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This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in and bailout policies on banks’ funding costs, incentives for loan monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two investment stages, a full bail-in turns out to be, ex post, the optimal policy to deal with a failing bank. Unlike a bailout, it allows the government to recapitalize the bank without resorting to distortionary taxes. As a consequence, however, investors expect bail-ins rather than bailouts. Ex ante, this raises banks’ cost of debt and depresses bankers’ incentives to monitor. When moral hazard is severe, this time inconsistency leads to a credit market collapse in which productive projects are not financed, unless the government precommits to an alternative resolution policy. The optimal policy is either a combination of bail-in and bailout—in which the government uses a minimal amount of public transfers to lower banks’ cost of debt—or liquidation, depending on the severity of moral hazard and the shadow cost of the partial bailout. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Using Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data on cross-border bank flows across 128 countries and over two decades, we find that heightened bank flows are associated with improved financial stability in a recipient country’s bank system. The reductions in marginal expected shortfall (MES) are concentrated among network-central banks and especially those in less concentrated banking sectors. Higher bank flows are also associated with improvements in bank asset quality, efficiency, and profitability in recipient markets. We interpret these new findings as consistent with predictions from recent models of bank globalization that emphasize a competition channel for bank risk-taking.

Purpose Capital, risk and liquidity are the vitality of the banking industry, which can improve the efficiency of banking and promote the efficiency of resource allocation. The purpose of this study is to examine how Basel III new liquidity ratios affect bank capital and risk adjustments and how banks respond to the new liquidity rules. Design/methodology/approach The authors adopted the system generalized method of moments (GMM) to examine how Basel III new liquidity ratios affect bank capital and risk adjustments and how banks respond to the new liquidity rules. Based on the call reports data from banks, GMM was used to test the hypotheses that new liquidity ratios affect bank capital and risk adjustments, as well as how banks respond to the regulation. Findings The results indicate banks targeted capital, risk and liquidity and simultaneously coordinate short-term adjustments in capital and risk. New liquidity measures enable banks to coordinate risk and liquidity decisions. Short-term adjustments in new liquidity rules inversely impact bank capital. Short-term adjustments in new liquidity rules inversely impact bank capital and capital adjustments adversely affect changes in the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). Research limitations/implications The primary results revealed that Ghanaian banks simultaneously coordinate and target capital, risk exposure and liquidity level. Also, capital adjustments positively influence risk adjustments and vice versa while bidirectional negative coordination exists between bank capital and risk on one hand and liquidity on the other hand. Short-term adjustments in new liquidity rule inversely impact bank capital and capital adjustments adversely affect changes in the LCR. The findings partially confirm the theoretical predictions of Repullo (2005) regarding the negative links between capital, risk and liquidity but the authors have higher capital induces higher risk. Practical implications Banks should balance off their targeted risk and liquidity in order not to sacrifice capital accumulation for liquidity. Originality/value This research offers new contributions in the research of bank management of capital and liquidity toward banks during a financial crisis from a theoretical perspective and trust management from an applicative perspective.

Purpose Systemic risk has been a cause of concern for the bank regulatory authorities worldwide since the global financial crisis. This study aims to identify systemically important banks (SIBs) in India by using SRISK to measure the expected capital shortfall of banks in a systemic event. The sample size comprises a balanced data set of 31 listed Indian commercial banks from 2006 to 2019. Design/methodology/approach In this study, the authors have used SRISK to identify banks that have a maximum contribution to the systemic risk of the Indian banking sector. Leverage, size and long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) are used to compute SRISK. Forward-looking LRMES is computed using the GJR-GARCH-dynamic conditional correlation methodology for early prediction of a bank’s contribution to systemic risk. Findings This study finds that public sector banks are more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks owing to their capital inadequacy vis-à-vis the private sector banks. This study also emphasizes that size should not be used as a standalone factor to assess the systemic importance of a bank. Originality/value Systemic risk has attracted a lot of research interest; however, it is largely limited to the developed nations. This paper fills an important research gap in banking literature about the identification of SIBs in an emerging economy, India. As SRISK uses both balance sheet and market-based information, it can be used to complement the existing methodology used by the Reserve Bank of India to identify SIBs.

