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• Participants ascribed slightly higher but similar levels of freedom, free will, and control for arbitrary compared to easy deliberate decisions. • Participants ascribed greater freedom, free will, and control for easy decisions compared to difficult deliberate decisions. • Participants ascribed high levels of freedom, free will, and control while denying the ability to do otherwise in easy deliberate decisions. • Whether decisions were highly consequential or mundane had little impact on participants' intuitions about freedom, free will, control, and the ability to do otherwise. Philosophical accounts of free will frequently appeal to deliberate, consequential, and purposeful decisions. However, some recent studies have found that laypeople attribute more freedom to arbitrary than to deliberate decisions. We hypothesized that these differences stem from diverging intuitions about concepts surrounding free will—especially freedom, being in control, and the ability to decide otherwise. In two studies, we found that laypeople attributed high levels of free will, freedom, and control to both arbitrary and deliberate decisions. However, subjects surprisingly attributed reduced ability to decide otherwise when faced with an "easy" decision with one clearly superior option. Furthermore, laypeople attributed greater free will, freedom, and control to "easy" than "hard" decisions with no clearly superior option. Our results suggest that laypeople have diverging intuitions about these different, free-will-related concepts. Therefore, a scientific account of free will may require integrating results from studies on different types of decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion about how science can inform the free will debate. These discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that decisions might be influenced or biased by various unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do they render subjects' decisions less free or even unfree? Here, we argue that, while unconscious influences on decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will in general, they provide important information about limitations on freedom in specific circumstances. We demonstrate that aspects of this long-lasting controversy are empirically testable and provide insight into their bearing on degrees of freedom, laying the groundwork for future scientific-philosophical approaches. A growing body of literature argues for unconscious effects on decision-making. We review a body of such studies while acknowledging methodological limitations, and categorize the types of unconscious influence reported. These effects intuitively challenge free will, despite being generally overlooked in the free will literature. To what extent can decisions be free if they are affected by unconscious factors? Our analysis suggests that unconscious influences on behavior affect degrees of control or reasons-responsiveness. We argue that they do not threaten the existence of free will in general, but only the degree to which we can be free in specific circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings. • We systematically reviewed 2220 papers related to the neuroscience of volition. • We detail Libet's work including the seminal "free will" experiments. • We discuss and categorize the extensive criticisms of Libet's experiments. • We present key philosophical issues relevant to the neuroscience of volition. • We examine contemporary techniques, methods, and findings related to volition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious intention" and attempts to measure its timing. Scalp electroencephalographic activity prior to movement, the Bereitschaftspotential, clearly begins prior to the reported onset of conscious intent. However, the interpretation of this finding remains controversial. Numerous studies show that the Libet method for determining intent, W time, is not accurate and may be misleading. We conclude that intention has many different aspects, and although we now understand much more about how the brain makes movements, identifying the time of conscious intention is still elusive. • Libet's experiments were the first to consider the timing of conscious intention (W). • These experiments and replications show W to follow the onset of movement-related EEG. • Various manipulations show that W can be altered raising questions about its meaning. • There are also questions about the interpretation of movement-related EEG. • W may be useful for some purposes but is not a reliable indicator of intention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]