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The distributed training of federated machine learning, referred to as federated learning (FL), is discussed in models by multiple participants using local data without compromising data privacy and violating laws. In this paper, we consider the training of federated machine models with uncertain participation attitudes and uncertain benefits of each federated participant, and to encourage all participants to train the desired FL models, we design a fuzzy Shapley value incentive mechanism with supervision. In this incentive mechanism, if the supervision of the supervised mechanism detects that the payoffs of a federated participant reach a value that satisfies the Pareto optimality condition, the federated participant receives a distribution of federated payoffs. The results of numerical experiments demonstrate that the mechanism successfully achieves a fair and Pareto optimal distribution of payoffs. The contradiction between fairness and Pareto-efficient optimization is solved by introducing a supervised mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Federated learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning framework that enables scattered participants to collaboratively train machine learning models without revealing information to other participants. Due to its distributed nature, FL is susceptible to being manipulated by malicious clients. These malicious clients can launch backdoor attacks by contaminating local data or tampering with local model gradients, thereby damaging the global model. However, existing backdoor attacks in distributed scenarios have several vulnerabilities. For example, (1) the triggers in distributed backdoor attacks are mostly visible and easily perceivable by humans; (2) these triggers are mostly applied in the spatial domain, inevitably corrupting the semantic information of the contaminated pixels. To address these issues, this paper introduces a frequency-domain injection-based backdoor attack in FL. Specifically, by performing a Fourier transform, the trigger and the clean image are linearly mixed in the frequency domain, injecting the low-frequency information of the trigger into the clean image while preserving its semantic information. Experiments on multiple image classification datasets demonstrate that the attack method proposed in this paper is stealthier and more effective in FL scenarios compared to existing attack methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Federated learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning framework that can effectively help multiple players to use data to train federated models while complying with their privacy, data security, and government regulations. Due to federated model training, an accurate model should be trained, and all federated players should actively participate. Therefore, it is crucial to design an incentive mechanism; however, there is a conflict between fairness and Pareto efficiency in the incentive mechanism. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism via the combination of the Shapley value and Pareto efficiency optimization, in which a third party is introduced to supervise the federated payoff allocation. If the payoff can reach Pareto optimality, the federated payoff is allocated by the Shapley value method; otherwise, the relevant federated players are punished. Numerical and simulation experiments show that the mechanism can achieve fair payoff allocation and Pareto optimality payoff allocation. The Nash equilibrium of this mechanism is formed when Pareto optimality payoff allocation is achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]