PurposeThis paper aims to establish the effect of bank regulations on financial stability in Kenya. Specifically, the study seeks to uncover the effect of micro and macro prudential regulations on financial stability and their trade-offs or complementarities.Design/methodology/approachUsing annual time series data over the period 1990–2017, the study uses structural equation model (SEM) estimation technique. This solves the problem of approximating measurement errors, using both latent constructs and indicator constructs.FindingsStudy findings reveal that macro and micro prudential regulations are significant drivers of financial stability. Further, prudential regulations are more effective when they complement each other.Research limitations/implicationsThis study centers on how bank regulations affect financial stability. Future research could be carried out on the effect of Non-Bank Financial Institutions regulations on financial system stability.Practical implicationsComplementing macro and micro prudential regulation is more effective and efficient in ensuring stability of the financial system other than letting the two policy objectives operate independently.Social implicationsRegulatory authorities should introduce prudential regulations that would encourage innovations in the banking sector. This ensures easy deposit mobilization that enhances financial inclusion. Prudential regulations that ensure financial stability will be effective when low income earners are included in the financial system.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the role of banking regulations on financial stability. This study is also pioneering in the use of SEM estimation technique, in examining how prudential regulations affect financial stability. Previous cross-country studies have focused on macro prudential regulations ignoring the importance of micro prudential regulations.

PurposeThis paper focuses on the relationship between the regulatory capital requirements and the supply of credit for commercial banks that are operating in the MENA region from 1999 till 2017.Design/methodology/approachThe application of the Fixed Effects Model on a panel of commercial banks in the MENA region has shown a negative relationship between supply of credit and both the capital requirements and solvency ratios.FindingsThe results showed that the idiosyncratic, the macroeconomic and the institutional variables affect the supply of credit behavior of banks. The robustness tests using the Two-Stage Least Square method (2SLS) also led to a negative correlation between the growth of credit and capital requirements. Specific macroeconomic and institutional variables have revealed the expected sign and are significant regardless of the estimated specifications.Research limitations/implicationsThis work can be subjected to further future extensions. The explanatory power of our model can be improved by incorporating variables that reflect the corporate governance and structure of banking sector. Similarly, we can also include a variable that takes into account the increasing competition that could affect the stability of the banking sector and therefore the prudential banking regulation.Originality/valuePrevious studies that investigated only the relationship between capital level and risk-taking behavior of banks in the MENA region did not take into account neither the economic and institutional environment nor the impact of these regulations on credit (loans) supply.

This study delivers new empirical evidence on the impact of banking regulations on the levels of social and financial efficiency of microfinance institutions (MFIs) between the years 2012 to 2018. The sample consisted of data from 172 MFIs from ASEAN-5 countries. As the first stage of the analysis, data envelopment analysis (DEA) was employed to determine a score of the level of social and financial efficiency for the sampled MFIs. Meanwhile, panel regression analysis and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator were used to examine the impact of banking regulations on the level of social and financial efficiency of the sampled MFIs. The findings showed that the sampled MFIs achieved a lower level of social efficiency while attaining a higher level of financial efficiency. The lower level of social efficiency indicated that the sampled MFIs had lost their focus on poverty reduction, while at the same time, switching their focus toward financial sustainability. The empirical findings also showed a significant impact of bank regulation and bank supervision on the levels of social and financial efficiency. Overall, bank regulation negatively influenced the level of social efficiency and bank supervision impacted the level of financial efficiency of the sampled MFIs positively. The findings from this study provide new insights for bank regulators and policymakers to construct regulatory frameworks that are relevant to the operation of MFIs.

This research aims to analyze the effect of bank scale and Loan to Deposit Ratio toward profita-bility within the credit risk as moderating variable in banking companies that listed on 2014-2018 Indonesia Stock Exchange. The population of this research include of banking companies that has listed on 2014-2018 Indonesia Stock Exchange. The sampling technique used purposive sam-pling, in order to obtain 28 companies within 5 years of observations to 140 observations. The data analysis used Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 25. The data analysis technique was done by residual test. The results of this research showed that bank scale has posi-tive and significant influence on profitability, loan to deposit ratio has no influence on profitabil-ity, the risk of bank is unable to moderate the effect of bank scale on profitability and the risk of bank is unable to moderate the effect of loan to deposit ratio on profitability. The scale of bank and loan to deposit ratio can explain the profitability of 27.3% while the other 72.7% was ex-plained by other variables outside of study. It is recommended for companies to increase supervi-sion of asset management, thus the scale of bank will be better and maintain the balance of LDR based on Indonesian Bank regulation number 15/ 7/ PBI / 2013 Article 10 of 78-92% with the aim of increasing profitability.

Mortgage lending plays a key role in providing citizens with housing. However, the processes of obtaining and servicing a mortgage loan are associated with the provision of a large number of interconnected finan-cial services, each of which requires a quality relationship with the consumer. The article proposes to discuss a number of basic indicators and approaches to increase the protection of financial services consumers in mortgage lending, as well as instruments of influence on financial organizations providing such services. In particular, it is proposed to fix the numerical value of the maximum debt burden on the borrower as an indicator of a sustainable mortgage loan, as well as factors taken into account when calculating it at any time during the life of the loan, and not only at the time of its issuance.

