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This paper examines the impact of implicit guarantees and capital regulations on the behavior of a bank and on the expected losses for its depositors. I show that implicit guarantees increase the incentives of the bank to enhance leverage and/or risk taking and that this leads to higher expected losses for its depositors. To reduce the adverse effects of moral hazard, policy measures have to be taken. However, a simple leverage ratio is likely to increase expected losses further and risk adjusted capital requirements do not necessarily affect highly leveraged banks with very low risk assets. A combination of both requirements can be successful. Positive long-term effects can be achieved by a reduction of moral hazard and informational imperfections. However, it is difficult to achieve these reductions and potentially severe short-term effects have to be taken into account.

This paper studies the impact of the banks’ portfolio holdings of financial derivatives on the banks’ individual contribution to systemic risk over and above the effect of variables related to size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and other balance sheet information. Using a sample of 95 U.S. bank holding companies from 2002 to 2011, we compare five measures of the banks’ contribution to systemic risk and find that the new measure proposed in this study, Net Shapley Value, outperforms the others. Using this measure we find that banks’ aggregate holdings of five classes of derivatives do not exhibit a significant effect on the bank’s contribution to systemic risk. On the contrary, the banks’ holdings of certain specific types of derivatives such as foreign exchange and credit derivatives increase the banks contributions to systemic risk whereas holdings of interest rate derivatives decrease it. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-performing loans over total loans and the leverage ratio have much stronger impact on systemic risk than derivatives holdings. Therefore, the derivatives’ impact plays a second fiddle in comparison with traditional banking activities related to the former two items.

This paper provides parametric estimates of technical change, efficiency change, economies of scale, and total factor productivity growth for large banks (those with assets in excess of $1 billion) in the United States, over the period from 2000 to 2005. This is done by estimating an output distance function subject to theoretical regularity within a Bayesian framework. We find that failure to incorporate theoretical regularity conditions results in mismeasured shadow revenue and/or cost shares, which in turn leads to perverse conclusions regarding productivity growth. Our results from the regularity-constrained model show that total factor productivity of the large US banks grew at an average rate of 1.98% over the sample period. However, our estimates also show a clear downward trend in the growth rate of total factor productivity and our decomposition of the primal Divisia total factor productivity growth index into its three components – technical change, efficiency change, and economies of scale – indicates that technical change is the driving force behind this decline.

During the housing bust of 2008–2009, housing prices and transaction volumes fell across the United Kingdom. Although the drop in prices was similar across housing types, transaction volumes fell more for units at the lower end of the market. I document this fact and provide panel and instrumental variable estimates showing its link with tightening credit conditions in England and Wales during 2008. I then use an overlapping-generation framework to relate the change in the composition of sales with the reduction in loan-to-value ratios by British banks and to derive additional predictions. As down-payment requirements increase, young households with scarce financial resources are priced out by older owners who retain their previous houses as rental properties when trading up. Recent changes in aggregate housing tenure, disaggregated changes in renting, and sales in areas with different age compositions, are consistent with these predictions. The results presented here show how the composition of sales changes over the housing cycle and may inform ongoing policy discussions about reduced access to home-ownership by the young.

This paper studies the welfare properties of mutual funds in a Diamond–Dybvig economy with two sources of aggregate risk: (i) shocks to long-term investment returns; and (ii) shocks to aggregate liquidity demand. Mutual funds are inefficient when the long-term investment is risky. Mutual funds improve upon autarky by introducing a wedge between the market and technological rates of return. However, the wedge distorts the decisions of consumers not facing liquidity shocks, and the resulting equilibrium is inefficient. If only aggregate liquidity demand is subject to shocks, mutual funds can implement the social optimum (even when liquidity demand is not directly observable) by means of a price-contingent dividend policy.

We study the impact of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit when bank lending is denominated in foreign currencies. Accessing a comprehensive supervisory dataset from Hungary, we find that the supply of bank credit in a foreign currency is less sensitive to changes in domestic monetary conditions than the equivalent supply in the domestic currency. Changes in foreign monetary conditions similarly affect bank lending more in the foreign than in the domestic currency. Hence when banks lend in multiple currencies the domestic bank lending channel is weakened and international bank lending channels become operational.

