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To decide to A, as I conceive of it, is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to A. I argue that ordinary instances of practical deciding, so conceived, falsify the following two theses: (1) Necessarily, S intentionally A-s only if S intends to A; (2) In every actual case of intentionally A-ing, the agent intends to A. But I also argue that actions of some other types falsify these theses. Practical deciding is not unique in this respect. In another respect, however, it may be unique. It may be the only source of counterexamples to the thesis that, in any actual case of intentional action, some relevant intention is at work. In addition, actual instances of deciding to A may differ from other actual basic actions in that whereas the latter are successful attempts to A, actual agents never try to decide to A (as opposed to trying to decide what to do and to trying to bring it about that they decide to A). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article has two primary aims. The first is to identify relationships among direct control, direct moral responsibility for an action, and directly free action. The second is to provide a partial map depicting the bearing of some familiar competing views about moral responsibility and free action – traditional compatibilism, semicompatibilism, and event‐causal libertarianism – on differences in conceptions of direct and indirect species of moral responsibility and free action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings. • We systematically reviewed 2220 papers related to the neuroscience of volition. • We detail Libet's work including the seminal "free will" experiments. • We discuss and categorize the extensive criticisms of Libet's experiments. • We present key philosophical issues relevant to the neuroscience of volition. • We examine contemporary techniques, methods, and findings related to volition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compatibilists about free will maintain that free will is compatible with determinism, and incompatibilists disagree. Incompatibilist believers in free will have been challenged to solve a problem that luck poses for them—the problem of present luck. This article articulates that challenge and then explores a novel compatibilist view recently proposed by Christian List. It is argued that List's view, unlike standard compatibilist views, faces a very similar problem about luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's views on neuroscientific arguments for the nonexistence of free will. It mentions that the experiments performed by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet in the 1980s pose an alleged challenge to the existence of a free will. It provides insufficient evidence that conscious reasoning plays no relatively proximal role in producing the former decisions to the conclusion that this is true of all decisions to act.

In the final chapter of her Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio offers (among other things) a novel reply to an original-design argument for the thesis that determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility, an argument that resembles Alfred Mele’s zygote argument in Free Will and Luck. This article assesses the merits of her reply. It is concluded that Sartorio has more work to do if she is to lay this style of argument to rest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a critical discussion of Derk Pereboom's 'disappearing agent objection' to event-causal libertarianism in his Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014). This objection is an important plank in Pereboom's argument for free will skepticism. It is intended to knock event-causal libertarianism, a leading pro-free-will view, out of contention. I explain why readers should not find the objection persuasive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the conceptual connections between free action and action for which the agent is morally responsible. Questions addressed include the following. Can agents who are never morally responsible for anything sometimes act freely? Can agents who never act freely be morally responsible for some of their actions? Various compatibilist and incompatibilist responses to these questions are discussed, as is the control over their behavior that ordinary agents attribute to themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the positive element of a libertarian view. Topics discussed include an argument about luck and free will by philosopher Bernard Berofsky, the moral responsibility for free actions, and the view of philosopher Meghan Griffith regarding the problem of present luck.

The 'problem of present luck' (Mele, Free Will and Luck, chapters 3 and 5) targets a standard libertarian thesis about free will. It has been argued that there is an analogous problem about luck for compatibilists. This article explores similarities and differences between the alleged problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is sometimes claimed that certain experiments show that free will is an illusion by showing that all decisions are made unconsciously. I have argued elsewhere that these experiments do not show that any decisions are made unconsciously. But suppose I am wrong about that. Even then, I argue, these experiments do not pose a serious threat to free will. First, one is not warranted in generalizing from findings about the decisions allegedly made in these experiments to the claim that all decisions are unconsciously made. Second, even if all decisions are made unconsciously, the findings are compatible with a modest time-lag hypothesis about our conscious detection of decisions we make, and the supposed truth of that hypothesis is compatible with our making some of our decisions freely. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article's guiding question is about bullet biting: When should compatibilists about moral responsibility bite the bullet in responding to stories used in arguments for incompatibilism about moral responsibility? Featured stories are vignettes in which agents' systems of values are radically reversed by means of brainwashing and the story behind the zygote argument. The malady known as 'intuition deficit disorder' is also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses libertarianism as evidence of indeterministic brain processes that influence human behavior. He examines the control, Frankfurt-style cases and event-casual libertarianism between compatibilism and agent-casual libertarianism. He also mentions that libertarianism on free will is composed of incompatibility and pro-free-will thesis. He further suggests the need to understand several positive libertarian ideas without taking a stand on the negative side of libertarianism.

Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author argues that no over actions have corresponding consciously made decisions or conscious intention.

The article responds to a review by philosopher Manuel Vargas of the author's book "Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will," which contends that neurological factors make conscious moral decision irrelevant. Topics include the nature of free will in relation to critiques by neuroscientists, a naturalistic approach to free will that does not involve substance dualism, and the role of causation in decision making.

Two questions guide this article. First, according to Fischer and Ravizza (jointly and otherwise), what epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for performing an action A are not also requirements for freely performing A? Second, how much progress have they made on this front? The article's main moral is for philosophers who believe that there are epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for A-ing that are not requirements for freely A-ing because they assume that Fischer (on his own or otherwise) has shown that this is so. In showing that this assumption is false, I reopen an important question for these philosophers: How are epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for A-ing related to requirements for freely A-ing? This is an interesting question in its own right, of course. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article distinguishes among and examines three different kinds of argument for the thesis that moral responsibility and free action are each incompatible with the truth of determinism: straight manipulation arguments; manipulation arguments to the best explanation; and original-design arguments. Structural and methodological matters are the primary focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the line of argument regarding the role of consciousness and free will in human behavior, advanced by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet and psychologist Daniel Wegner. It overviews the argument in the work of Libet concerning the state and function of the human brain and free will in deciding to do certain action. Wegner supported the argument of Libet and added the relationship of conscious intentions, free will and subsequent actions. The article also discusses some concepts in both works, such as intentional action and free will, decisions and consciousness of mind.

This article critically examines recent work on free will and moral responsibility by Randolph Clarke, Robert Kane, and Timothy O’Connor in an attempt to clarify issues about control and luck that are central to the debate between libertarians (agent causationists and others) and their critics. It is argued that luck poses an as yet unresolved problem for libertarians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his Freedom Evolves (2003) Daniel Dennett criticizes a view I defend in Autonomous Agents (1995) about the importance of agents' histories for autonomy, freedom, and moral responsibility and defends a competing view. Our disagreement on this issue is the major focus of this article. Additional topics are manipulation, avoidance, and avoidability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the views and capacity of Libertarians in promise making. Principles of Libertarianism that relate to free action and moral responsibility with determinism and human action; Distinction between right and wrong; Criticisms on the essay by Peter van Inwagen, "Free Will Remains a Mystery."

Focuses on the striking similarities between Humean compatibilism and libertarianism. Details on the debate among libertarians, compatibilists and semicompatibilists on free will; Compatibility of determinism and free will; Humean concepts on laws of nature.

Focuses on the philosophy of strict akratic actions. Distinctions between akratic and addicts; Discussions on free will; Differences between akratic actions and unfree actions.

Focuses on the trio of related spheres of the position on moral responsibility by Fischer and Ravizza. Objections to leading arguments for incompatibilism; Issues in the necessity of taking responsibility in moral responsibility; Misstatement of Fischer and Ravizza's reactive attitudes condition for reflective agents; Concern in the weak reasons-reactivity; Problems in omissions.

In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious intention" and attempts to measure its timing. Scalp electroencephalographic activity prior to movement, the Bereitschaftspotential, clearly begins prior to the reported onset of conscious intent. However, the interpretation of this finding remains controversial. Numerous studies show that the Libet method for determining intent, W time, is not accurate and may be misleading. We conclude that intention has many different aspects, and although we now understand much more about how the brain makes movements, identifying the time of conscious intention is still elusive. • Libet's experiments were the first to consider the timing of conscious intention (W). • These experiments and replications show W to follow the onset of movement-related EEG. • Various manipulations show that W can be altered raising questions about its meaning. • There are also questions about the interpretation of movement-related EEG. • W may be useful for some purposes but is not a reliable indicator of intention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]