The study sought to determine the effect of bank regulation and level of nonperforming loans in commercial banks in Nakuru County Kenya. The specific objectives of the study were to explore the effect of capital adequacy on the level of nonperforming loans in commercial banks in Nakuru County Kenya, to find out the effect of asset quality on the level of nonperforming loans in commercial banks in Nakuru County Kenya, to evaluate the effect of liquidity management on the level of nonperforming loans in commercial banks in Nakuru County Kenya, to examine the effect of management efficiency on the level of nonperforming loans in commercial banks in Nakuru County Kenya and to determine the moderating effect of macroeconomic factors on the relationship between bank regulation and level of nonperforming loans. The literature review focused on portfolio theory of investment, capital asset pricing theory and the capital buffer theory of capital adequacy. The primary data was collected using structured questionnaires and secondary data was collected from the banking survey 2017 and central bank of Kenya annual supervisory reports. The study employed multiple linear regression analysis and the finding revealed that there exist a negative and statistically insignificant relationship between capital adequacy and non-performing loans. It was also observed that there exist a negative and statistically insignificant relationship between liquidity management and non-performing loans. On the other hand, there exist a positive and statistically significant relationship between asset quality and non-performing loans. Similarly, there exist a positive and statistically insignificant relationship between management efficiency and non-performing loans. Finally, the findings indicated that macroeconomic factors have moderating effect on the relationship between bank regulations and non-performing loans in commercial banks in Nakuru County. It was concluded that asset quality positively influences non-performing loans while management efficiency influence positively the non-performing loans. Similarly, liquidity management exerts a negative influence on non-performing loans. Finally, capital adequacy influence negatively on non-performing loans. The study recommends that Central Bank of Kenya should regularly access lending behavior to ensure compliance with banking regulations to avoid increasing incidences of non-performing loans. In addition, Central Bank of Kenya should closely monitor banks with deteriorating asset quality. Further, Central Bank of Kenya should strictly monitor the economic sector and ensure that banks provide adequate provisions for loans to mitigate risks of default. Furthermore, banks should maintain a good balance on deposits and lending out loans and adhere to regulators decisions about monetary policies. Finally, banks should increase the operational efficiency of operation weakness and improve corporate governance on the sanction of loans and Central Bank of Kenya should focus on managerial performance in order to detect banks with potential increases in non-performing loans.

Most people may not be familiar with industrial banks (IBs). Yet these financial institutions have been around for more than a century and predate the establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1913. Throughout the industry’s history, the only way a non-financial firm could enter banking was through the establishment of an IB. The reason was that the Federal government over the years has enacted legislation to block the entry of commercial firms into banking. By 1999, commercial firms had just one remaining point of entry: the acquisition or formation of an IB. A few years later, a flurry of news stories occurred in 2005, when retail giant Wal-Mart filed an application for an IB. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) held public hearings on Wal-Mart’s application and declared moratorium on new IB insurance applications. The controversy was defused when Wal-Mart withdrew its application for federal deposit insurance before the FDIC made a ruling. We examine the evolving role of regulation designed to prevent non-financial firms from owning banks and demonstrate the performance and regulation of IBs over time challenge the justification and necessity of such a separation.

We explore the impact of supervision on the riskiness, profitability, and growth of U.S. banks. Using data on supervisors' time use, we demonstrate that the top‐ranked banks by size within a supervisory district receive more attention from supervisors, even after controlling for size, complexity, risk, and other characteristics. Using a matched sample approach, we find that these top‐ranked banks that receive more supervisory attention hold less risky loan portfolios, are less volatile, and are less sensitive to industry downturns, but do not have lower growth or profitability. Our results underscore the distinct role of supervision in mitigating banking sector risk.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine how banking regulation and supervision affect the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). It proposes performance of the MFIs from the aspect of social and financial efficiency because the MFIs nowadays not only view to sustain the social role of poverty eradication but in the same time they must strive the financial sustainability to maintain the operation in long run. This study also includes the macroeconomic condition and firm level variables to control for social and financial efficiency of the MFIs. Design/methodology/approach The data consists 168 MFIs from five countries in Southeast Asia from year 2011 to 2017. First stage of analysis is to identify level of social and financial efficiency by using data envelopment analysis approach. Second stage is to examine impact of bank regulation and supervision to the social and financial efficiency by applying panel regression analysis and generalized method of moments for robust estimation methods. Findings The finding shows the MFIs own lower social efficiency and higher score in financial efficiency. This indicates in pursuing financial sustainability, the MFIs in Southeast Asia countries have lost sight of their original mission of poverty reduction. Furthermore, the result also presents a significant impact of bank regulation and supervision to the social and financial efficiency of the MFIs. However, the results appear in different direction when more negative effect is associated with social efficiency. This specifies that bank regulation and supervision are not appropriate to accommodate the social needs, thus hampering the effort of poverty reduction by the MFIs. Research limitations/implications The present study only concentrates on the impact bank regulation and supervision to the performance of the MFIs. As the operation of the MFIs currently has been largely exposed in banking operation, it is suggested that future studies to look for other special issues such as country governance that might influence specifically in social and financial aspect of the MFIs. Practical implications The empirical findings from this study could be useful and may have significant implications for the regulators. The regulators or policymakers could establish the new regulation framework that fulfil the dual needs (social and financial) of the MFIs. Furthermore, the empirical findings also could serve as guidance to regulators and decision-makers in designing new policies for a sustainable and competitive sector of the MFIs. Although the MFIs recently brings a similar role as commercial banks, they need to retain the social aspects as that is the original mission of the MFIs Originality/value The present study proves that the bank regulation and supervision have brought a significant influence to the performance of the MFIs in ASEAN 5 countries.

