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Water Quality Trading (WQT) and federal conservation programs such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) employ incentive payments to encourage agricultural best management practices (BMPs). In many cases, WQT and EQIP are encouraging the same types of farmers to implement the same types of BMPs using similar incentive payments. A number of analysts have recommended that WQT partner with EQIP to recruit farmers, yet the literature lacks an analysis of whether EQIP could adequately substitute for WQT's project selection process. In this article, we systematically compare the project ranking procedures used by WQT and EQIP and suggest which partnership structures might be most appropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trust and communication barriers have contributed significantly to the lethargic performance of many point-nonpoint source water quality trading programs--farmers are often reluctant to participate despite direct financial incentives--yet the literature lacks a comprehensive investigation of how the social context affects trading outcomes. We draw on social embeddedness theory to analyze three mechanisms of communicating with farmers and conduct a case study analysis of 12 water quality trading programs. We find that employing trustworthy third parties or embedded ties may reduce farmers' reluctance to participate, although the most effective mechanism ultimately depends on local conditions and program objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]