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The present research investigates the advancement of sustainable transportation by promoting electric vehicles, expanding public transit, and implementing tax increases on fossil fuels and automobiles, via crucial strategies. The present study has examined a market with a fossil fuel vehicle (FFV) manufacturer, an electric vehicle manufacturer, and the government. The manufacturers' pricing strategies are geared towards optimizing profits, whereas the government's objectives for transportation are centered on attaining sustainability across economic, environmental, and social dimensions. The government has considered two strategies, one taxation-based and the other non-taxation-based, to achieve its objectives. In the taxation-based strategy, fixed taxes on fossil-fuel vehicles and fossil fuels are considered, while in the non-taxation-based strategy, subsidies for purchasing electric vehicles and the number of buses purchased for public transportation are predefined. Based on this, eight scenarios with different values for the predefined factors of each strategy have been defined to attain their respective objectives. Game theory has been utilized to determine an optimal solution based on Norwegian data, owing to the interconnected decision-making among stakeholders. By analyzing the findings, managers can enhance their decision-making capabilities. The results suggest that appropriately adjusting subsidies, taxes, and bus numbers within specific thresholds is crucial for mitigating air pollution and achieving other objectives. The assertion that electric cars are a definitive solution may not be accurate, as it depends on the source of the generated electricity. While excessive subsidies in non-renewable energy countries can lead to increased pollution, even in Norway, where most electricity is renewable, rising demand for electric vehicles contributes to air pollution due to increased production. In countries where electricity generation is not primarily from renewable resources, the growth of electric vehicles further exacerbates pollution. Simultaneous increases in fuel taxes and tariffs on fossil fuel vehicles negatively impact the demand for fossil fuel vehicles and government revenues. Therefore, it is recommended that an increase in fuel taxes be implemented to optimize both government revenues and social welfare. This approach safeguards public revenues, promotes societal well-being, and mitigates air pollution. • Examining the impact of promoting Evs and public transportation on sustainable transportation development. • Pricing of electric and fossil fuel vehicles using game theory and based on a case of Norway. • Studying the impact of tax, subsidies, and public transportation expansion on sustainable transportation goals. • Investigating vehicle selection based on government policies (allowing EV access to dedicated bus lanes). • Examining the Rebound effect of excessive promotion of electric vehicles or buses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

[Display omitted] • Electric and fossil car pricing is discussed from a game theoretic point of view. • The role of the battery manufacturer as an important element in the electric vehicle supply chain was investigated. • The government used tax and subsidy policies to achieve its economic, social and environmental goals. • An integrated Shannon entropy and TOPSIS method was used to find the best government strategy. • The results of a case study in Norway are provided. This study examines the issue of electric and fossil car pricing in a 3-level supply chain including the government, Gasoline vehicle (GV) manufacturer, electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer and electric vehicle battery manufacturer, in which the manufacturers, in order to increase their profits, determine the price and take care the amount of improvement of their products And the government, as a leader, uses direct and indirect financial tools, including subsidies and car purchase taxes, fuel taxes and subsidies to battery manufacturers to cooperate in the research and development cost of battery production and reduce its price, in order to achieve various economic, social and environmental goals to make the transportation system sustainable. To reach the optimal solution of this problem, the approach of game theory and Stackelberg method has been used and the results have been obtained using the data of Norway. Examining the results provides a special approach to managers to make optimal decisions in different situations. In this matter, different scenarios have been considered according to the goals of the government and finally, using the TOPSIS method, the best decision has been introduced for the government. As a result, in order to attract more customers to buy EV and increase the range of electric cars and, to increase the profits of EV manufacturers and EV battery manufacturers, the government should give large subsidies to EV customers and, with the aim of reducing pollution and increasing its income, impose more taxes on fossil cars and fossil fuels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, the economic and environmental aspects of sustainability are considered on the waste recycling process under a three-echelon dual-channel supply chain containing one collector, one recycler, and one manufacturer. To our knowledge, this study is the first one focused on the recyclables under a dual-channel structure. Under the considered structure, the customers’ demand for the finished product is specified. Then, the manufacturer procures the product from a recyclable waste with a specific recyclability degree. The collector collects the waste while the recycler recycles it. The manufacturer is also capable to recycle the waste. Thus, he can purchase the recycled materials from the recycler or gets the non-recycled waste from the collector and then recycles it. Under the various power structures, the game-theoretic models are established among the members. Then, the equilibrium strategies are obtained and various managerial insights are revealed. It is found that under the various games, the manufacturer selects the collector when some thresholds are met. When the collector and recycler have similar decision powers, the manufacturer gets higher profit than the situation that they make decisions with different decision powers. Moreover, more the recyclability degree of the waste leads to higher profits for the members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper considers the impact of transparency on the demand function and investigates the effect of transparency and corporate social responsibility on the decisions of the members of a supply chain and their profits for a green product. The main contribution of the present study is considering the impact of the transparency of a manufacturer on the profits of the supply chain members and customer satisfaction. In addition, a new consumer satisfaction index is proposed as a corporate social responsibility indicator. Moreover, three different strategies of manufacturer is considered: centralized, decentralized without corporate social responsibility concerns and decentralized with corporate social responsibility concerns. Furthermore, a game theoretic approach is used to formulate the problem and the equilibrium decision variables is calculated. At last, based upon the equilibrium solutions, several analysis and insights are proposed. As a result, if the manufacturer concerns with corporate social responsibility, his profit, the wholesale price and the retail price decreases, whereas the whole system profit, the demand, the retailer's profit and the whole supply chain profit increases compared with when he does not concern with corporate social responsibility. In addition, in all strategies, more transparency of the manufacturer leads to the more demand and supply chain profit and the higher level of greening degree leads to the higher prices and more demand. Highlights • Proposing a transparency-dependent demand in a supply chain for the first time. • Considering transparency in supply chain using a game-theoretic framework. • Proposing a new index for consumer satisfaction as the CSR indicator. • Using a new utility function considering the CSR and consumer satisfaction. • Determining the equilibrium decision variables in three different strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments in energy consumption 'management' have heightened the need for energy efficiency considerations in energy-intensive supply chains, according to the sustainable development framework. Therefore, policy-makers need to find out how they can improve these conditions, considering the resource limitations and energy requirements. According to these issues, we address a novel pricing model for new energy-efficient products, conventional models, and relative energy consumption under a tax-subsidy system. The products and energy services are made in a product supply chain consisting of an energy supplier and two manufacturers in a duopoly. Furthermore, the protection costs of innovation process such as copyright are investigated for the first time in this problem. Then, a multi-stage game model is developed considering two scenarios, based on different game structures. Finally, we solve the problem and provide a comprehensive analysis of the optimal values of variables and players' profit. The results show that the first scenario has more advantages than the leader-follower competition. However, the second scenario results in less energy consumption than the first one. The findings also suggest that energy policies applied on the producer side are more effective than the consumer-side energy policies to improve energy-saving. • A pricing mechanism for energy/product is developed using a duopoly Bertrand model. • We discussed the innovation protection costs and energy policy on social welfare. • Policies on the producer side are more effective than the consumer-side policies. • A 2.3% increase in energy demand is seen by a 25% household rebound effects. • A 30% increase in ω leads to 1.95% (on average) decrease in manufacturers' profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]