This paper empirically examines how banks' dividend policy, the institutional environment, and banking regulation affects banks' profitability using panel data of a sample of 567 banks, mainly from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, for 2004–2015. It further examines whether the effect of the institutional environment and banking regulation varies for crisis and noncrisis years. The estimation results reveal that banks' dividend policy influences positively banks' profitability, whereas higher levels of the institutional environment or stricter banking regulation reduces banks' profitability. The negative effect of the institutional environment and banking regulation was of lower magnitude during the global financial crisis, followed by the Eurozone crisis, and for less‐developed countries and larger banks.

This paper offers two new explanations for banks' home bias in government bond holdings: a sovereign‐based rating cap on corporates and the existence of a ‘bank tax.’ These are complementary to the four explanations offered in the literature: risk‐shifting, gambling for resurrection, moral suasion, and a means to store liquidity for financing future investment. Collectively, they cast doubt on the European Union's demand‐led approach to investment in European safe bonds (ESBies) by banks in low‐rated countries. Bank regulations such as constraints on large exposure or risk‐based capital on credit risk concentration will be needed if the objective is to break the so‐called ‘deadly embrace.’

Purpose Following the recent global financial crisis, US regulatory agencies issued laws to implement the Basel III accords to ensure the resiliency of the US banking sector. Theories predict that enhanced regulations may alter credit issuance of the regulated banks due to increased capital requirements, but the direction of changes might not be straightforward especially with respect to the agricultural loans. A decrease in credit availability from banks might pose a serious problem for farmers who rely on bank credit especially during economic recessions. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach In this study, the impact of Basel III regulatory framework implementation on agricultural lending in the USA is examined. Using panel data of FDIC-insured banks from 2008 to 2017, the agricultural loan volume and growth rates are examined for agricultural banks and all US banks. Findings The results show that agricultural loan growth rates have slowed down, but the amount of agricultural loan volume issuance still remained positive. More detailed examination finds that regulated agricultural banks have decreased both the agricultural loan volume and their loan exposure to the agricultural sector, showing a possible sign of credit crunch. Originality/value This study examines whether the implementation of the Basel III regulation has resulted in changes in agricultural loan issuance by US banks as predicted by the lending channel theory.

This paper examines changes in bank capital and capital regulations since the global financial crisis, in the Europe and Central Asia region. It shows that banks in Europe and Central Asia are better capitalized, as measured by regulatory capital ratios, than they were prior to the crisis. However, the increase in simple equity ratios for the same banks has been smaller over the past 10 years. The increases in regulatory capital ratios have coincided with a reduction in the stringency of the definition of Tier 1 capital and reduction in risk-weights. We further analyze the relationship between bank capital and bank risk using individual bank data. We show that bank risk in Europe and Central Asia is more sensitive to changes in simple leverage ratios than changes in regulatory capital ratios, consistent with the notion that equity ratios only include high-quality capital and do not rely on internal risk models to compute risk-weights. Although there has been some effort to increase capital and liquidity requirements for institutions deemed systemically important, the region has been lagging in addressing the resolution of these institutions. In line with Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2013), our findings show the importance of the definition of bank capital to assure bank financial stability in Europe and Central Asia.

