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This paper provides evidence for the propagation of idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks to the macroeconomy. Based on micro-level data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act for the 1990-2016 period, our results suggest that lender-specific mortgage supply shocks affect aggregate mortgage, house price, and employment dynamics at the regional level. The larger the idiosyncratic shocks to newly issued mortgages, the stronger are mortgage, house price, and employment growth. While shocks at the level of shadow banks significantly affect mortgage and house price dynamics, too, they do not matter much for employment.

Viele europäische Länder haben nach der globalen Finanzkrise 2008/09 Abgaben von Banken eingeführt, um die Finanzinstitute über Abwicklungs- und Restrukturierungsfonds an den Kosten möglicher künftiger Bankenkrisen zu beteiligen. Gleichzeitig kann durch solche Abgaben für Banken ein Anreiz zu einem geringeren Verschuldungsgrad und damit einer stabileren Kapitalstruktur gesetzt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht anhand von Bankbilanzdaten, inwieweit Bankenabgaben zu einer geringeren Verschuldung beigetragen haben und welche Rolle die Höhe des Körperschaftsteuersatzes dafür spielt. Denn durch die steuerliche Bevorzugung von Fremdkapital begünstigen höhere Körperschaftsteuersätze eine stärkere Verschuldung. Die empirischen Befunde zeigen, dass Banken in Ländern mit einer Bankenabgabe auf Bankverbindlichkeiten einen geringeren Verschuldungsgrad und damit höhere Kapitalpuffer aufweisen als Banken in Ländern ohne eine solche Abgabe. Je höher der Körperschaftsteuersatz ist, desto weniger reduzieren Bankenabgaben allerdings die Verschuldung. Um die Effektivität regulatorischer Abgaben zu gewährleisten, sollten bei ihrer Ausgestaltung Wechselwirkungen mit anderen Steuern berücksichtigt werden., DIW Wochenbericht

Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn insignificant. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.

Following the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, many European countries introduced bank levies to enable financial institutions to share in the costs of future banking crises via resolution and restructuring funds. Simultaneously, bank levies can set an incentive for banks to reduce their leverage, thereby achieving a more stable capital structure. Using information from banks’ balance sheets, this report investigates to what extent bank levies have reduced leverage ratios and what role the corporate income tax rate plays in this. Preferential tax treatment of debt capital means that higher corporate tax rates favor a higher leverage ratio. The empirical findings show that banks in countries with a bank levy on bank debt have lower leverage and thus higher capital buffers than banks in countries without a levy. The higher the corporate tax rate, however, the less bank levies reduce leverage. To ensure regulatory levies are effective, how they interact with other taxes must be taken into account., DIW Weekly Report

Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.

Since the global financial crisis and the related restructuring of banking systems, bank concentration is on the rise in many countries. Consequently, bank size and its role for macroeconomic volatility (or: stability) is the subject of intense debate. This paper analyzes the effects of financial regulations on the link between bank size, as measured by the volume of the loan portfolio, and volatility. Using bank-level data for 1999 to 2014, we estimate a power law that relates bank size to the volatility of loan growth. The effect of regulation on the power law coefficient indicates whether regulation weakens or strengthens the size-volatility nexus. Our analysis reveals that more stringent capital regulation and the introduction of bank levies weaken the size-volatility nexus; in countries with more stringent capital regulation or levies in place, large banks show, ceteris paribus, lower loan portfolio volatility. Moreover, we find weak evidence that diversification guidelines weaken the link between size and volatility.

Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.

This paper investigates the link between mortgage supply shocks at the banklevel and regional house price growth in the U.S. using micro-level data on mortgage markets from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act for the 1990-2014 period. Our results suggest that bank-specific mortgage supply shocks indeed affect house price growth at the regional level. The larger the idiosyncratic shocks to newly issued mortgages, the stronger is house price growth. We show that the positive link between idiosyncratic mortgage shocks and regional house price growth is very robust and economically meaningful, however not very persistent since it fades out after two years.

This paper investigates how the withdrawal of banks from their cross-border business impacted the borrowing costs of European firms since the crisis. We combine aggregate information on total and cross-border credit with firm-level survey data for the period 2010 - 2014. We find that the decline in cross-border lending led to a deterioration in the borrowing conditions of small firms. In countries with more pronounced reductions in cross-border credit inflows, the likelihood of a rise in firms' external financing costs has increased. This result is mainly driven by the interbank channel, which plays a crucial role in transmitting shocks to the real sector across borders.

