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Over the past decade, countries such as France, Belgium, Denmark, Austria, Latvia, and Bulgaria have banned face-coverings from public spaces. These bans are popularly known as 'burqa bans' as they seem to have been drafted with the aim of preventing people from wearing burqas and niqabs specifically. The scholarly response to these bans has been overwhelmingly negative, with several lawyers and philosophers arguing that they violate the human right to freedom of religion. While this article shares some of the concerns that have been raised, it argues that banning face-coverings in public is morally justified under certain conditions with the exception of facemasks that are necessary for the containment of infectious diseases, such as COVID-19. The reason for this is that those who publicly cover their face make it very difficult for other members of society to socially interact with them, especially for those who are deaf or hard-of-hearing, which is problematic in an age where many people are chronically lonely or at risk of becoming chronically lonely. As such, this article can be understood as a more elaborate, and arguably more sophisticated, defence of the justification that France offered for its face-covering ban before the European Court of Human Rights, namely that covering one's face undermines the conditions for 'living together'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Racism and "othering" of ethnicities is an enduring feature of Western politics. In Australia, Senator Pauline Hanson is well known for radical conservative political opinions, some of which are regarded by her critics as racist. One of her most notorious anti‐Muslim campaigns came in the form of her support for a burqa ban, with engagement in constant media commentary and a publicity stunt in 2017 in which she wore a burqa into the Federal Senate Chamber. This article analyses the public discourse surrounding Hanson's call for a burqa ban, focusing on Twitter as an online media forum for the sharing and dissemination of political beliefs. In analysing Twitter posts and responses linked to Hanson's Twitter handle referring to #burqaban and related terms between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2018, clear themes depicting orientalism, dualism, and Islamophobia emerge. I argue that the propagation of these political discourses perpetuates a perception of the burqa as epitomising fear of dangerous and harmful mischaracterisations of Australian Muslims. The normalisation and continued utilisation of orientalist, dualist, and Islamophobic themes in political and public discourse, linked with the political profile and positional authority of Pauline Hanson, legitimises calls for impositions on Muslims' religious freedoms, manifesting in debates such as the "burqa ban". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers global news brief on Church-State Affairs as of July 2018. Topics discussed include amendment to Bolivia's penal code provoked protests against its limitation of religious liberty, Danish government has proposed a ban on full-face coverings niqab and burqa in public places and European Court of Justice ruled that courts could consider cases of hiring discrimination by faith-based organizations despite historic exemptions for church.

This paper focuses on the use of the full-face veil in the public sphere, discussing the standpoint adopted by some local authorities in Spain and Italy and the content of different proposals that have been submitted to Parliament in both countries, aimed at restricting the use of this garment in public places. The doctrine of the ECtHR in S.A.S. v. France will be taken as a benchmark for a comparative study of this issue in both Mediterranean countries. It is assumed that from a legal approach the wearing of burqa is a very complex question that requires a detailed analysis of the different elements involved, including its social implications before giving it an enduring solution. A general ban can be detrimental for the goal of integration, and give way to new forms of discrimination. Therefore, prior to enacting any legislation that could affect fundamental rights, it should be considered what public interests are in real need of protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This case note comprises a review of the European Court of Human Rights' ('ECtHR') judgment in SAS v France which upheld the French 'burqa ban'. I focus on the ECtHR's acceptance of a French societal principle, vivre ensemble, as a limitation on the rights to privacy and freedom of religion covered by the limitation ground of 'the protection of the rights and freedoms of others'. I argue that, contrary to what a number of authors have proposed, the ECtHR did not take a new approach to 'the rights and freedoms of others' in SAS v France. Rather, as I demonstrate with the help of the 'headscarf cases' leading up to the judgment and other cases in which the ECtHR sanctioned reliance on fundamental societal principles, SAS v France further establishes an emerging trend at the ECtHR to bring in what are essentially ordre public (public order) arguments under human rights provisions which do not contain an ordre public limitation ground via their inclusion under 'the rights and freedoms of others'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision to ban wearing a burqa in France being upheld by the European Court of Justice. It states that wearing the burqa was seen as a sign of subservience by women threatening human dignity and gender equality in France. It mentions the freedom of religion was limited by the principle of vivre ensemble or living together in a community. It highlights that civil values supersede civil rights in such cases.

In the summer of 2014, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the French 2010 law banning face-covering clothing in public spaces, the so-called burqa ban, did not violate the right to freedom of religion. Due to the 'wide margin of appreciation', the Court deemed the ban proportionate to the French state's legitimate aim with the ban of preserving the conditions of 'living together'. The paper analyses and provides an internal criticism of the Court's justification for this judgement focusing on the aim of living together and the right to freedom of religion. The Court's justification presupposes that (a) there is a justification for the ban in terms of the aim of living together, (b) this is a legitimate aim and (c) the ban is a proportional means of pursuing this aim. The paper analyses the Court's justification and argues that it fails to substantiate all three conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers world news briefs on issues related to religion and the state as of December 2013. France's ban on the wearing of burkas in public is being challenged at the European Court of Human Rights. The Indian state of Madhya Pradesh has passed legislation regulating religious conversion. Seventh Day Adventists won a case in Kenya regarding Sabbath observance.

