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The regional elections of 2021 in the PACA/South Region have delivered a result quite similar to the major trends observed at the national level: despite promising polls, the RN has failed once again to take a region that seemed guaranteed to it. This failure in the PACA, echoed by the RN’s disappointments in several other major regions that were thought to be within its reach, shows the limits of the strategy of normalization of the party pursued by Marine Le Pen and deprives her of the great electoral foothold she had hoped for in the perspective of the 2022 presidential election.As in 2015, the left is to face its very own brand new long march at the regional level towards regaining importance.Absent from the council for six years, its power in the region has fallen even further in 2021 and finds itself at rock bottom.In the PACA, as in many other regions, the regional election has highlighted the organizational weaknesses of LREM and the lack of local presence of the presidential party, forced to forge an alliance with the classic right, a crucial keep-in-mind of a very likely (albeit not yet officialized) candidacy of Emmanuel Macron for a second term. On the right, finally, the psychodrama that was played out around the constitution of the Muselier list testifies to the difficulties of LR to position itself today in a political space between LREM and the RN. The ability of the Republicans to solve this strategic equation will, without a doubt, be one of the keys to the presidential election and, as far as PACA is concerned, to the legislative elections.

“The greatest change that has occurred during Macron’s presidency is the polarisation of the French political system,” says Gilles Ivaldi, a researcher in politics at the Centre for Political Research at Sciences Po in Paris, France. Ivaldi explains that Macron seized the centre-ground of French politics. “Because of that, he’s weakened all the previously dominant parties of the left and right and therefore he’s opened space for more radical parties,” he says. Ivaldi says his surveys of the French electorate show more and more people are placing themselves on the right in French politics. “The polarisation is asymmetrical. It has happened more to the right of the French party system than to the left of it,” he says. This shift to the right was already happening before Macron, but the manner of his victory – and his shift to the right during the past five years – exacerbated it, according to Ivaldi.

La séquence électorale de 2022 en France a marqué un tournant important dans l’histoire politique de l’extrême-droite depuis 1945. Au premier tour, Marine Le Pen et Éric Zemmour ont réuni près d’un tiers des suffrages ; face à Emmanuel Macron, la candidate du RN a établi un nouveau record pour son parti en totalisant 41,5 % des voix représentant plus de 13 millions d’électrices et d’électeurs. Au-delà des facteurs économiques, culturels et politiques propres au cycle électoral qui vient de s’achever, cette nouvelle poussée de l’extrême-droite hexagonale illustre plus largement certaines des évolutions à l’œuvre au sein du phénomène extrémiste contemporain en Europe et aux États-Unis.

Les vagues 11 et 11bis du Baromètre de la confiance politique (BCP) illustrent un mouvement de repli national au sein de l’opinion à l’égard de l’ouverture de la France sur le monde. Entre février et avril 2020, le pourcentage d’enquêtés estimant que la France doit avant tout se protéger davantage du monde aujourd’hui est passé de 54% à 64%. À partir des données « panélisées » du baromètre, cette note tente d’éclairer les mécanismes de ce changement d’attitude au niveau individuel. Nos résultats suggèrent que ce basculement concerne avant tout l’évaluation de la situation générale du pays plus que l’impact de l’épidémie sur les finances personnelles ou le risque de perdre son emploi. Ce mouvement de fermeture est nourri par la colère plus que par la peur, et traduit, pour partie au moins, le mécontentement vis-à-vis de la gestion de la crise par le gouvernement. Il semble toucher, enfin, un segment spécifique d’électeurs « ouverts » mais dont les préférences cosmopolites demeurent moins fortement structurées au niveau attitudinal, s’agissant notamment des questions migratoires ou de l’appartenance à l’Union européenne.