Die europäische Finanz- und Schuldenkrise hat für viele kleine und mittelgroße Unternehmen (KMU) im Euroraum höhere Finanzierungskosten mit sich gebracht. Ein Grund dafür ist, dass der europäische Kreditmarkt heute stärker fragmentiert ist als zu Beginn der Krise, weil viele Banken ihr internationales Kreditgeschäft reduziert haben. Dieser Bericht zeigt, dass Firmen, in deren Heimatländern die Kreditvergabe ausländischer Banken eingebrochen war, in den Jahren 2010 bis 2014 schlechtere Finanzierungskonditionen hinnehmen mussten. Die Ergebnisse unterstreichen, dass die Integration der internationalen Kreditmärkte eine wichtige Rolle für die Finanzierungsbedingungen von KMU spielt. Empfehlenswert ist daher, die hohe Abhängigkeit der KMU von Banken zu reduzieren und ihnen, etwa über einen leichteren Zugang zum Kapitalmarkt, auch andere Finanzierungsquellen zu eröffnen.

In this paper, we investigate how the withdrawal of banks from their cross-border business has impacted on firms' borrowing costs since the recent crisis. We combine aggregate information on total and cross-border credit with firm-level data from the Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs in the euro area. We find that the decline in cross-border lending has led to a deterioration in the borrowing conditions of SMEs. First, in countries with more pronounced reductions in cross-border credit inflows to firms and banks, the likelihood of a rise in firm's external financing costs has significantly increased. Second, both actual and perceived financing constraints of SMEs have become more likely. This result is mainly driven by the interbank channel, which has played a crucial role in transmitting shocks to the real sector across borders.

Does the structure of banking markets affect macroeconomic volatility and, if yes, is this link different in low-income countries? Banking markets in low-income countries differ from those in developed market economies. Banking systems in lower-income countries are typically smaller and less open. In this paper, we explore the channels through which the structure of banking markets affects macroeconomic volatility. Our research has three main findings. First, we study the relevance of granular effects: if the degree of market concentration in the banking sector is sufficiently high, idiosyncratic volatility at the bank-level can impact aggregate volatility. We find weak evidence for a link between granular banking sector volatility and macroeconomic fluctuations. Second, a higher share of domestic credit to GDP coincides with higher volatility in the short run. Third, a higher level of cross-border asset holdings, i.e. a higher degree of de facto financial integration, increases volatility in low-income countries.

Despite the most recent period of calm on the financial markets, the long-term resilience of the European financial system is not yet assured, even several years after the financial crisis began. However, the stability of the financial system playsa crucial role for real economic development and consequently for growth and prosperity. The financial crisis has shown that stricter regulation is required to improve the stability and resilience of the banking system. Further, it has become evident in recent years that banking supervision requires better international coordination in this age of globalization. The present report first analyzes current developments with regard to the European banking system: what regulatory and institutional changes have been introduced since the crisis? How have market structures and the stability of the banking system developed? Second, the report proposes recommendations to further promote the stability of the banking system: the European banking sector has not been fully consolidated and this should be driven forward as a matter of urgency. The transparency of the new regulatory and institutional structure should be increased. The close ties between banks and governments must also be loosened further. Beyond the adjustments planned to date, policy makers should promote alternative financing sources for small and medium-size firms, e.g. the direct access to capital markets.

We explore the impact of large banks and of financial openness for aggregate growth. Large banks matter because of granular effects: if markets are very concentrated in terms of the size distribution of banks, idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level do not cancel out in the aggregate but can affect macroeconomic outcomes. Financial openness may affect GDP growth in and of itself, and it may also influence concentration in banking and thus the impact of bank-specific shocks for the aggregate economy. To test these relationships, we use different measures of de jure and de facto financial openness in a linked micro-macro panel dataset. Our research has three main findings: First, bank-level shocks significantly impact on GDP. Second, financial openness lowers GDP growth. Third, granular effects tend to be stronger in financially closed economies.

This study assesses how banking sector integration and especially cross-border lending affect macroeconomic stability. I use a two-country general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks that are hit by idiosyncratic shocks. According to the concept of granularity, idiosyncratic shocks to large firms (or: banks) do not have to cancel out under a skewed distribution of firm sizes. Given the highly skewed distribution of bank sizes, macroeconomic stability may thus be affected by shocks to large banks. Hence, to grasp the impact of financial liberalization on aggregate fluctuations, the presence of large banks as measured by high concentration in the banking industry has to be accounted for. I study the role of different forms of banking sector integration - i.e. arms-length crossborder lending versus lending via foreign affiliates - for the stability of aggregate lending. I find that banking sector integration decreases the aggregate volatility of lending due to intensified competition. The model implies that cross-border lending is more stable under lending via foreign affiliates than under arms-length cross-border lending.