Alléaume, Romain, Branciard, Cyril, Bouda, Jan, Debuisschert, Thierry, Dianati, Mehrdad, Gisin, Nicolas, Godfrey, Mark, Grangier, Philippe, Langer, Thomas, Lutkenhaus, Norbert, Monyk, Christian, Painchault, Philippe, Peev, Momtchil, Poppe, Andreas, Pornin, Thomas, Rarity, John, Renner, Renato, Ribordy, Gregoire, Riguidel, Michel, Salvail, Louis, Shields, Andrew, Weinfurter, Harald, Zeilinger, Anton, Lütkenhaus, N., Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information (LTCI), Télécom ParisTech-Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), SeQureNet, Thales Research and Technology [Palaiseau], THALES, University of Surrey (UNIS), University of Bristol [Bristol], Laboratoire Charles Fabry / Optique Quantique, Laboratoire Charles Fabry (LCF), Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 (UP11)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut d'Optique Graduate School (IOGS)-Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 (UP11)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut d'Optique Graduate School (IOGS), Institute for Quantum Computing [Waterloo] (IQC), University of Waterloo [Waterloo], Thales Communications [Colombes], Cryptolog International (Cryptolog), Cryptolog International, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich] (ETH Zürich), ID Quantique (IDQ), University of Montreal, Toshiba Research Europe Ltd, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU), and University of Vienna [Vienna]
The appealing feature of quantum key distribution (QKD), from a cryptographic viewpoint, is the ability to prove the information-theoretic security (ITS) of the established keys. As a key establishment primitive, QKD however does not provide a standalone security service in its own: the secret keys established by QKD are in general then used by a subsequent cryptographic applications for which the requirements, the context of use and the security properties can vary. It is therefore important, in the perspective of integrating QKD in security infrastructures, to analyze how QKD can be combined with other cryptographic primitives. The purpose of this survey article, which is mostly centered on European research results, is to contribute to such an analysis. We first review and compare the properties of the existing key establishment techniques, QKD being one of them. We then study more specifically two generic scenarios related to the practical use of QKD in cryptographic infrastructures: 1) using QKD as a key renewal technique for a symmetric cipher over a point-to-point link; 2) using QKD in a network containing many users with the objective of offering any-to-any key establishment service. We discuss the constraints as well as the potential interest of using QKD in these contexts. We finally give an overview of challenges relative to the development of QKD technology that also constitute potential avenues for cryptographic research., Revised version of the SECOQC White Paper. Published in the special issue on QKD of TCS, Theoretical Computer Science (2014), pp. 62-81