Search

SYNOPSIS: In this study, we investigate whether individual auditors are associated with the comparability of their clients' financial statements, based on a sample of Chinese companies audited by ten large audit firms. We demonstrate that individual auditors have an incremental effect on comparability, beyond the office-level effect. We also find that the style of individual auditors is stronger when they are affiliated with Big 4 audit firms (compared to non-Big 4 large audit firms) and when they are industry experts. In addition, two possible channels of enhanced comparability are identified: (1) clients' accounting flexibility, which provides opportunities for auditors to exert influences; and (2) individual auditors' characteristics, such as age, position, and academic degree, which affect auditors' abilities to exert influence. Our results are robust to alternative comparability and industry expertise measures, to various sampling methods, and to corrections for potential endogeneity problems. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether monitors are likely to compromise their monitoring objectivity in the face of economically important clients in international business settings. In the context of external auditing and assurance services, we measure monitor objectivity by whether auditors are more (or less) likely to issue to their important clients modified audit opinions, that is, audit opinions provided to outside investors about the firm that demotes explicit areas of concern. Using a large cross-country sample, we document that auditors are more likely to issue modified opinions to their economically important clients relative to other clients. Furthermore, we find that this association is stronger (1) for Big N auditors, (2) for multinational audit clients, and (3) in countries with stronger legal regimes. These results suggest that monitors prioritize the protection of their reputation over lucrative economic relationships, and such information certification function is more pronounced for international auditors, multinational client firms, and in strong legal regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]