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El presente trabajo de investigación aborda las particularidades del control de la legalidad de las decisiones de la regulación bancaria, en el marco del actual sistema de supervisión financiera, desde una perspectiva del derecho administrativo español y europeo. En particular, se analizan las situaciones derivadas de la reforma implementada en la última década en la Unión Europea para establecer un sistema único de regulación bancaria en la eurozona, tanto en el ejercicio de las funciones de control de los supervisores, como en el ejercicio de la potestad de resolución bancaria. This research addresses the particularities of the control of the legality of banking regulation within the framework of the current financial supervi-sion system, from a Spanish and European Administrative Law perspective. It undertakes a particular analysis of the situations derived from the reform implemented in the last decade in the European Union to establish a single system of banking regulation in the eurozone, and considers not only the supervisor’s control functions, but also the power of bank resolution.

O conceito de ‘Finanças Verdes’ surgiu como uma resposta à necessidade de compatibilizar a economia global com os esforços para combater as alterações climáticas e assim, prosseguir um desenvolvimento ambientalmente sustentável. Para o sistema financeiro, esta abordagem implica tratar dos riscos financeiros relacionados com o clima, que resultam dos impactos adversos das alterações climáticas, assim como das externalidades negativas decorrentes da transição para uma economia neutra na emissão de carbono. No entanto, os bancos centrais e os quadros regulamentares existentes negligenciaram até então estas fontes de risco, resultando numa ausência de informação financeira e nãofinanceira relativa à exposição dos bancos a riscos climáticos e numa potencial falta de credibilidade em produtos financeiros verdes e sustentáveis. Esta pesquisa visa definir, caracterizar e analisar os riscos financeiros relacionados com o clima no sector bancário, incluindo os desafios de adaptação das carteiras de empréstimos aos fatores de transmissão micro e macroeconómicos de riscos físicos e transitórios. Em particular, centra-se no papel da regulação e supervisão financeira, bem como dos bancos centrais no panorama internacional e, em particular, da União Europeia, a fim de assegurar um sistema financeiro sólido e estável face aos crescentes impactos adversos das alterações climáticas, nomeadamente na transformação dos fundamentos económicos e na mudança das preferências dos consumidores em direção a uma economia sustentável. Esse papel poderá implicar um alargamento dos mandatos dos supervisores financeiros e dos bancos centrais a fim de considerarem fatores de sustentabilidade nas suas tomadas de decisão. Seguindo uma abordagem tradicional baseada no risco, analisam-se os principais instrumentos micro e macroprudenciais à luz dos três pilares dos Acordos de Basileia, bem como possíveis alterações à política monetária e aos seus instrumentos financeiros tradicionais. The concept of "Green Finance" emerged as a response to the need of aligning the global economy with the efforts to fight climate change and thus, pursuing an environmentally sustainable development. For the financial system, this includes addressing climate-related financial risks, which arise from the adverse impacts of climate change, and the negative externalities of the transition to a carbonneutral economy. However, central banks and the existing regulatory frameworks have traditionally neglected these sources of risk, resulting in a lack of financial and non-financial information on banks' exposure to climate risks and a lack of trust in green and sustainable financial products. This research aims to define, characterise and analyse climate-related financial risks in the banking sector, including the challenges in adapting lending portfolios to physical and transitional micro and macroeconomic transmission channels. In particular, it focuses on the role of financial regulation and supervision, as well as central banks, in the international landscape (especially in the context of the European Union) to ensure a sound and stable financial system in light of the rising negative effects of climate change, the changing economic fundamentals, and shifting consumer preferences towards a sustainable economy. Furthermore, supervisors and central banks may be persuaded to prioritise sustainability factors in their decision-making processes, which may entail an extension of their mandates. Using a traditional risk-based approach, key micro and macroprudential instruments are analysed in the light of the three pillars of the Basel Accords, as well as possible changes to monetary policy and its traditional financial instruments.

