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Information technology is increasingly facilitating mechanisms by which information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the financial sector can be reduced in order to enhance financial access for human and economic development in developing countries. We examine conditional financial development from ICT-driven information sharing in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. ICT is measured with mobile phone penetration and internet penetration whereas information sharing offices are public credit registries and private credit bureaus. The following findings are established. First, there are positive effects with positive thresholds from ICT-driven information sharing on financial depth (money supply and liquid liabilities) and financial activity (at banking and financial system levels). Second, for financial intermediation efficiency, the positive effects from mobile-driven information sharing are apparent exclusively in certain levels of financial efficiency. Third, with regard to financial size, mobile-driven information sharing is positive with a negative threshold, whereas, internet-driven information sharing is positive exclusively among countries in the bottom half of financial size. Positive thresholds are defined as decreasing negative or increasing positive estimated effects from information sharing offices and vice-versa for negative thresholds. Policy implications are discussed.

This study investigates the role of information sharing offices (public credit registries and private credit bureaus) in reducing market power for financial access in the African banking industry. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks from 42 countries for the period 2001-2011. Three simultaneity-robust empirical strategies are employed, namely: (i) Two Stage Least Squares with Fixed Effects in order to account for simultaneity and the observed heterogeneity; (ii) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to control for simultaneity and time-invariant omitted variables and (iii) Instrumental Variable Quantile regressions to account for simultaneity and initial levels of financial access. In order to ensure that information sharing offices influence market power for loan price (quantity) to decrease (increase), public credit registries should have between 3.156% and 3.3% coverage, while private credit bureaus should have between 1.443 and 18.4% coverage. The established thresholds are cut-off points at which information sharing offices completely neutralise the negative effect of market power on financial access. The thresholds are contingent on the dimension (loan price versus loan quantity) and distribution (conditional mean versus conditional distribution) of financial access.

Financial dollarization in Sub-Saharan Africa is the most persistent compared to other regions of the world. This study complements the existing scant literature on dollarization in Africa by assessing the role of information sharing offices (public credit registries and private credit bureaus) on financial dollarization in 26 countries of SSA for the period 2001-2012. The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The findings show that information sharing offices (which are designed to reduce information asymmetry) in the banking industry are a deterrent to dollarization. Policy implications are discussed.

We examine policy thresholds of information sharing for financial development in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. Public credit registries (PCR) and private credit bureaus (PCB) are used as proxies for reducing information asymmetry whereas financial development includes all financial dimensions identified by the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank, namely: depth, efficiency, activity and size. The empirical evidence is based on interactive Generalised Methods of Moments with forward orthogonal deviations. The following findings are established. First, PCR and PCB have negative effects on financial depth, with the magnitude of the former higher. Second, contrary to PCR which have insignificant effects, PCB has a negative impact on banking system efficiency. Third, PCR and PCB have negative impacts on financial activity, with the magnitude of the latter higher. Moreover, their marginal effects are negative. Fourth, PCR and PCB have positive effects on financial size, with the effect of the former higher. While marginal effects are positive, corresponding thresholds are not within range. Policy implications are discussed.

To the best our knowledge, in the first empirical macroeconomic examination of the nexus between financial intermediation and mobile phones, Asongu employs two conflicting financial system definitions in the assessment of how mobile phones have stimulated financial development in Africa. Within the framework of the dominant International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (2008) definition, mobile phones are established to be negatively associated with financial intermediary dynamics of depth, activity and size. Conversely, when the previously neglected informal financial sector is integrated into the conception, definition and measurement of the financial system, mobile phones are positively (negatively) correlated with the informal (formal) financial intermediation sector. The empirical evidence is based on 52 African countries. Causality in the established linkages has been confirmed in subsequent studies by the same author. At least three policy implications derive from the findings. First, the role of informal financial intermediation is increasing to the detriment of formal financial mechanisms. Second, in order to capture the positive effect of mobile phones on finance, it is imperative to integrate the missing informal financial sector component into the IMF definition of the financial system. Third, it is a wake-up call for more scholarly research on: (i) macroeconomic financial development implications of mobile phone penetration and (ii) monetary policy instruments in the face of burgeoning 'mobile phone'-oriented financial intermediation.