The evaluation of data based on environmental, social sustainability and respon-sible corporate governance-related factors (together: ESG), and the assessment of companies and of investments made in them on this basis, has hitherto es-sentially taken place within a market-based evaluative framework developing in an entirely evolutive manner. However, ESG has gained so much importance on capital markets in recent years that the voices calling for some of its aspects to be regulated anyway have grown increasingly louder. This is particularly the case in the banking sector, where – contrary to asset man-agement – ESG has seldom been in the spotlight thus far. As a reaction to this, the ESG approach is set to gradually materialise within EU bank regulation in the coming years, primarily in the context of risk management expectations and re-porting requirements, as well as in bank supervision. The new rules may present a significant challenge on less developed markets, and thus for Hungarian banks, principally in the area of data collection. Compliance will nevertheless have the positive benefit of enabling credit institutions to gain a more accurate picture of how sustainably their clients operate, and how resistant they are to climate change and other megatrends, as well as to the related sweeping and profound economic, social and regulatory changes.

We measure the impact of bank capital requirements on corporate borrowing and expansion. We use French loan-level data and take advantage of the transition from Basel I to Basel II. While under Basel I the capital charge was the same for all firms, under Basel II, it depends in a predictable way on both the bank's model and the firm's risk. We exploit this two-way variation to empirically estimate the sensitivity of bank lending to capital requirement. This rich identification allows us to control for firm-level credit demand shocks and bank-level credit supply shocks. We find very large effects of capital requirements on bank lending: A 1 percentage point decrease in capital requirement leads to an increase in loan size by about 5%. At the firm level, borrowing also responds strongly although a bit less, consistent with some limited between-bank substitutability. Investment and employment also increase strongly. Overall, because the transition to Basel II led to an average reduction by 2 percentage points of capital requirements, we estimate that the new regulation led, in France, to an increase in average loan size by 10%, an increase in aggregate corporate lending by 1.5%, an increase in aggregate investment by 0.5%, and the creation or preservation of 235,000 jobs.

The paper provides robust evidence that compliance with Basel Core Principles (BCPs) has a strong positive effect on the Z-score of conventional banks, albeit less pronounced on the Zscore of Islamic banks. Using a sample of banks operating in 19 developing countries, the results appear to be driven by capital ratios, a component of Z-score for the two types of banks. Even though smaller on Islamic banks, individual chapters of BCPs also suggest a positive effect on the stability of conventional banks. The findings support the effective role of BCP standards in improving bank stability, whose important implications led to the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) publication of new recommendations in 2015 to bring BCP standards in line with the Core Principles for Islamic Finance Regulation (CPIFRs) standards. Our findings suggest that because Islamic banks are benchmarked closely to BCPs, the implementation of CPFIRs should also positively affect their stability.

Purpose Basel III is a framework to protect the global banking system. The purpose of this paper is to provide a policy discussion on Basel III in Africa. Design/methodology/approach The significance of Basel III is discussed, and some ideas to consider when implementing Basel III to make it work in Africa, are provided. Findings Under Basel III, the African banking industry should expect better capital quality, higher capital levels, minimum liquidity requirement for banks, reduced systemic risk and differences in Basel III transitional arrangements. This paper also emphasizes that there should be enough time for the transition to Basel III in Africa; a combination of micro and macro-prudential regulations is needed; and the need to repair the balance sheets of banks, in preparation for Basel III. Originality/value The discussions in this paper will benefit policymakers, academics and other stakeholders interested in financial regulation in Africa such as the World bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Purpose This paper aims to examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on financial stability. Financial sector reform, especially in developing countries, takes the form of a sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision. The main objective of the paper is to examine whether this fast and sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision has an undesirable impact on financial stability. Furthermore, the paper examines the role of real economic development in determining the impact of financial reform on financial stability. Design/methodology/approach Empirically, on a sample of 57 developing countries over the period 2000-2013, the author explored the impact of bank regulation and supervision on financial stability for different sub-groups of countries. The division is based on the real level of economic development and, most importantly, on the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision. The study uses the cross-sectional–ordinary least square model. Each country has three observations (average 2000-2004, average 2005-2008 and average 2009-2013), which are convenient, with the date of the three surveys on regulation and supervision (2002-2006-2011). The period of the averages is selected to cover periods before and after the survey as regulation and supervision may be adopted before the survey and as its impact may persist for the period after. Findings The major finding of this study is that it supports the important role of the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision, and its impact on financial stability. Soft adjustment in regulation and supervision has more positive impact on financial stability than fast adjustment. Activity restrictions have positive and significant impact on financial stability in soft adjustment countries’ group. On the other hand, in countries with fast adjustment, results show negative and statistically significant impact on financial stability, especially for supervisory independence. More time is needed for supervisors to adapt to new regulation and supervision and gain expertise to monitor financial condition of banks in a consistent manner. Results also show that the level of economic development is an important factor when testing the impact of regulation and supervision on financial stability. In lower income countries, more room is available for corruption in lending, which has a negative impact on financial stability. Practical implications This study advocates the necessity of taking the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision by policymakers in developing countries, while initiating reform in the financial sector. Financial sector reform that takes the form of a sudden adjustment in regulation and supervision may have undesirable results in terms of financial stability. On the other hand, soft adjustment in regulation and supervision, which gives more room for supervisors to adapt and gain expertise, may have more positive impact on financial stability. Originality/value This paper is the first paper to explore new methods of calculating the speed of adjustment in regulation and supervision, and to examine whether the high speed of financial reform in developing countries has an undesirable impact on financial stability.