We investigate the effects of the announcement and the disclosure of the clarification, methodology, and outcomes of the US banking stress tests on banks' equity prices, credit risk, systematic risk, and systemic risk during the 2009-13 period. We find only weak evidence that stress tests after 2009 affected equity returns of large US banks. In contrast, CDS spreads declined in response to the disclosure of stress test results. We also find that bank systematic risk, as measured by betas, declined in some years after the publication of stress test results. Our evidence suggests that stress tests affect systemic risk.

This article presents a comprehensive framework for valuing financial instruments subject to credit risk. In particular, we focus on the impact of default dependence on asset pricing, as correlated default risk is one of the most pervasive threats in financial markets. We analyze how swap rates are affected by bilateral counterparty credit risk, and how CDS spreads depend on the trilateral credit risk of the buyer, seller, and reference entity in a contract. Moreover, we study the effect of collateralization on valuation, since the majority of OTC derivatives are collateralized. The model shows that a fully collateralized swap is risk-free, whereas a fully collateralized CDS is not equivalent to a risk-free one. Supplemental material at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tim_Xiao/publication/337157228_The_Impact_of_Default_Dependency_and_Collateralization_on_Asset_Pricing_and_Credit_Risk_Modeling/links/5ef0a4fc299bf1faac6cada3/The-Impact-of-Default-Dependency-and-Collateralization-on-Asset-Pricing-and-Credit-Risk-Modeling.pdf, https:://ia801501.us.archive.org/12/items/default-dependency-collateralization-7/default-dependency-collateralization-7.pdf

We exploit historically determined variation in local credit markets to identify the impact of bank lending on innovation across Russian firms. We find that deeper credit markets increase firms’ use of bank credit, their adoption of new products and technologies, and their productivity growth. This relationship is more pronounced in industries farther from the technological frontier, more exposed to import competition, and that export more. These impacts are also stronger for firms near historical R&D centers or railways and in regions with supportive institutions. Consistent with these results, credit markets contribute to economic growth in such regions.Authors have furnished a data set, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We study a controlled experiment in which a bank's loan officers were incentivized based on originated loan volume to encourage prospecting for new business. While treated loan officers did attract new applications, both extensive and intensive margins of loan origination expanded (+ 31% new loans; loan size + 15%). We find that loan officers gave greater weight to hard information in approval decisions. Despite no change in the observable characteristics of approved loans, their default rate increased (+ 24%). Finally, the bank's imputed credit default model lost its predictive power. Overall, loan prospecting incentives led to unfavorable soft information being overlooked in the origination process.

International audience; In this paper, we examine the costs and benefits of diversification and expansion into non-traditional activities on the bank level. Using detailed information on the US banking sector over the period 2002–2012, we investigate whether or not banks’ involvement in various business lines has been associated with higher risks and returns. Using cross-sectional analysis, we find evidence that banks’ expansion into non-traditional activities has lacked revenue and diversification benefits: The overall risks of non-traditional banks have been higher, while returns were not. A higher degree of diversification across traditional and certain non-traditional activities, on the contrary, has been associated with higher returns and risk-reduction benefits. The results thus indicate that diversification prior to the financial crisis proved effective in the crisis environment, whereas too high involvement in non-traditional businesses did not. These results hold for small and large banks, banks of different tax status and various profitability and risk measures.

When borrowers are delinquent, senior debtholders prefer liquidation, whereas junior debtholders prefer to maintain their option value by delaying resolution or modifying the loan. In the mortgage market, a conflict of interest (“holdup”) arises when servicers of securitized senior liens are also the owners of the junior liens on the same property. We show that holdup servicers are able to delay action on the first-lien mortgage. When they do act, servicers are more likely to choose resolutions that maintain their option value, favoring modification and soft foreclosures over outright foreclosures. Holdup behavior is more likely to result in borrower self-curing.