The phenomenal growth of cryptocurrencies raises important questions about their footprint on the financial system. What role are traditional financial intermediaries playing in cryptocurrency markets and what drives their engagement? Are new nodes emerging? We help answer these questions by leveraging a novel global supervisory database of banks' cryptocurrency exposures and by synthesising a range of complementary data sources for other types of institutions. We find that major banks' exposures currently remain at very modest levels. Across countries, higher innovation capacity, more advanced economic development, and greater financial inclusion are associated with a higher likelihood of banks taking on cryptocurrency exposures. We show that substantial activity is concentrated in lightly regulated crypto exchanges. This "shadow crypto financial system" serves both retail and institutional clients, such as dedicated investment funds. An uneven regulatory treatment across banks and crypto exchanges and significant data gaps suggest that a proactive, holistic and forward-looking approach to regulating and overseeing cryptocurrency markets is needed. It should focus on ensuring a more level playing field with regard to financial services provided by established financial institutions and intermediaries in the emerging crypto shadow financial system by introducing more stringent regulatory and supervisory oversight for the latter.

El presente trabajo de investigación aborda las particularidades del control de la legalidad de las decisiones de la regulación bancaria, en el marco del actual sistema de supervisión financiera, desde una perspectiva del derecho administrativo español y europeo. En particular, se analizan las situaciones derivadas de la reforma implementada en la última década en la Unión Europea para establecer un sistema único de regulación bancaria en la eurozona, tanto en el ejercicio de las funciones de control de los supervisores, como en el ejercicio de la potestad de resolución bancaria. This research addresses the particularities of the control of the legality of banking regulation within the framework of the current financial supervi-sion system, from a Spanish and European Administrative Law perspective. It undertakes a particular analysis of the situations derived from the reform implemented in the last decade in the European Union to establish a single system of banking regulation in the eurozone, and considers not only the supervisor’s control functions, but also the power of bank resolution.

We exploit the establishment of a supranational supervisor in Europe (the Single Supervisory Mechanism) to learn how the organizational design of supervisory institutions impacts the enforcement of financial regulation. Banks under supranational supervision are required to increase regulatory capital for exposures to the same firm compared to banks under the local supervisor. Local supervisors provide preferential treatment to larger institutes. The central supervisor removes such biases, which results in an overall standardized behavior. While the central supervisor treats banks more equally, we document a loss in information in banks' risk models associated with central supervision. The tighter supervision of larger banks results in a shift of particularly risky lending activities to smaller banks. We document lower sales and employment for firms receiving most of their funding from banks that receive a tighter supervisory treatment. Overall, the central supervisor treats banks more equally but has less information about them than the local supervisor.

In recent years, as more and more regulators have begun to assume the role of supervision and oversight over credit bureau(s), the World Bank Group has supported supervisors in understanding and carrying out their duties as it relates to this role. The WBG has supported the development of the credit bureau supervisory framework and the capacity to supervise these systems in several countries, including Morocco, the West African Monetary Union, Jordan, Bhutan, and the Bahamas. In addition, the WBG has provided light touch assistance on the supervision of credit bureaus in several Caribbean countries including Jamaica, Belize, the OECS, Guyana and Suriname. The WBG has facilitated study tours for regulators to markets where credit bureau supervision processes are established, thereby enabling the exchange of experiences and information between regulators. Such study tours include mock audits of the credit bureau in the host country, where possible. The mock audits provide the visiting regulators with an opportunity to mimic the processes that would be followed in case of an audit. This primer draws upon the WBG’s experience across various markets and intended to provide regulators, policymakers, practitioners and financial sector specialists with a general overview of what the licensing and supervision of a credit bureau entails.

International audience; In the light of recurrent systemic crises that financialized market economies have been experiencing since the 1980s, this article seeks to determine the conditions required for a regulatory framework apt to ensure financial stability. Drawing upon an Institutionalist Minskyian endogenous financial instability approach, the article studies the fragilities of liberalized finance and points to some policy alternatives able to lead to an alternative financial regulatory model that is consistent with macroeconomic stability. It argues that in a weak regulatory environment financial markets naturally generate instabilities that could turn into systemic crises. The analysis maintains that in order to deal with such crises, a tight supervision should be framed under the aegis of public authorities and suggests some rules to develop a relevant regulatory system through an open and democratic decision process. Two points then deserve particular attention : a macro-prudential approach that regards instability as a systemic (non-individual) issue, and a preventive approach that aims at preventing systemic-risk generating activities from taking control over the markets.