International audience; The 2017 French presidential and legislative elections constituted a crisis point for a mainstream Right which, since the mid-1980s, had proved remarkably adept at exploiting the political opportunity structure of the French political system to balance the centripetal forces of Silent Revolution value change and the ‘liberal consensus’ with the centrifugal pull of the Silent Counter-Revolutionary Front National (FN) on the populist radical right. This chapter will analyse how, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the conservative Gaullists and their centre-right liberal coalition partners constituted competing but stable bloc components within France’s two-round majoritarian electoral system, while pursuing weak accommodative strategies vis-à-vis the FN. The absence of an effective centre-located competitor ensured that the Gaullists’ increasing encroachment upon the centre-right’s support, culminating in the formation of the UMP in 2002, did not threaten the bloc’s stability. Conversely, from 2007 onwards, a more conservative mainstream Right faced challenges from both the populist radical right, reviving Silent Counter Revolution values which were again salient in the wake of the economic crisis, and renewed centrist formations largely accepting of progressive Silent Revolution cultural values. The chapter demonstrates that significant, simultaneous electoral challenge from the centrist and populist radical right compromised the Right bloc’s integrity, and recast the French party system, pulling liberal Republicans wing towards cooperation with the centrist government, and leaving conservative-authoritarian Republicans wing to drift towards the Radical Right.

International audience; The literature on populism has been split, reflecting the distribution of the populist phenomenon across regions, i.e. left-wing populism in Southern Europe and Latin America, and right-wing populism in Northern Europe (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). There are only few cases where populist parties and voters both left and right are found to coexist and compete within the same political system. More recently, there has been a complexification of the populist ‘market’ across a number of countries, however. While competing against the mainstream, populist parties in those countries are also fishing from the same pool of voters dissatisfied with ‘old’ politics and traditional party elites, thereby competing against each other from different party system locations. Little is known of what may unite and oppose populist voters operating across both sides of the left-right spectrum in a given polity. Whilst we may expect populist voters to differ according to their attaching ideology, there may be more convergence on political attitudes –i.e. the core of populism defined as a Manichean representation of politics- as well as attitudes towards the EU which are increasingly associated with populist mobilization. In this paper, these possible commonalities of populist mobilization are examined cross-nationally from two voter surveys conducted in France and the Netherlands. Both countries provide suitable cases where relevant populist parties are found in both their radical left and radical right manifestations. This study aims to assess the relationships of varieties and/or common similarities of populism within a same context, when confronting similar institutional constraints and competitive incentives. Its findings have important implications for our understanding of the electoral dynamics of competition within a ‘populist market’, which, as recent developments in populist politics worldwide suggest, may become an increasingly relevant phenomenon across a range of actors and contexts, and a promising research area.

International audience; Marine Le Pen's far-right Front National party continues to influence political discourse on both sides of the political spectrum in France, having won a record 6.8 million votes in the first round of France's 2015 regional elections. In the United States, Donald Trump has attracted a fervent political following, successfully playing on voters' sense of economic insecurity and adopting inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric. The panelists will shed light on what is driving populism in both countries and what it means for the future of our two democracies.

International audience; The Front national (FN) has made an impressive come back in the 2012 French presidential election winning 17.9 per cent of the first-round vote. Such performance was bolstered by the economic and political context: in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, France had entered a period of economic instability, rising unemployment and deep social pessimism. This paper looks at how the FN has striven to adapt to the social demand for protection and redistribution in the French public. Under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the party has undergone significant changes in its economic policies and endorsed statist redistributive economic policies. This paper examines the magnitude of this strategic programmatic shift by the FN, and to which extent the formulation of a renewed economic agenda has enabled the party to evolve towards an electorally more beneficial position in the 2012 presidential race

This paper examines the FN in the current French party system. It looks at the extent to which 'de-demonization' has changed the party's strategic and programmatic profile. We ask whether these changes have affected the status of the party across three main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, and consider the internal and external stimuli for party modernization. We conclude that, despite the moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, the FN has not yet shed its populist radical right profile, and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. De-demonization is increasingly putting the cordon sanitaire under pressure however, creating new competitive opportunities for the FN.