This paper investigates the importance of bank loans for the financing of startups and how location matters for expansion plans and financing. We will show that there has not been sufficient attention paid to legal form when distinguishing between the external and internal financing of startups. The focus will be on the corporate form of business and the implications of this legal form for what can be considered external financing. In the analysis of how location matters, we will draw upon the literature about agglomeration and knowledge spillovers. The two main questions posed are: How does the corporate form matter for what can be considered the external financing of startups, and how does location matter for expansion plans and financing? To provide empirical answers to these questions, both survey data and registry data have been used. The survey data are from a questionnaire sent out to startups listed in the files of the Swedish Jobs and Society Foundation. We looked at corporations founded during the period 2009-2013 that family firms in terms of ownership structure. The survey indicated that bank loans are rare and had to be backed up with personal assets used as collateral and personal guarantees of repayment for the majority of the firms who had used bank loans. Essentially, the entrepreneur personally takes most of the business risk. Bank loans have, to a large extent, the character of internal financing. Combining registry data with the qualitative data from the survey, we used regression analysis to further study differences due to location. The regression analysis showed that the degree of urbanization matters for plans for expansion. In the three most urbanized areas, the startup firms had plans to expand their business both at home and abroad. In the other urbanized areas, the focus was on expansion at home.

This paper shows that the sovereign debt crisis and the resulting credit crunch in the periphery of the Eurozone lead to negative real effects for borrowing firms. Using a hand matched sample of loan information from Dealscan and accounting information from Amadeus, we show that firms with a higher exposure to banks affected by the sovereign debt crisis become financially constrained during the crisis. As a result, these firms have significantly lower employment growth, capital expenditures, and sales growth rates. We show that our results are not driven by country or industry-specific macroeconomic shocks or a change in the demand for credit of borrowing firms. Thus, the high interdependence of bank and sovereign health and the resulting credit crunch is one important contributor to the severe economic downturn in the southern European countries during the sovereign debt crisis.

Using a novel way to identify relationship and transaction banks, we study how banks’ lending techniques affect credit constraints of small and medium-sized enterprises across emerging Europe. We link the lending techniques that banks use in the direct vicinity of firms to these firms’ credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle. We show that relationship lending alleviates credit constraints during a cyclical downturn but not during a boom period. The positive impact of relationship lending in a downturn is strongest for smaller and more opaque firms and in regions where the downturn is more severe. Additional evidence suggests that the reduction in credit constraints due to relationship lending helps to mitigate the adverse impact of an economic downturn on local firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of underperforming loans.

This study examines the exposure of microfinance institutions to liquidity-, interest rate and foreign exchange (FX) risk. Using manually collected data from microfinance institutions’ financial reporting, I find that the microfinance sector faces minimal liquidity risk, high interest rate risk and a lower than commonly assumed exposure to FX risk. Linking risk exposure to institutional characteristics, the data shows that legal status and regional affiliation are correlated with risk exposure while regulatory quality is not. Results suggest that the development community may not expect large benefits from expanding the plethora of current measures taken to mitigate liquidity or FX risk.

We study how debt market frictions that constrain the ability of firms to buffer a tightening in bank credit supply affect corporate yield spreads. We focus on the frictions driven by the regional availability of debt financing. We provide evidence of a strong regional segmentation in the debt market, and build a measure of debt inflexibility that captures the inability to replace bank loans with corporate bonds. We document that more inflexible firms suffer a bigger increase in yield spreads as bank credit tightens. The impact is stronger among smaller firms, lower rated firms, and firms relying more on bank debt. Further, more inflexible firms display a stronger link between yield spreads and cash flow volatility, a stronger link between yield spreads and stock volatility (Campbell and Taksler, 2003) as well as a closer connection between changes in yield spreads and stock returns.

Why does the market discipline that financial intermediaries face seem too weak during booms and too strong during crises? This paper shows in a general equilibrium setting that rollover risk as a disciplining device is effective only if all intermediaries face purely idiosyncratic risk. However, if assets are correlated, a two-sided inefficiency arises: Good aggregate states have intermediaries taking excessive risks, while bad aggregate states suffer from costly fire sales. The driving force behind this inefficiency is an amplifying feedback loop between asset values and market discipline. In equilibrium, financial intermediaries inefficiently amplify both positive and negative aggregate shocks.