La idoneidad y conducta adecuada son cualidades especialmente meritorias en los funcionarios de las instituciones financieras; garantizan el desarrollo de un sistema económico con estabilidad e integridad financiera. A diferencia de otros riesgos de naturaleza cuantitativa, tales como el riesgo de crédito y el riesgo de mercado, estos elementos cualitativos que forman parte de la cultura ideal al interior de las instituciones financieras, son componentes complejos que requieren un estudio particular para luego poder ser incluidos en la regulación y supervisión financiera. El presente trabajo de investigación plantea una serie de criterios en relación, tanto con la idoneidad como con el riesgo de mala conducta, como aspectos que podrían ser incorporados en la regulación y la supervisión de la Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y Administradoras Privadas de Fondos de Pensiones del Perú. The suitability and appropriate conduct are particularly worthy qualities in the officials of financial institutions; they guarantee the development of an economic system with stability and financial integrity. However, unlike other risks of quantitative nature, such as credit risk and market risk, these qualitative elements which form a unit in the culture within financial institutions are complex components that require research and development, before being included in financial regulation and supervision. This research develops a series of criteria associated with both suitability and misconduct risk, and proposes aspects that could be incorporated into the regulation and supervision applicable by the Superintendence of Banking, Insurance and Private Pension Funds Administrators of Peru.

The study presents the main stages of the development of the European financial supervisory regulation and the current European System of Financial Supervision. The financial economic crisis highlighted the weaknesses in the supervisory system and the fact that the supervisor has an important role in consumer protection and in the mitigation of risk-taking by financial institutions. The European Union has developed a new financial strategy known as Banking Union, which has a three-pillar framework. These three pillars are the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and the Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme. This system is intended to achieve a single economic and monetary union at supranational level and to avoid the emergence of a new crisis as far as possible.

Following the 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis many countries have changed their financial supervisory architecture by increasing the involvement of central banks in supervision. This has led many scholars to argue that financial crises are an important driver in explaining the evolution of the role of central banks as supervisors. In this paper, we formally test whether there is any link between supervisory reforms and the occurrence of financial crises. We study the evolution of financial sector supervision by constructing a new database that captures the full set of supervisory reforms implemented during the period 1996-2013 in a large sample of countries. Our findings support the view that systemic banking crises are important drivers of reforms in supervisory structure. However, we also highlight an equally important “bandwagon” effect, namely a tendency of countries to reform their financial supervisory architecture when others do so as well. Our finding can explain how it is possible to identify a political driver in reforming the supervisory settings notwithstanding the economic theory does not indicate an optimal institutional setting. We construct several measures of spatial spillover effects and show that they can explain institutional similarities among countries and impact the probability of reforming the role of the central bank in financial sector supervision. We also stress the importance of the degree of central bank independence in the choice to concentrate financial supervision in the hands of the central bank. Our results support the view that the traditional theory of central banking has to be integrated with political economy considerations.Our results support the view that the traditional theory of central banking has to be integrated with political economy considerations.

In 2009, the G20 embarked on an ambitious financial regulatory reform agenda to address the fault lines that caused the global financial crisis. Although the global benefits are expected to outweigh the overall costs, these reforms could produce cross-border adverse spillover effects to individual emerging markets and developing economies that are not required to implement the reforms themselves, but are affected by their implementation elsewhere. To improve the evidence base on such potential adverse impacts, the World Bank has undertaken qualitative surveys of senior officials at regulatory agencies, local banks, and global banks that are active in seven emerging markets and developing economies. While important caveats prevent the formulation of definitive conclusions, the survey finds that banks and regulators routinely have different perspectives on the impacts. Most banks claim adverse effects on financial products, services, and markets; regulators broadly expect the effects to be positive over the longer term, but some recognize they may be negative during the transition phase. Regulators tend to agree that the (potential for) spillover impacts demand stronger home-host coordination, impose a higher supervisory burden, and require a stronger role for the international community to monitor and evaluate the impacts. The findings also emphasize the need for regulatory consistency within and between jurisdictions to ensure a level playing field. Taken together, more work remains to better understand the nature of these spillover effects, how they shape the provision of commercial financing to meet developmental objectives, and what action can be taken to mitigate any adverse impacts.