This paper examines the FN in the current French party system. It looks at the extent to which 'de-demonization' has changed the party's strategic and programmatic profile. We ask whether these changes have affected the status of the party across three main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, and consider the internal and external stimuli for party modernization. We conclude that, despite the moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, the FN has not yet shed its populist radical right profile, and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. De-demonization is increasingly putting the cordon sanitaire under pressure however, creating new competitive opportunities for the FN.

This paper examines the FN in the current French party system. It looks at the extent to which 'de-demonization' has changed the party's strategic and programmatic profile. We ask whether these changes have affected the status of the party across three main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, and consider the internal and external stimuli for party modernization. We conclude that, despite the moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, the FN has not yet shed its populist radical right profile, and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. De-demonization is increasingly putting the cordon sanitaire under pressure however, creating new competitive opportunities for the FN.

International audience; This paper examines the recent transformation of the French Front national (FN) under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, and assess to which extent the so-called 'de-demonization' strategy has altered the party's core ideology, party system status and primary goals. The analysis suggests that the FN has maintained its niche status and populist radical appeal, while simultaneously seeking to shed its extremist profile to broaden its base of support. In recent elections, the FN has indeed enlarged its support base, making significant inroads into previously unchartered electoral territories. The party currently shows bright electoral prospects in th 2014 municipal and European elections.

International audience; The Front national (FN) has made an impressive come back in the 2012 French presidential election winning 17.9 per cent of the first-round vote. Such performance was bolstered by the economic and political context: in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, France had entered a period of economic instability, rising unemployment and deep social pessimism. This paper looks at how the FN has striven to adapt to the social demand for protection and redistribution amidst the crisis. Under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the party has substantially altered its economic policies to endorse statist redistributive economic policies. This paper examines the magnitude of this strategic programmatic shift by the FN, and to which extent the formulation of a new economic agenda has allowed the party to occupy an electorally more beneficial position in the 2012 presidential race.

Paper delivered to the Workshop on 'Populists and Public Office' ECPR Joint Sessions 22-27 March 2010, Münster; This paper aims to assess the French Front national's performances in municipal office following its success in securing a majority in four city councils in the mid-1990s. First, a brief account of the local political opportunity structures that participated in the municipal success of the FN is provided. The paper then suggests a characterisation of two divergent models of policy and vote-seeking styles of municipal governance whilst pointing at the commonality in the classic far right agenda underpinning social and cultural policies across the four localities under FN administration. As will be discussed, this strong authoritarian tropism translated into sectoral re-allocation of council financial resources and the targeting of the party's traditional constituency at local level. The building of an electoral clientele paved the way to the development of political corruption and municipal nepotism, which in most cases would later account for the rejection of incumbent FN mayors by voters. Wherever possible, the above framework for analysis is applied to exploring the strategic attempts by the extreme right to get hold of the Northern city of Hénin-Beaumont in the recent 2008 and 2009 municipal elections. The emphasis is on how a more pragmatic line of political communication was again replicated in combination with the populist anti-tax and anti-corruption agenda that had already contributed to the municipal rise of the party in the South in the mid-1990s.

Building on the analysis of party communication in the 2007 presidential campaign in France, this paper explores two correlated aspects of change in patterns of partisan competition in the right pole of French politics. Looking at the strategic responses by the UMP to the rise of the FN in 2002, we examine first the process of profound ideological revision under Sarkozy's leadership. The emphasis is on the reformulation of two archaeological repertoires of the French conservative New Right –namely anti-egalitarianism and cultural differentialism– and how this ‘winning formula' was successfully articulated with strong populist and anti-establishment appeals. In the second section, this distinctive trajectory is contrasted with the transformation and adaptation of the FN to the new party system configuration that emerged from Le Pen's Pyrrhic victory of 2002. The focus is on the de-radicalisation of the party's programmatic appeal in 2007 and a significant re-interpretation of its traditional ethnicised mythology of national identity. Implications for the characterisation of the radical Right phenomenon in France are discussed in the conclusion.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview and characterisation of the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by a majority of voters in France's referendum held on 29 May 2005. Whilst pointing to the salience of political discontent with the incumbent right-wing government and some elements of the longstanding crisis in French national party politics, the analysis places the emphasis on the central role played by social issues in the referendum, the transposition at the European level of the mechanism of the evaluation by voters of traditional parties' performances and responsiveness to the country's social malaise and the unilateral termination by a majority of left-wing voters of the social welfare and economic growth confidence pact that they had made with their national political elites on the occasion of the Maastricht referendum in 1992