Opposition to the burqa is widespread in Europe but not in the United States. What explains the difference? Focusing primarily on the French case and its Belgian facsimile, we seek to underscore the role of social theorists in legitimizing bans on the full veil. Ironically, this role has been largely disregarded by Anglophone theorists who write on the veil, and who often oppose its prohibition. This article suggests that Europe tends to be morerepressivetowards full veils because its political process is moreopento multiple theoretical representations of the phenomenon of veiling. Conversely, the United States is more open to the provocative display of religious symbols in public because the political process is pre-structured by legal conventions that tend to filter out social theory. The push to ban the burqa in France principally derives from its brand of republicanism rather than being a product of racism and Islamophobia. Of particular significance in the French case is the emphasis on reciprocity as a political principle, a principle that is elongated into an ideal of sociability by French theorists in different disciplines. The arguments of these theorists are described, their rationale is explained and the impact of their intervention on the policy process is documented. The French case, where the popular press and legislature play a major role in shaping policy towards the burqa, is contrasted with that of the United States, where the judiciary, defending religious freedom, remains the most influential collective actor. Each country has correspondingly different attitudes to democracy. In France, the mission of democracy is to extend political equality to the social realm whereas in the United States it is religion that is prioritized so as to protect that which is deemed most sacred to the individual. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the constitutionality of a government ban on face coverings in U.S. public schools as of January 2013, focusing on analyses of various laws in countries such as France and Belgium which regulate the use of face veils and other coverings in government-owned buildings and schools. Muslim religious practices, burqas, and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are addressed. America's Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 is mentioned.

The article focuses on the controversies related to the wearing of Muslim religious garment, burqa which is considered as a form of discrimination of women and the need of banning it for promoting women's dignity and gender equality. The challenges including freedom of religion, violation of human rights and individual liberty is considered with reference to French law. The principle of secularism, impact on minority community and the role of European Convention on Human Rights are discussed.

The article reflects on the different approaches to the freedom of religion in France and the U.S. in light of France's passing of law banning burka in public places. It discusses the role of the state as a vital factor in determining a specific understanding of republicanism and secularism in France and the U.S. It analyzes the banning of burka by France and presents information on various questions regarding gender equality and interpretation of the meaning of wearing a headscarf.

Analysis of the justifiability of general burqa bans in public – Comparative study of burqa bans in France, Belgium and concept legislation in the Netherlands – Evaluation of burqa bans in light of the Article 9 ECHR, the right to freedom of religion – Evaluation of grounds for introduction of bans, including public safety, public order and the protection of rights and freedoms of others – Conclusion: general burqa bans diffcult to justify in the light of ECHR standards [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author focuses on the burqa ban law enacted by the French National Assembly. According to the law, woman wearing clothes which conceal her face in public places will be a punishable offence and anyone forcing woman to wear such clothes will have to pay 30,000 euros as penalty. She further states that the law violates the freedom of religion and the law does not fulfill gender equality and public safety issues.

The use of Islamic veil for girls in public schools of France has aroused an important discussion about laicism, multiculturalism and religious freedom. This debate was under the scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights, which issued several judgments about the problem. The requirement of neutrality, the fundamental principle of laicism, allows that the State, supposing to protect the freedom of conscience of no religious people, confines the exercise of religious freedom to the strict boundaries of private life. At the same time, while requiring neutrality, the State is trying to impose in the public arena a sort of civil religion, depriving of the right of expression in religion matters. These two elements could be found not only in the fathers and current thinkers of laicism, but in authors that, without this enrollment, are finally supporting the same conclusions. The principal mistake that is under that is a conception of freedom derived from the Illustrated liberalism, an error that in the end is derived of a limited conception of the man. The pretensions of these doctrines are impossible to perform, because the religion cannot be relegated to the interior of man without to force the freedom itself. If some States continue following these ideas, will be no limits in the violation of the individual freedoms. Therefore, instead to see the religion as a "toxic" element in the social sphere, the relationship between State and religion should be marked for a positive laicism. That implies a legitimate autonomy between them and to recognize the positive value of religion for the individual and social life, an element that is so valuable to the point that is consecrated as a human right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on French President Nicolas Sarkozy's ban on the use of the burka, which refers to a garment that covers the entire body, in France. The author believes it is silly for the face of women to be the determinant so that a culture or religion will be socially acceptable, asking whether the unveiling of French women will lead to the integration of Arab and Muslim people in France. He adds that a government adopts an illiberal position when it strives to control what its citizens can or cannot wear.