Purpose: The purpose of the paper is to identify the factors that affect the development of the models of financial market state supervision and to identify the factors that have influenced the evolution of the supervision model in Poland. Methodology: critical analysis of literature, legal provisions and documents. Findings: The completely integrated and the fully dispersed model of supervision are located at the opposite ends of the spectrum. A variety of the hybrid models can be identified between them. Factors that affect supervision organization are both economic and non-economic. Factors that have influenced the Polish model of supervision include political aspects, administration costs and, in due course, also the development of the financial market. Research implications: The variety of state supervision structures, combined with the ambiguity and multiplicity of factors that affect their evolution create a new research challenge. Significant problems in accessing documents have been identified. Originality: The author presents an overview of models of state supervision of financial markets and factors affecting the evolution and structure of supervision. Conclusions drawn from the analysis were used to identify factors that influence the evolution and supervision of the Polish financial market.

Zagrożenia wynikające z niewłaściwego uregulowania działalności instytucj należących do bankowości równoległej mogą dotknąć zarówno ich klientów, jak i całego systemu finansowego. Zostało to dostrzeżone przez władze finansowe w Polsce (Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego, Narodowy Bank Polski), a także w Unii Europejskiej (Komisja Europejska, Europejski Bank Centralny) oraz w skali światowej (Komisja Stabilności Finansowej). Jednakże zadanie właściwego uregulowania funkcjonowania bankowości równoległej jest dopiero w początkowej fazie realizacji i wymaga od wymienionych instytucji jeszcze wiele pracy.

The Central Bank of Chile (Banco Central de Chile, BCCh) and Chile’s Ministry of Finance, in their letter of January 9th, 2015, requested the World Bank to undertake a stand-alone Review of Standards and Codes (ROSC) module of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) of the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO). The main tool used by the assessment was the CPSS-IOSCO Assessment Methodology for the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure and the Responsibilities of Authorities”. Each of the FMIs and Chilean authorities, the Banco Central de Chile (BCCh), the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS) and the Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (SBIF) – completed a self-assessment for the PFMI and the Responsibilities of Authorities, respectively. On this basis, the WBG team and the local team conducted detailed interviews with senior and mid-level managers of all the respective institutions, and prepared the assessment reports. In addition to the self-assessments, other sources of information included the applicable laws and regulations, as well as each FMI’s main policies and internal documents (e.g. detailed policies, and processes and procedures for certain key areas) which were shared by the FMIs with the assessors, and other information available at each FMI’s website (e.g. statistics). The WBG and local teams also met with a number of users of these FMIs, including two large commercial banks and two brokers-dealers that are not part of local bank-lead conglomerates.

European Union countries offer a unique experience of financial regulatory and supervisory integration, complementing various other European integration efforts following the second world war. Financial regulatory and supervisory integration was a very slow process before 2008, despite significant cross-border integration especially of wholesale financial markets.However, the policy framework proved inadequate in the context of the major financial crisis in the EU starting in 2007, and especially in the euro area after 2010. That crisis triggered major changes to European financial regulation and to the financial supervisory architecture, most prominently with the creation of three new European supervisory authorities in 2011 and the gradual establishment of European banking union starting in 2012. The banking union is a major structural institutional change for the EU, arguably the most significant since the introduction of the euro. Even in its current highly incomplete form, and with no prospects for rapid completion, the banking union has improved financial supervision in the euro area and increased the euro area’s resilience. Asian financial integration lags well behind Europe, and there is no comparable political and legal integration. Nevertheless, Asia can draw useful lessons from European experiences in multiple areas that include the harmonisation of the micro-prudential framework, proper macro-prudential structures, and participation in global financial authorities.