In the years preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis, forward-looking indicators of bank risk concentrated and suggested unusually low expectations of bank default. We assess whether the ex-ante (i.e. prior to the crisis) cross-sectional variability in bank characteristics is related to the ex-post (i.e. during the crisis) materialization of bank risk. Our tailor-made dataset crucially accounts for the different dimensions of realized bank risk including access to central bank liquidity during the crisis. We consistently find that less reliance on deposit funding, more aggressive credit growth, larger size and leverage were associated with larger levels of realized risk. The impact of these characteristics is particularly relevant for capturing the systemic dimensions of bank risk and tends to become stronger for the tail of the riskier banks. The majority of these characteristics also predicted bank risk as materialized before the financial crisis.

© 2017 Elsevier B.V. We study the effect of mortgage prepayment penalties on borrowers’ prepayments and delinquencies by exploiting a 2007 reform in Italy that reduced penalties on outstanding mortgages and banned penalties on newly-issued mortgages. Using a unique dataset of mortgages issued by a large Italian lender, we provide evidence that: 1) before the reform, mortgages issued to riskier borrowers included larger penalties; 2) higher prepayment penalties decreased borrowers’ prepayments; and 3) higher prepayment penalties did not affect borrowers’ delinquencies. Moreover, we find suggestive evidence that prepayment penalties affected mortgage pricing, as well as prepayments and delinquencies through borrowers’ mortgage selection at origination, most notably for riskier borrowers.

Multi-market banks reallocate capital when local credit demand increases after natural disasters. Following such events, credit in unaffected but connected markets declines by about 50 cents per dollar of additional lending in shocked areas, but most of the decline comes from loans in areas where banks do not own branches. Moreover, banks increase sales of more-liquid loans in order to lessen the impact of the demand shock on credit supply. Larger, multi-market banks appear better able than smaller ones to shield credit supplied to their core markets (those with branches) by aggressively cutting back lending outside those markets.

We assess the effects of reforms in product and labor markets in a model economy featuring credit restrictions and pre-existing long-term debt. Both elements, which are core features of the current scenario faced by some euro area countries, combine to produce a slow and protracted deleveraging of the private sector and a persistent recession following a negative financial shock. In this environment, we show that product and labor market reforms may stimulate output and employment even in the short run, despite their defl ationary effects. Furthermore, by favoring a faster recovery of investment and collateral values, product market reforms bring forward the end of deleveraging and the exit from recession.

We examine the delinquency rate for mortgages originated before and after the 2008 financial crisis, using a novel and large representative panel obtained by merging data from tax records and credit registers. First, we estimate the selection into the mortgage market using an exogenous index of local credit supply as exclusion restriction. Second, controlling for selection we estimate the impact of income shocks on the probability of recording a delinquency. We find that since 2008 the selection process operated by banks has led to the halving of the delinquency rate. Conditional on mortgage origination, a job loss nearly doubles the delinquency risk. Estimates uncorrected for selection are subject to severe downward biased.

Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription. Using an international panel of 104 countries over the period 1995–2012, we analyze the relationship between country-level securitization and economic activity. Our findings suggest that securitization is negatively related to various proxies of economic activity – even prior to the crisis of 2007–2009. We explain this finding as the results of securitization spurring consumption at the expense of investment and capital formation. Consistent with this, we find that securitization of household loans is negatively associated with economic activity, whereas business securitization displays a weak positive association with it, and that household securitization increases an economy's consumption-investment ratio. Our results inform recent initiatives aimed at reviving securitization markets, as they indicate that the impact of securitization crucially depends on the underlying collateral.