The purpose of this chapter is to contrast the situation of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front national on a number of key elements of party ideology, political competition and party system change since the mid 1980s. In deconstructing the ‘new society' utopia of the VB and FN, the analysis shows important similarities in the doctrine and, in spite of those parties' alleged commitment to representative democracy, illustrates a common and developed set of ethnocentrist, authoritarian, and anti-egalitarian values underpinning an essentially non-democratic ideology. The analysis draws on the electoral success, organisational development and institutionalisation of the far right in both countries and points to the comparable systemic isolation of those parties despite the growth and stabilisation of their electorates. This is the English version of: Ivaldi (Gilles), Swyngedouw (Marc), 2006, « Rechtsextremismus in populistischer Gestalt. Front National und Vlaams Blok » in Decker (Frank) (Hrsg.), Populismus. Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches Korrektiv?, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften / GWV Fachverlage GmbH, pp.121-143

Les élections récentes ont confirmé l'ancrage de l'extrême-droite au sein du jeu partisan national. La présence inattendue du leader frontiste au second tour de l'élection présidentielle de 2002 a provoqué un véritable traumatisme dans la société française. Les performances du FN enregistrées depuis (lors du second tour présidentiel et du scrutin législatif de 2002, ainsi qu'à l'occasion des élections du printemps 2004) ont éclairé le dilemme profond d'une extrême droite, en mesure de réaliser de bons scores, occasionnellement même de conquérir de nouveaux territoires, en surfant sur une opposition critique à l'ensemble de l'élite politique. Elle se montre toutefois simultanément incapable de concrétiser son influence en faisant élire de nombreux représentants et en participant à l'exercice des pouvoirs. Trois ans après la scission de janvier 1999, ces consultations ont également achevé de consacrer l'hégémonie du Front national de Jean-Marie Le Pen et l'absence d'espace électoral pour le Mouvement national républicain rival de Bruno Mégret. Ce chapitre analyse l'électorat de l'extrême-droite française, son idéologie, l'organisation des partis.

Beyond the specific circumstances of the 2002 elections which allowed Jean-Marie Le Pen to progress to the second round, but which saw a relative drop for FN and MNR candidates in the subsequent legislative ballots, the Extreme Right vote has a number of specific characteristics which raise it above the status of a simple protest vote which has so often been used to characterise Le Pen and his party's support. The FN has undoubtedly enjoyed a renaissance on the back of the 2004 elections, particularly in its hegemony of the Extreme Right space over the essentially moribund party led by Bruno Mégret. However, the party seems as isolated as ever from the rest of the party system, and in particular from the mainstream Right. It has been incapable of building itself a legislative role consonant with its electoral capital, and has consequently only ever been able to exploit its nuisance and protest potential, instead of joining its moderate neighbours in the corridors of power, in the way that the Italian Extreme Right has managed.

This chapter will first look back at the pre-1999 period to assess the role played by the FN in challenging the traditional bipolar format of French politics. It will then move on to analyse the historical and political factors underlying the split, the electoral performances of the two parties that emerged from this critical breakdown and the key features of party ideology within the Extreme Right pole. Thirdly it will address the electoral prospects of the FN and MNR in the light of their results in the presidential and legislative elections of Spring 2002.

This paper looks at the 1972-1999 period to assess the role played by the FN in challenging the traditional bipolar format of French politics. It then moves on to analyse the historical and political factors underlying the 1999 split, the electoral performances of the two parties that emerged from this critical breakdown and the key features of party ideology within the Extreme Right pole. Thirdly it addresses the electoral prospects of the FN and MNR in the light of their results in the presidential and legislative elections of Spring 2002. http://www.politik.uni-mainz.de/ereps/download/france_overview.pdf