and regulatory framework covering rules and principles on instances of internet governance to find solutions for future developments. After critically examining new guidelines, the study found a case of overreaching provisions that dilute free speech and privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article examines how governments can regulate the values of social media companies that themselves regulate disinformation spread on their own platforms. We use 'disinformation' to refer to motivated faking of news. We examine the effects that disinformation initiatives (many based on automated decision-making systems using Artificial Intelligence [AI] to cope with the scale of content being shared) have on freedom of expression, media pluralism and the exercise of democracy, from the wider lens of tackling illegal content online and concerns to request proactive (automated) measures of online intermediaries. We particularly focus on the responses of the member states and institutions of the European Union. In Section 1 , we argue that the apparent significance of the threat has led many governments to legislate despite this lack of evidence, with over 40 national laws to combat disinformation chronicled by March 2019. Which types of regulation are proposed, which actors are targeted, and who is making these regulations? Regulating fake news should not fall solely on national governments or supranational bodies like the European Union. Neither should the companies be responsible for regulating themselves. Instead, we favour co-regulation. Co-regulation means that the companies develop – individually or collectively – mechanisms to regulate their own users, which in turn must be approved by democratically legitimate state regulators or legislatures, who also monitor their effectiveness. In Section 2 , we explain the current EU use of Codes of Conduct. In Section 3 , we then explain the relatively novel idea that social media content regulation, and specifically disinformation, can be dealt with by deploying AI at massive scale. It is necessary to deal with this technological issue in order to explain the wider content of co-regulatory policy options, which we explain and for which we argue in Section 4. In Section 5 we explain what this means for technology regulation generally, and the socio-economic calculus in this policy field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]