An increasing number of countries show a trend towards a certain degree of consolidation of powers in financial supervision, which has resulted in the establishment of unified regulators, that are different from the national central banks. By contrast a high involvement of the central bank in supervision seems to be correlated with a multi-authorities regime (central bank fragmentation effect). This paper, using a simple application of a general common agency game, sheds light on which conditions the politicians prefer when implementing an unified sector supervision outside the central bank. From a theoretical point of view the quality of public sector governance plays a crucial role in determining the supervision unification. Focusing on the behaviour of the “good” policymaker (helping hand type), it will prefer a unified financial authority that is different from the central bank if the correspondent welfare gains-linked to at least one of the three effects: moral hazard, conflict of interest, bureaucracy—are considered higher respect to the information losses. The “bad” policymaker (grabbing hand type) will choose the single financial authority if the financial industry likes it, and the central bank is not a captured one. On the other hand, the paper tests the model, confirming the robustness of the institutional position of the central bank in explaining the recent trend in supervision consolidation, with an empirical analysis performed with ordered functions on an updated dataset.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to review current trends in reforms of the supervisory architecture in European Union (EU) countries.Design/methodology/approach – Against the background of the debate on the advisability of further centralizing prudential supervision in the EU this paper develops a study of applied institutional economics, analyzing the financial supervisory architecture of each of the 27 EU countries and assesses their degree of institutional convergence. The paper investigate whether the recent wave of reforms are leading to a convergence of the national architectures.Findings – While the degree of supervisory convergence is low, there is no single superior model of bank supervision.Originality/value – The paper contributes to the debate on convergence of supervisory architectures in EU member countries.

The European Commission's Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) from 1999 is a key document in the political process of building a common framework for financial markets in the EU area. The FSAP and financial regulation at the EU member state level are derived from a complicated mix of policy objectives. Decisions to regulate are based on a very broad spectrum of analysis and research. Important analytical contributions come from financial economics and company and capital market law. Within the framework of the stated policy objectives, both economists and jurists have analysed the need for and the likely effect of different types of regulatory instruments. The aim of the present paper is to combine regulatory objectives and research contributions in a systematic way. The classification system developed by the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) is applied to categorise the relevant research contributions. Observations in a so-called ‘Objectives/Research Category Matrix’ based on a large sample of references reveal some interesting patterns. There seem to be some systematic differences in the objective orientation of researchers belonging to different JEL-categories. Different academic disciplines approach issues of regulation in different ways and with different analytical paradigms. Researchers whose publications are classified in JEL-category G. Financial Economics, have particularly focused on protection against systemic risk, ensuring company efficiency and ensuring market efficiency. Researchers belonging to JEL-category K. Law and Economics, are primarily concerned with the objective of ensuring company efficiency, market efficiency and to some extent stakeholder protection.

Мета статті полягає у дослідженні відмінностей між поняттям “фінансовий нагляд” та поняттями “фінансове регулювання” і “фінансовий контроль” та їх розмежування. У результаті дослідження було доведено, що фінансовий нагляд є взаємозалежним від фінансового регулювання і ґрунтується на адекватній законодавчій та методологічній базі фінансового регулювання. Обґрунтовано, що фінансовий нагляд є особливим видом контрольної діяльності держави і має частково спільну мету із фінансовим контролем та спільний методичний інструментарій. Перспективами подальших досліджень у даному напрямі є визначення співвідношення вітчизняної практики фінансового нагляду, фінансового регулювання і фінансового контролю в діяльності органів державної влади. Цель статьи заключается в исследовании различий между понятием “финансовый надзор” и понятиями “финансовое регулирование” и “финансовый контроль” и их разграничение. В результате исследования было доказано, что финансовый надзор является взаимозависимым от финансового регулирования и основывается на адекватной законодательной и методологической базе финансового регулирования. Обосновано, что финансовый надзор является видом контрольной деятельности государства и имеет частично общую цель с финансовым контролем и общий методический инструментарий. Перспективами дальнейших исследований в данном направлении является определение соотношения отечественной практики финансового надзора, финансового регулирования и финансового контроля в деятельности органов государственной власти. The goal of the article lies in the study of differences between the “financial supervision” notion and “financial regulation” and “financial control” notions. In the result of the study the article proves that financial supervision is interdependent on financial regulation and is based on the adequate legislative and methodological base of financial regulation. The article shows that financial supervision is a type of control activity of the state and has a partially common goal and common methodical instruments with financial control. The prospect of further studies in this direction is identification of relations of the domestic practice of financial supervision, financial regulation and financial control in the activity of bodies of state power.

