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Theoretical papers show that there could be a welfare gain from switching to tax regulation if managers are more uncertain about key parameters of a fishery than fishers. We estimate the size of the welfare gain that would result if a manager of the Danish cod fishery in the Kattegat switched from the current individual transferable quota system to tax regulation. We find that this would generate a small welfare gain of 0.023% of the industry profit and variations in parameter values (± 20%) at most result in a gain of 0.039%. (JEL Q22, Q28) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The success of regulations of multispecies fisheries may depend critically on understanding output dependencies correctly. An example is purse seine fisheries that target several species over the season but are specialized in the sense that each species are targeted individually. Such fisheries are typically modeled as either independent single species fisheries or using standard multispecies functional forms characterized by jointness in inputs. We argue that production of each species is essentially independent but that jointness may be caused by competition for fixed but allocable input of vessel capacity. We develop a fixed but allocatable input model of purse seine fisheries capturing this particular type of jointness. We estimate the model for the Norwegian purse seine fishery and find that it is characterized by nonjointness, while estimations for this fishery using the standard models imply jointness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]