Following the 2007–9 financial crisis, the EU strengthened its institutional apparatus for bank regulation, creating a trio of sectoral bodies, including the European Banking Authority (EBA). Various aspects of this new system have been studied, but to date, little is known about how banks engage with their new supranational regulator. We argue that such engagement fosters an interdependence between banks and regulators, thus contributing to the efficiency and robustness of the overall regulatory regime; but also that it is contingent on the regulator exhibiting the qualities of credibility, legitimacy, and transparency. These qualities are grounded in the domestic regulatory governance literature, but we suggest that they are rendered problematic by the complexities of the EU's multilevel system and, in particular, the overlap in competences between the EBA and the European Central Bank. We examine the EBA in the light of these criteria and find that banks’ engagement remains pitched towards established national regulators and the EU's legislative arena. This poses concerns for the efficacy of agency governance in the EU's regulatory regime for banking.

SUMMARY Pablo Zbinden?>We consider the drivers and implications of the growth of ‘BigTech’ in finance – i.e. the financial services offerings of technology companies with established presence in the market for digital services. BigTech firms often start with payments. Thereafter, some expand into the provision of credit, insurance and money management products, either directly or in cooperation with financial institution partners. Focusing on credit, we show that BigTech firms lend more in countries with less competitive banking sectors and less stringent bank regulation. Analysing the case of Argentina, we find support for the hypothesis that BigTech lenders, by acquiring a vast amount of non-traditional information, have an advantage in credit assessment relative to a traditional credit bureau. They also serve unbanked borrowers, and may have an advantage in contract enforcement. It is too early to judge the extent of BigTech’s eventual advance into the provision of financial services. However, the early evidence allows us to pose pertinent questions that bear on their impact on financial stability and overall economic welfare.

With a comprehensive dataset covering 129 countries over 1995–2013, this study investigates the impact of bank globalization on financial stability. I find strong evidence that foreign bank entry increases both loan risk and the overall risk of bank failure, and threatens the financial stability of the host country. However, this link is dependent on the regulatory and institutional framework of the host country. The adverse impact from foreign banks can be mitigated when the host country has more restrictions on fee-generating activities, less stringent capital requirement, more asset diversification guidelines, a single supervisor, less government-owned banks, lower market entry barrier, and/or less effective credit information sharing. Instead, foreign bank entry could even lower bank risk when host country regulations on bank activities are highly restrictive, capital requirement is less stringent, and/or market entry barrier is low. The need to improve financial stability and that to reduce the adverse impact of foreign bank entry impose conflicting demand on some bank regulations, thus policymakers need to balance both needs and carefully condition the prudential regulations to ensure financial stability and at the same time minimize the adverse impact from foreign bank entry.

Failures and FDIC losses for community banks during the banking crises of the late 1980s and late 2000s are compared. Despite increases in risky commercial real estate (CRE) lending and more severe economic shocks in the recent crisis, failure rates were lower. We find that other changes in bank characteristics, like higher capital, made community banks more resilient to shocks. In contrast, FDIC losses on failed banks were higher. These are not explained by changes in CRE exposure or economic shocks. We find that an interest-receivable variable is predictive of failures and FDIC losses. Implications for prompt corrective action are discussed.

We employ the European Central Bank’s Loan-level Reporting Initiative as a shock to banks’ asset disclosures. We find that after the disclosure regulation, treatment banks raise more capital at cheaper rates and increase lending. Using novel survey data on small businesses, we also document that, in regimes with heightened bank disclosures, borrowers receive greater funding, conditional on their demand for credit. Furthermore, companies whose relationship banks provide asset disclosures start to borrow and invest more relative to firms from the same country and industry. Collectively, our inferences suggest that asset disclosures alleviate the capital market frictions that banks face and allow them to supply more credit to the real economy.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance and risk-taking behaviour of banks operating in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. Design/methodology/approach In doing so, the authors use a data set covering 165 banks located in 13 MENA countries over the period 2005–2012 and apply dynamic panel data methodology. Findings The results show that good governance acting in the interests of shareholders could lead to excessive risk taking; in this sense, a conflict of interest between the stakeholders, interested in the solvency of the financial system, and shareholders, trying to maximise their benefit, may occur. The greater risk can be reinforced by the governance of the country and a strong macro governance framework can incentivise a higher risk exposure in banks, showing the influence of bank regulation and law enforcement on the risks taken by banks. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper showing that corporate governance is relevant for explaining risk taking at the country and bank levels in MENA countries.