The European Banking Union (EBU) suddenly entered the EU’s agenda at the beginning of the summer of 2012, after the idea had been floating around for a few months. Since then, the design of the project and the efforts for its implementation have been proceeding rather quickly. Considering the importance and the political and technical difficulties of EBU, the speed of advancement has been surprising even if, while finalizing this paper, many among both the protagonists and the commentators of this venture seem unsatisfied as they find that the glass looks more half empty than half full and they think that the dysfunctional European banking sector would require a more radical and less gradual reform process.

The global financial crisis challenged the existing architecture for financial services regulation and supervision in the European Union (EU). This article first examines the new pieces of legislation that were issued by the EU in the wake of the crisis, as well as substantial revisions of existing EU legislation. Second, it conducts an overall assessment of the reforms implemented and highlights some open issues that were underscored by the crisis and that were only partially addressed afterward. It is argued that the framework for financial regulation and supervision in the EU after the crisis is still poorly equipped to deal with (or to prevent) future financial crises mainly because of the political constraints encountered during the reform process. One of the most important lessons to be drawn is that political factors are as important as (if not more important than) economic factors in shaping financial services regulation and supervision in the EU (and, arguably, elsewhere). © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

In the wake of the recent economic and financial crisis there is a vivid discussion among academics and practitioners regarding financial regulation and supervision in individual countries, in the European Union and in the world as a whole. The foremost reason for such interest in this subject derives from the role that appropriate legislation and supervision have in ensuring financial stability. Financial stability has been introduced as the new policy goal, although what instruments are to be used and who would do that has not been quite fixed yet. But all agree that regulation and supervision of financial sectors are indispensable for financial stability. In this regard the last financial crisis was somewhat fortunate. This is because it disclosed significant gaps in the current state of knowledge about the nature of financial systems and economic policy in general. In addition it revealed that existing financial regulation and supervision have only exacerbated the crisis. Against this background this dissertation explores and assesses the changes and current state of financial regulation and supervision in the EU. The objective is to determine whether the existing European regulatory and supervisory system (at the supranational level) with its theoretical rationale, objectives and instruments, is adequate to sustain financial stability across the EU (at both national and supranational level) and whether it benefits all financial sectors. The focus is primarily on supranational, EU rules and arrangements ; when the focus shifts to "EU countries", it is solely on Italy and Croatia. Following an interdisciplinary analysis of four building blocks in finance (i.e. financial assets, financial transactions, financial institutions and financial markets) the thesis determines what could be considered as appropriate regulation and efficient supervision that would support financial stability across the EU and at the same time accommodate the needs of future EU members (particularly those of transition economies such as Croatia). In this respect, the thesis argues that the perspective of EU membership puts completely different requirements in front of transition economies, than those put before other EU countries. Namely, it gives predominance to the needs of European enterprises, banks and other financial intermediaries, before these countries have even managed to secure their own social and economic objectives. Hence, the "EU commitment" requires them to forsake an immense part of their national determination in economy and to serve primarily "common needs". In this regard, the "uniformity" brought by EU financial regulation and supervision will damage transition economies the most. Putting aside the political aspect of membership negotiations, the thesis argues that the economic requirements put before transition countries should have been different. In fact, in the case of transition economies "uniformity" shouldn’t have been the goal of EU regulation at all ; the goal should have been to enhance the operation of national economic systems. Simply put, transition economies are too diverse from other "ordinary" EU Member States to be molded into a "single rulebook". Thus, the thesis suggests that centralization is not the appropriate way forward in the development of EU financial regulation. It is true that the recent financial crisis has challenged the understanding of financial regulation and supervision and of the complex relationship between financial and political integration within the EU. But it has also given an opportunity to further explore the interdependence between (de)centralization and financial stability. Although for the time being it seems as the debate regarding "regulatory control" between the national and supranational level is over in favor of greater supranational control of regulation, it remains to be seen whether this environment will equally benefit all EU countries. It is possible that excessive centralization and "regulatory uniformity" will blur the specific interests of smaller EU Member States (especially those of transition economies) in the bigger picture of the "European common good" (that is financial stability for the purpose of the thesis). Regardless of the regulatory and economic success achieved by EU integrations and the significant share of sovereignty delegated by Member States to the EU, the role of nation states still cannot be dismissed. European policymakers cannot proceed on the assumption that the EU may be on the way of becoming a perfectly integrated "super-state". They should accept the restraints of integration – both from their political and economic aspect. The nation states are still a reality, and even when part of a sui generis political and economic integration such as the EU, their regulatory diversity and the right to safeguard national economic interests should be acknowledged.