Using account-level credit card data from six major commercial banks from January 2009 to December 2013, we apply machine-learning techniques to combined consumer tradeline, credit bureau, and macroeconomic variables to predict delinquency. In addition to providing accurate measures of loss probabilities and credit risk, our models can also be used to analyze and compare risk management practices and the drivers of delinquency across banks. We find substantial heterogeneity in risk factors, sensitivities, and predictability of delinquency across banks, implying that no single model applies to all six institutions. We measure the efficacy of a bank's risk management process by the percentage of delinquent accounts that a bank manages effectively, and find that efficacy also varies widely across institutions. These results suggest the need for a more customized approached to the supervision and regulation of financial institutions, in which capital ratios, loss reserves, and other parameters are specified individually for each institution according to its credit risk model exposures and forecasts.

The CLASS model is a top-down capital stress testing framework that uses public data, simple econometric models and auxiliary assumptions to project the effect of macroeconomic scenarios on U.S. banking firms. Through the lens of the model, we find that the total banking system capital shortfall under stressful macroeconomic conditions began to rise 4 years before the financial crisis, peaking in the fourth quarter of 2008. The capital gap has since fallen sharply, and is now significantly below pre-crisis levels. In the cross-section, banking firms estimated to be most sensitive to macroeconomic conditions also have higher capital ratios, consistent with a “precautionary” view of bank capital, though this behavior is evident only since the crisis. We interpret our results as evidence that the resiliency of the U.S. banking system has improved since the financial crisis, and also as an illustration of the value of stress testing as a macroprudential policy tool.

The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a prior connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner’s confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Personal connections to top executive branch officials can matter greatly even in a country with strong overall institutions, at least during a time of acute financial crisis and heightened policy discretion.

This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the impact of macroprudential regulation on bank’s financial decisions and the implications for the real sector. I explicitly incorporate costs and benefits of capital requirements. I model an occasionally binding capital constraint and approximate it using an asymmetric non linear penalty function. This friction means that the banks refrain from valuable lending. At the same time, countercyclical buffers provide structural stability to the financial system. I show that higher capital requirements can dampen the business cycle fluctuations. I also show that stronger regulation can induce banks to hold buffers and hence mitigate an economic downturn as well. Increasing the capital requirements do not seem to have an adverse effect on the welfare. Lastly, I also show that switching to a countercyclical capital requirement regime can help reduce fluctuations and raise welfare.

A bank that lends on the unsecured market requires compensations for facing the default risk of the borrowing bank (credit risk) and the risk associated to its own future funding needs (liquidity risk). In this paper, we propose a quadratic term-structure model of the spreads between unsecured and risk-free interbank rates. Our no-arbitrage econometric framework allows us to decompose the term structure of spreads into credit and liquidity components and to identify risk premia associated with each of these two risks. Our results suggest that, over the period 2012–2013, most of the reduction in interbank spreads comes from a decrease in liquidity-related risk components.

An individual bank can put the whole banking system at risk if its losses in response to shocks push losses for the system as a whole above a critical threshold. We determine the contribution of banks to this systemic risk using a generalisation of the Shapley value; a concept originating in co-operative game theory. An important feature of this approach is that the order in which banks fail in response to a shock depends on the composition of the banks’ asset portfolios and capital buffers. We show how these factors affect banks’ contributions to systemic risk, and the extent to which these contributions depend on the level of the critical threshold.

Although, according to uncovered interest rate parity, exchange rates should move so as to prevent the carry trade being systematically profitable, there is a vast empirical literature demonstrating the opposite. High interest currencies more often tend to appreciate rather than depreciate, as noted by Fama (1984). In this paper, we treat volatility as the critical state variable and show that positive returns to the carry trade are overwhelmingly generated in the low-volatility “normal” state, whereas the high-volatility state is associated with lower returns or with losses as currencies revert to the long run level approximated by their mean real exchange rate – in other words, purchasing-power parity (PPP) tends to reassert itself, at least to some extent, during periods of turbulence. We confirm these results by comparing the returns from three possible monthly trading strategies: the carry trade, a strategy which is long the undervalued and short the overvalued currencies (the “fundamental” strategy) and a mixed strategy which involves switching from carry trade to fundamentals whenever the previous period's volatility was in the top quartile. We are left with the anomalous (but apparently robust) result that the mixed strategy appears to generate higher returns and Sharpe ratios than either of the pure strategies.