Recent regulations increased minimum capital standards for bank holding companies. We test the effectiveness of this action in preventing bank failures during the sub-prime mortgage crisis. We find that while holding company capital is the most influential variable in the failures of banks affiliated with multi-bank holding companies, this is not the case for banks affiliated with a one-bank holding company. For these banks, the bank's own characteristics are more influential than group capital, meaning the established standards may not be universally effective.

In April 2013, the UK implemented a dual-regulation approach to financial services often referred to as twin peaks. In this paper, we assess the impact of the introduction of twin peaks regulation on the systemic risk contributions of UK financial institutions. Using a matched sample of single- and dual-regulated financial institutions, we provide evidence that twin peaks regulation resulted in a relative reduction in systemic risk for dual-regulated firms.

Governments worldwide reacted swiftly to the global financial crisis by tougher regulations. This paper investigates the impacts of the regulatory environment on operating costs using panel data of 2,200 German banks over the timeframe from 1999 to 2014. We estimate cost functions with and without proxies for regulation and analyze the results with respect to period, bank size, and group affiliation. Our results show that regulatory costs were peaking in 2001, 2008, and lately since 2012. Most interesting, however, is the asymmetry of regulation: Whereas the cost effects were symmetric for all banks until 2003, the last ten years were different. Larger institutions and savings banks could neutralize the impacts of increasing regulation on operating costs. In contrast, smaller banks, especially if they are cooperative banks, were facing significant cost increases. We therefore expect unintended structural shifts like a reduction in the diversity of banks, which are negative for competition, service quality, and for the stability of the financial system. Zusammenfassung Weltweit wurde als Folge der globalen Finanzkrise die Regulierung des Finanzsektors verschärft. Dieser Beitrag geht der Frage nach, welche Konsequenzen diese Regulierungsmaßnahmen für die operativen Kosten im Bankengeschäft haben. Auf der Basis von Paneldaten von 2,200 in Deutschland aktiven Banken über den Zeitraum von 1999 bis 2014 schätzen wir Kostenfunktionen mit und ohne Proxies für Regulierung und werten die Ergebnisse nach Beobachtungsjahr, Bankengröße, und Gruppenzugehörigkeit aus. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen Kostenspitzen in den Jahren 2001, 2008, und zuletzt seit 2012. Am interessantesten sind jedoch die asymmetrischen Effekte der Bankenregulierung: Während unsere Modelle bis einschließlich 2003 nahezu gleichmäßige Kostenbelastungen anzeigen, änderte sich dies deutlich mit dem Jahr 2004. Im Gegensatz zu großen Institute und Sparkassen, die die Regulierungskosten nahezu neutralisieren konnten, sahen sich kleine Institute und Genossenschaftsbanken mit deutlichen Kostensteigerungen konfrontiert. Als Folge dieser asymmetrischen Kostenwirkungen staatlicher Bankenregulierung erwarten wir unbeabsichtigte Strukturveränderungen wie z.B. Konzentrationsprozesse, die sich negativ auf Wettbewerb, Dienstleistungsqualität, und letztendlich auch negativ auf die Stabilität des gesamten Finanzsystems auswirken werden. JEL Classification: G21, G38

This paper investigates the loan loss provisioning behaviour of Italian banks during the period 2006–2013. We examine the main discretionary and non-discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions (LLPs) and explicitly investigate the role of bank's functional distance, geographic diversification and risk. Empirical results suggest that LLPs by Italian banks are mainly driven by non-discretionary factors related to expected credit risk. Moreover, we find that distantly managed banks adopt a more prudent provisioning approach, whereas small local cooperative credit banks have a lower level of LLPs. We also show that LLPs are higher in regional banking systems with higher loan concentration and lower degree of competition. Finally, we find that banks facing increasing levels of risk are not only characterised by higher LLPs, but also have a higher tendency to engage in earnings management practices to stabilise their income flows over time.

We study the relation between bank regulation stringency and announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings across 21 countries. Under a low to moderate bank regulation environment, the market reacts more positively to the bank SEO announcements for an increase in the level of bank regulation. However, the bank SEO announcement effects become more negative if the bank regulation becomes too stringent. This inverted U-shaped relation is robust after we use the exogenous cross-country and cross-year variation in the timing of the Basel II adoption as an instrument to assess the causal impact of bank regulation on SEO announcement effects. Bank regulation has no significant impact of SEO announcement effects if the equity offering is involuntary.

