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The article talks about the French security policy towards the government of president Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the late 1970s. Topics discussed include an attack on the Shaba Province of Zaire in 1977 and 1978 by Katangan Gendarmes rebels, the provision of crucial military support by France to Mobutu, and why french policymakers assisted a former Belgian colony.

The article discusses public concern surrounding the service of West Germans in the French Foreign Legion in the 1950s. It comments on what the author terms a "moral panic" in West Germany over the recruitment of young German men, reflecting on concerns about abductions and discourses of slavery and homosexuality. The author considers the reactivation of Paragraph 141 of the German criminal code criminalizing the practice of foreign military recruitment, and he also addresses German views of French colonialism in this period.

From 1956 to 1960, the French Army developed a force of Muslim auxiliaries (supplétifs) as a major component of its strategy to combat the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency in Algeria. Aside from their military utility in hunting down the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, the supplétifs were instrumental in undermining FLN legitimacy in the countryside. The rapid growth and employment of the supplétif force dismantled FLN political control in the villages, undermined the enemy's unity, and critically weakened the revolutionaries' claim to represent all of Algeria's Muslims. The military and political activities of France's Muslim soldiers also projected an image of Muslim–European unity behind the French cause, and portrayed the French Army as the only legitimate political force in numerous villages. These political successes, however, were limited to the local, tactical level of revolutionary warfare, and the Army was never able to convert the supplétifs into a force of decisive, strategic political significance. They thus had little ultimate impact on the outcome of the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article has two main theses: first, that from 1958 to 1967—Charles de Gaulle's presidency—there was a typical patron-client relationship between France and Israel that lasted until the Six Day War. It challenges the frequent claim in the literature that relations between Israel and France did not essentially change after de Gaulle's rise to power. Second, it argues that the basis on which this relationship was founded was rocky from the start since as a client, Israel was not ready to accede to French demands that it restrain its security policy to conform to key French interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]