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system and to stimulate bank competition, it is necessary to raise the level of bank information transparency. However, empirical studies which examine the determinants of competition in the financial sector, the effect of competition on financial stability, or the relationship between transparency and bank stability, leave aside the link between transparency and competition. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. To test the hypothesis that greater bank information disclosure is associated with lower market power and lower concentration in the banking system, we use country-level data covering 213 countries. The years under consideration are 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010, which correspond to the years of the World Bank's Banking Regulation and Supervision Survey rounds. Our findings do not always support the conventional wisdom: countries with higher levels of transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and competition is less pronounced. The effect from information disclosure grows – for both concentration and market power – with an increase of bank credit risks.

Financement et commerce international : une revue de la litterature Ce papier propose une revue de la litterature consacree aux liens entre financement et commerce international. Nous montrons tout d’abord que les firmes et les secteurs les plus fragiles financierement exportent moins que les autres. De meme, un developpement financier insuffisant et la survenance de crises financieres reduisent d’autant plus les exportations que l’entreprise ou le secteur depend fortement du financement externe. Ensuite, les outils de financement du commerce international, tels que les lettres de credit ou l’assurance-credit export, constituent un puissant canal de transmission des chocs financiers au commerce international. Enfin, nous insistons sur la complexite des liens entre finance et commerce international. D’une part, la causalite entre les deux spheres est en fait reciproque. D’autre part, il existe des interactions institutionnelles entre les reformes financieres et les politiques commerciales.

We analyze the profitability of government-owned banks’ lending to their owners, using a unique data set of relatively homogeneous government-owned banks; the banks are all owned by similarly structured local governments in a single country. Making use of a natural experiment that altered the regulatory and competitive environment, we find evidence that such lending was used to transfer revenues from the banks to the governments. Some of the evidence is particularly pronounced in localities where the incumbent politicians face significant competition for reelection.

We use data on UK banks’ minimum capital requirements to study the interaction of monetary policy and capital requirement regulation. UK banks were subject to both time-varying capital requirements and changes in interest rate policy. Tightening of either capital requirements or monetary policy reduces the supply of lending. Lending by large banks reacts substantially to capital requirement changes, but not to monetary policy changes. Lending by small banks reacts to both. There is little evidence of interaction between these two policy instruments. The differences in the responses of small and large banks, and the lack of interaction between capital requirement changes and monetary policy, have important policy implications. Our results confirm the theoretical consensus view that monetary policy should focus on price stability objectives and that capital requirement changes are a more effective tool to achieve financial stability objectives related to loan supply. We also identify important distributional consequences within the financial system of these two policy instruments. Finally, our findings do not corroborate theoretical models that raise concerns about complex interactions between monetary policy and macroprudential variation in capital requirements.

This paper unveils a new resource for macroeconomic research: a long-run dataset covering disaggregated bank credit for 17 advanced economies since 1870. The new data show that the share of mortgages on banks’ balance sheets doubled in the course of the twentieth century, driven by a sharp rise of mortgage lending to households. Household debt to asset ratios have risen substantially in many countries. Financial stability risks have been increasingly linked to real estate lending booms, which are typically followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Housing finance has come to play a central role in the modern macroeconomy.

We describe the background, design choices, and particular details of stress tests used as part of an overall supervisory regime, that is, their formal integration into the ongoing prudential supervision of banks and other large financial institutions. We then describe how the US Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and Dodd-Frank Act stress testing (DFAST) regime is designed and what that means for the macroprudential versus microprudential nature of US supervisory exercises. We argue that routine stress tests have the potential to substantially change the nature of the supervisory process. We also argue that a great deal depends on the philosophy underpinning modeling decisions, which has not received as much attention as scenario design, disclosure, or other stress test design choices.