We show how shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts interact with strategic reporting under asymmetric information to influence bank regulation. Relative to a benchmark unregulated economy, higher capital requirements mitigate inefficient asset substitution, but potentially exacerbate underinvestment due to debt overhang. The optimal regulatory policy balances distortions created by agency conflicts and asymmetric information while incorporating the social benefit of bank debt. Asymmetric information and strategic reporting only impact regulation for intermediate social debt benefit levels. For lower social debt benefits in this interval, regulatory capital requirements are insensitive to accounting reports, so bank balance sheets need not be marked to market to implement the optimal regulatory policy. For higher social debt benefits, however, capital requirements are sensitive to accounting reports, thereby necessitating mark-to-market accounting to implement bank regulation. Mark-to-market accounting is essential when bank leverage levels are high, and is more likely to be necessary as banks' asset risk or specificity increases.

The study examined the determinants of bank stability within the South African banking sector. By controlling for individual bank characteristics and market characteristics, the study determined possible determinants of solvency, a proxy for bank stability, measured by z-score within the South African financial sector. The South African financial sector is highly concentrated but with a significantly large number of banks, the greater portion being foreign owned banks. The business models of some of the financial intermediaries differ from the big four and therefore the influence of the type of business model is of great interest in this study, as it highlights a unique feature of the South African financial sector. The study’s investigation used panel data estimation techniques and found that among the specific bank characteristics, lending activity and capitalization do significantly affect solvency of banks and at sector level concentration was significant. The crisis dummy also revealed that the presence of a financial crisis heightened insolvency. The results have implications for financial institutions and therefore are of interest to regulators, bank management and researchers. Policy prescription in the form of Prompt Corrective Action framework is made to ensure proactive reaction to trends likely to cause instability.

Purpose This study aims to investigate how ownership structure and bank regulations individually and interactively influence risk-taking behaviour of a bank. Design/methodology/approach This empirical framework is based on dynamic two-step system generalised method of moments estimation technique to analyse an unbalanced panel data set covering 144 conventional banks from 12 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. Findings The estimation results suggest that foreign shareholding has an inverse relationship with bank risk-taking. In addition, official supervisory power is found to have a positive association with bank risk, and this relationship is reinforced for banks with higher ownership concentration. In addition, capital stringency increases bank risk, whereas market discipline has an opposite effect, only in countries with higher activity restrictions. Finally, the interaction between ownership concentration and activity restriction has an inverse association with bank risk-taking. Research limitations/implications Overall, the evidence suggests that the Basel II framework and the regulatory reform initiatives in the post-global financial crisis period do not seem to have reduced bank risk-taking in MENA countries. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of regulatory reform based on the three pillars of the Basel II guidance (capital regulations, market-oriented disclosures and official supervisory power), and offers evidence in support of “political/regulatory capture hypothesis” of bank regulation. The results also provide support for “global advantage hypothesis” of bank ownership.

In this study, we analyzed the regulatory, macroeconomic and institutional environmental effects on the probability of the emergence of banking crises in 78 emerging countries that had a fragile banking system in 1997 in a cross-sectional study using a logit model. The empirical examination validates a link between the weakness of certain regulatory and macroeconomic factors and of newly liberalized emerging market banking crises, this study want to examine weakness of regulatory and macroeconomic factors of newly liberalized, etc. banking concentration, restrictions on insurance, the financial market and the real estate sector were not related to the outbreak of banking crises in our estimates. On the basis of results, this study concludes that good regulation leads to bank stability. However, certain restrictions on inappropriate banking activity were the causes of the emergence of banking crises. As a result, the fragility of macroeconomic and institutional factors and the lack of diversification has clearly led to bank fragility and consequently to banking crises.

This paper investigates the impact of regulation and ownership on the performance of banks in 19 countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. We test the hypothesis that the effect of regulation on bank profitability depends on the type of ownership structure. The public and private views of bank regulation are also tested along with the interaction of bank regulation and ownership. We find regulation measures to have a strong influence on bank profitability, whereas ownership structure seems to play a limited role in explaining bank performance in the MENA region. The results support the private view of bank regulation and suggest that capital requirements and private monitoring when interacted with ownership concentration exert a strong influence on bank profitability. When the analysis is done separately for conventional and Islamic banks, we find that the impact of bank regulations though strongly significant, does not depend on the type of ownership structure prevailing in conventional banks. In contrast, regulatory effects seem to be important drivers of profitability of Islamic banks. Therefore, it is very important for policy makers in these countries not to treat the two types of banks identically when setting up and implementing bank regulations especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.