This paper assesses the determinants of the recent wave of financial supervision reforms, reviewing six different views concerning the determinants of financial supervision architectures: economic view, market view, law view, political view, geography view and institutional view. The empirical tests provide first support for this view: in a setting characterized by a central bank traditionally less involved in supervision a unified model of supervision seems to be more likely to occur. The role of central bank involvement in supervision still holds when its level of monetary independence is taking in account. Furthermore, the probability that a country will move toward a unified model is higher: the smaller the overall size of the economy; when the legal framework is characterized by German and Scandinavian roots. Therefore, also the economic size view and the law view matter.

The bachelor thesis deals with problem of institutional structure of financial regulation and supervision in Czech Republic and European Union. Thesis is divided into three parts. First part includes explanation of basic terms connected with regulation and supervision. Second part is dedicated to theoretical description of alternatives of institutional structure, integration trend and situation of institutional structure of regulation and supervision in EU. Third part is focused on development of institutional structure in Czech Republic and sums up its success. In third part is also mentioned possible integration trend of regulation and supervision of European financial markets.

Hipotekarna kriza je povzročila eno izmed največjih finančnih in kasneje gospodarskih kriz po veliki depresiji v tridesetih letih. Pojem hipotekarne krize se prvenstveno omejuje na ozemlje Združenih držav Amerike, čeprav se je kasneje razširil po vseh ostalih kontinentih. Izvor krize je v sekundarnem trgu hipotekarnih posojil in novih, kompleksnih ter računalniško podprtih finančnih instrumentih. Zaradi vse večje želje po zaslužku ter konstantne rasti cen nepremičnin so finančne institucije odobravale posojila s slabimi zavarovanji in brez preverjanja kreditnih bonitet posojilojemalcev. Prevladoval je kratkoročni pogled v prihodnost. Banke so na podlagi danih posojil posojila preko posebej za ta namen ustanovljenih podjetij listinile ter vrednostne papirje prodajale na trgu za zagotavljanje konstantnega denarnega toka. Ob spremembi monetarne politike in ostalih dejavnikov so se razmere na trgu zaostrile in povzročile množične prodaje in padce cen nepremičnin ter posledično izpad denarnega toka, ki je bil podlaga za izdajo vrednostnih papirjev. Slednji so tako ostali brez donosov, po mnogih pa tudi ni bilo povpraševanja. Tako ameriške kot tudi evropske banke, ki so absorbirale velike količine »okuženih« vrednostnih papirjev, so bile zaradi nične vrednosti primorane papirje odpisati, kar je povzročilo milijardne izgube ali celo propade nekaterih finančnih ustanov. Zaradi visokega tveganja, nezaupanja ter strahu na medbančnem in sploh celotnem finančnem trgu se je zaostrilo tudi poslovanje v gospodarskem sektorju. Zaradi visoke integriranosti finančnih sistemov je »okužba« z neverjetno hitrostjo ohromila tako vse evropske kot tudi svetovne sisteme. Države so pričele z ukrepi, ki bi v prvi vrsti omogočili preživetje določenim subjektom, v drugi vrsti pa oživili celoten finančni in gospodarski sistem. Finančna kriza je pokazala pomanjkljivosti tako v regulativi kot v nadzoru evropskega finančnega sistema. Finančne institucije pri svojem poslovanju tveganj, s katerimi so se soočale, niso upoštevale v zadostni meri. K temu je največ pripomogla regulacija, ki je dopuščala takšno poslovanje. Na podlagi različnih priporočil in mnenj se je ureditev že pričela spreminjati ter se bo tudi v prihodnosti. Banke bodo morale upoštevati strožja pravila, ki bodo zagotavljala večjo stabilnost v stresnih situacijah. Druge finančne institucije, ki so v preteklosti delovale v zaledju bančništva in so bile podvržene manjši regulaciji in nadzoru, bodo v prihodnosti morale upoštevati strožja pravila, saj okužba teh podjetij, tako kot bank, pomeni potencialno nevarnost za celotno stabilnost finančnega