Shocks emanating from and propagating through the banking system have recently gained interest in the macroeconomics literature, yet they are not a feature unique to the 2008/09 financial crisis. Banking disintermediation shocks occured frequently during the Great Inflation era due to fixed deposit rate ceilings. I estimate the effect of deposit rate ceilings inscribed in Regulation Q on the transmission of federal funds rate changes to bank level credit growth using a historic bank level data set spanning half a century from 1959 to 2013 with about two million observations. Measures of the degree of bindingness of Regulation Q suggest that individual banks’ lending growth was smaller the more binding the legally fixed rate ceiling. Interaction terms with monetary policy suggest that the policy impact on bank level credit growth was non-linear at the ceiling “kink” and significantly larger when rate ceilings were in place. At the bank level, short-term interest rates exceeding the legally fixed deposit rate ceilings identify bank loan supply shifts that disappeared with deposit rate deregulation and thus weakened the credit channel of monetary transmission since the early 1980s.

This paper exploits a unique data set on bank-firm relationships based on syndicated loan deals to examine the effect of banks’ credit risk and capital on firms’ risk and performance. Our data set is a multilevel cross-section, which essentially allows controlling for all bank and firm characteristics through respective fixed effects, thus avoiding concerns regarding omitted variables. We find that banks with higher credit risk are associated with more risky firms, with lower profitability and market value. In turn, we find that banks with higher risk-weighted capital ratios lend to riskier firms with less market value. Our results are indicative of a strong adverse selection mechanism and highlight the need to monitor the risky banks more closely, especially as we consider large and influential syndicated loan deals.

The financial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks and has led policy makers to propose regulation of banks’ remuneration packages. We explain why poor incentives for traders cannot be fully resolved by only regulating the bank’s top executives, and why direct intervention in trader compensation is called for. We present a model with both trader moral hazard and adverse selection on trader abilities. We demonstrate that as competition on the labour market for traders intensifies, banks optimally offer top traders contracts inducing them to take more risk, even if banks fully internalize the costs of negative outcomes. In this way, banks can reduce the surplus they have to offer to lower ability traders. In addition, we find that increasing banks’ capital requirements does not unambiguously lead to reduced risk-taking by their top traders.

This paper examines the impact of the recent global financial crisis on the cost of debt capital (syndicated loans) in a leading emerging market, namely China, using difference-in-differences and GARCH approaches. Before the crisis China adopted banking reforms allowing entry of foreign banks and more domestic participation in the syndicated loan market. As a result, during the crisis the volume of syndicated loans grew steadily, in contrast to other countries. In addition, the amount of foreign syndicated loans decreased and average maturity increased compared to the pre-crisis period. Our findings provide useful information to policy makers to devise effective responses to financial crises.

Group cooperation is fundamental to human society. The public goods game is often used to describe the difficulty of group cooperation. However, there are other structures of institutions to maintain group cooperation such as Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). ROSCAs are informal financial institutions that exist worldwide, in which all participants contribute to a common fund and take turns to receive a return. ROSCAs are common in developing countries and among migrant groups in developed countries. There are various types of ROSCAs, and they share a crucial problem in that participants whose turn to receive a return has passed have an incentive to default on their contributions. We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the mechanisms that can prevent default in a fixed ROSCA, in which the order of receipt of returns is determined before starting and is also known to members. The findings are as follows. (i) Excluding low contributors from ROSCA groups by voting increased contribution rates both before and after the receipt of returns. (ii) ROSCA members exhibited reciprocity and a sense of revenge: that is, members contributed to the returns payments of other members who had contributed to them, and did not contribute to the returns payments of non-contributors. Voluntary behaviors thus sustained ROSCAs. Meanwhile, an exogenous punishment whereby subjects were prevented from receiving returns payments unless they had themselves contributed previously did not increase contribution rates.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the combination of institutional factors and tech­nology advances as determinants for the choice of payment instruments. The theoretical set up suggests that countries that enter into a new institutional environment adopt the attitudes of the accepting group towards the payment choices as a consequence of institutional pressure and tech­nology development. We apply the results of the model to the European Union enlargement process of 2004. Our findings confirm the relevance of both institutional environment and technology de­velopment in retail payment choice decisions particular to Central and Eastern European Countries. First published online 2 November 2015

