Search

Viele europäische Länder haben nach der globalen Finanzkrise 2008/09 Abgaben von Banken eingeführt, um die Finanzinstitute über Abwicklungs- und Restrukturierungsfonds an den Kosten möglicher künftiger Bankenkrisen zu beteiligen. Gleichzeitig kann durch solche Abgaben für Banken ein Anreiz zu einem geringeren Verschuldungsgrad und damit einer stabileren Kapitalstruktur gesetzt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht anhand von Bankbilanzdaten, inwieweit Bankenabgaben zu einer geringeren Verschuldung beigetragen haben und welche Rolle die Höhe des Körperschaftsteuersatzes dafür spielt. Denn durch die steuerliche Bevorzugung von Fremdkapital begünstigen höhere Körperschaftsteuersätze eine stärkere Verschuldung. Die empirischen Befunde zeigen, dass Banken in Ländern mit einer Bankenabgabe auf Bankverbindlichkeiten einen geringeren Verschuldungsgrad und damit höhere Kapitalpuffer aufweisen als Banken in Ländern ohne eine solche Abgabe. Je höher der Körperschaftsteuersatz ist, desto weniger reduzieren Bankenabgaben allerdings die Verschuldung. Um die Effektivität regulatorischer Abgaben zu gewährleisten, sollten bei ihrer Ausgestaltung Wechselwirkungen mit anderen Steuern berücksichtigt werden., DIW Wochenbericht

Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn insignificant. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.

Following the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, many European countries introduced bank levies to enable financial institutions to share in the costs of future banking crises via resolution and restructuring funds. Simultaneously, bank levies can set an incentive for banks to reduce their leverage, thereby achieving a more stable capital structure. Using information from banks’ balance sheets, this report investigates to what extent bank levies have reduced leverage ratios and what role the corporate income tax rate plays in this. Preferential tax treatment of debt capital means that higher corporate tax rates favor a higher leverage ratio. The empirical findings show that banks in countries with a bank levy on bank debt have lower leverage and thus higher capital buffers than banks in countries without a levy. The higher the corporate tax rate, however, the less bank levies reduce leverage. To ensure regulatory levies are effective, how they interact with other taxes must be taken into account., DIW Weekly Report

Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.

Since the global financial crisis and the related restructuring of banking systems, bank concentration is on the rise in many countries. Consequently, bank size and its role for macroeconomic volatility (or: stability) is the subject of intense debate. This paper analyzes the effects of financial regulations on the link between bank size, as measured by the volume of the loan portfolio, and volatility. Using bank-level data for 1999 to 2014, we estimate a power law that relates bank size to the volatility of loan growth. The effect of regulation on the power law coefficient indicates whether regulation weakens or strengthens the size-volatility nexus. Our analysis reveals that more stringent capital regulation and the introduction of bank levies weaken the size-volatility nexus; in countries with more stringent capital regulation or levies in place, large banks show, ceteris paribus, lower loan portfolio volatility. Moreover, we find weak evidence that diversification guidelines weaken the link between size and volatility.

Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.

The paper analyzes the effects of changes to regulatory policy and to monetary policy on cross-border bank lending since the global financial crisis. Cross-border bank lending has decreased, and the home bias in the credit portfolio of banks has risen sharply, especially among banks in the euro area. Our results suggest that expansionary monetary policy in the source countries - as measured by the change in reserves held at central banks - has encouraged cross-border lending, both in euro area and non-euro area countries. Regarding regulatory policy, increases in financial supervisory power or independence of the supervisory authorities have encouraged credit outflows from source countries. The findings thus underline the importance of regulatory arbitrage as a driver of cross-border bank flows since the global financial crisis. However, in the euro area, arbitrage in capital stringency was linked to lower cross-border lending since the crisis.

Despite the most recent period of calm on the financial markets, the long-term resilience of the European financial system is not yet assured, even several years after the financial crisis began. However, the stability of the financial system playsa crucial role for real economic development and consequently for growth and prosperity. The financial crisis has shown that stricter regulation is required to improve the stability and resilience of the banking system. Further, it has become evident in recent years that banking supervision requires better international coordination in this age of globalization. The present report first analyzes current developments with regard to the European banking system: what regulatory and institutional changes have been introduced since the crisis? How have market structures and the stability of the banking system developed? Second, the report proposes recommendations to further promote the stability of the banking system: the European banking sector has not been fully consolidated and this should be driven forward as a matter of urgency. The transparency of the new regulatory and institutional structure should be increased. The close ties between banks and governments must also be loosened further. Beyond the adjustments planned to date, policy makers should promote alternative financing sources for small and medium-size firms, e.g. the direct access to capital markets.