sistema. Število nadzornikov in njihove pristojnosti bodo okrepljeni. S tem se bo zagotovilo sodelovanje različnih institucij, ki bodo s skupnimi znanji, spoznanji, informacijami ter infrastrukturo zmožne hitrega opozarjanja ter tako preprečevanja dogodkov, ki bi bili potencialni sovražnik stabilnosti finančnega sistema. Mortgage crisis has caused one of the major financial and later on also economical crisis after the Great depression in thirties. The term mortgage crisis had been primarily constricted to the territory of the United States of America, however, later on it has spread over other continents as well. The roots of mortgage crisis lie in the secondary market of mortgage loans and in new, complex and computer supported financial instruments. In the eagerness of receiving higher incomes and because of the constant growth of real estate prices, financial institutions started to grant mortgage loans against ineligible collateral and without providing a comprehensive prudential assessment of borrowers. Short-sided vision of future prevailed. By means of securitization of issued loans through special purpose vehicles banks ensured themselves a constant cash flow for the future. When monetary policy and other factors changed, conditions on markets drowned and further caused mass real estate selling, price depression and consequently loss of cash flow which was the basis for issuing securities. There was no yield and almost no demand for structured financial instruments. Because of that, many American and European banks which absorbed »toxic« securities had to write-off trillions of assets which caused many solvency problems and in some cases bankruptcies as well. Due to high risks, fear and lack of confidence in interbank and financial system as a whole many problems arose also in real sector. Because of highly integrated financial system the financial crisis has contributed to paralization of not only European but also other systems worldwide. Firstly countries began rescuing systems and secondly regaining financial and real sectors with different approaches. Financial crisis has shown several defects in financial regulatory and supervisory framework. Financial institutions failed to assess properly the risks to which they were exposed. The responsibility for that rests with the financial and other regulation. By means of numerous recommendations and opinions the regulation is now being amended and reshaped and it will be changed further also in the near future. Banks will have to take into consideration stricter regulations which will contribute to higher stability rate in stressful situations. Financial institutions in the so called »shadow banking system« which were in the past almost unregulated will now be subject to much stricter regulation because like banks, the fragility of »shadow banking institutions« also has potential threat to financial stability as a whole. The number of supervisors and their competence will be strengthened. New supervisors will contribute to higher rate of interaction between national supervisors. This will enable a stronger cooperation between competent authorities which will be in this way - with common knowledge, recognitions, informations and infrastructure - able to provide an early warning and thus prevent events which would be a potential threat to the financial stability.

This paper provides an overview of the regulation and supervision of the Belgian financial system from the creation of Belgium in 1830 to the early 21st century. After severe crises, the National Bank of Belgium was created in 1850. The Great Depression led to further reforms, increasing the role of the government, especially through the establishment of the Banking Commission. In the post-war period, reforms were driven by changes in the financial landscape, especially an increasing role for market forces. In line with the despecialisation process, the responsibilities of the Banking Commission were gradually extended, becoming, in 2004, the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission. Moreover, at the turn of the millennium, the role of the NBB in financial stability matters was enhanced.