In this paper we analyse aggregate and firm level systemic risk for US and European banks from 2004 to 2012. We observe that common systemic risk indicators are primarily driven by firm size which implies an overriding concern for “too-big-to-fail” institutions. However, smaller banks may still pose considerable systemic threats, as exemplified by the Northern Rock debacle in 2007. By introducing a simple standardisation, we obtain a new risk measure that identifies Northern Rock as a top ranking systemic institution up to 4 quarters before its bailout. The new indicator also appears to have a superior ability to predict which banks would be affected by the most severe stock price contractions during the 2007-2009 sub-prime crisis. In addition we find that a bank’s balance sheet characteristics can help to forecast its systemic importance and, as a result, may be useful early warning indicators. Interestingly, the systemic risk of US and European banks appears to be driven by different factors.

Tighter capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation are among the most prominently advocated regulatory measures to reduce excessive risk-taking in the banking industry. We analyze the interplay of the two instruments in an economy with two heterogenous banks that can fund uncorrelated projects with fully diversifiable risk or correlated projects with systemic risk. If both project types are in abundant supply, we find that full mandatory deferral of compensation is beneficial as it allows for weaker capital requirements, and hence for a larger banking sector, without increasing the incentives for risk-shifting. With competition for uncorrelated projects, however, deferred compensation may misallocate correlated projects to the bank which is inferior in managing risks. Our findings challenge the current tendency to impose stricter regulations on more sophisticated institutes.

We test whether adverse changes to banks' market valuations during the financial and sovereign debt crises, and the associated increase in banks' cost of funding, affected firms' real decisions. Using new data linking over 3,000 non-financial Italian firms to their bank(s), we find that increases in banks' CDS spreads, and decreases in their equity valuations, resulted in lower investment, employment, and bank debt for younger and smaller firms. These effects dominate those of banks' balance-sheet variables. Moreover, CDS spreads matter more than equity valuations. Finally, higher CDS spreads led to lower aggregate investment and employment, and to a less efficient resource allocation.

This paper shows that politicians’ pressure to climb the career ladder increases bank risk exposure in their region. Chinese local politicians are set growth targets in their region that are relative to each other. Growth is stimulated by debt-financed programs which are mainly financed via bank loans. The stronger the performance pressure the riskier the respective local bank exposure becomes. This effect holds for local banks which are under some control of local politicians, it has increased with the release of stimulus packages requiring local co-financing and it is stronger if politicians hold chairmen positions in bank boards.

We analyze the impact of non-compliance with a requirement similar to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio and its impact on bank intermediation applying Regression Discontinuity Designs. Using a unique dataset on Dutch banks, we show that non-compliance with a liquidity requirement causes banks to pay and charge higher interest rates as well as to increase borrowing and decrease lending on the long-term interbank market. Apart from lending rates, the short-term market is unlikely to be affected by the requirement. While non-compliance with a liquidity requirement does not seem to directly affect corporate lending rates, we find evidence that institutions with a liquidity deficiency turn to the long-term interbank rate as reference for lending to non-financial institutions.

Using a sample of 161 global banks in 23 countries, we examine the applicability of market-based structural models and accounting-based bank fundamentals to price global bank credit risk. First, we find that variables predicted by structural models are significantly associated with bank CDS spreads. Second, some CAMELS indicators contain incremental information for bank CDS prices. We find no evidence in favor of one model over the other, while the combined structural and CAMELS model performs better than each individual model. Moreover, leverage and asset quality have had a stronger impact on bank CDS since the onset of the recent financial crisis. Banks in countries with lower stock market volatility, fewer entry barriers, and/or more financial conglomerate restrictions tend to have lower credit risk. Deposit insurance appears to have an adverse effect on bank CDS spreads, indicating a moral hazard problem.

We provide empirical evidence for the existence, magnitude, and economic cost of stigma associated with banks borrowing from the Federal Reserve's Discount Window (DW) during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We find that banks were willing to pay a premium of around 44 basis points (bps) across funding sources (126 bps after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) to avoid borrowing from the DW. DW stigma is economically relevant as it increased some banks' borrowing cost by 32 bps of their pre-tax return on assets (ROA) during the crisis. The implications of our results for the provision of liquidity by central banks are discussed.