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International audience; This paper reports on a field experiment conducted to estimate the impact of the gender diversity of new venture top management teams (TMT) on research and development (R&D) intensity. Specifically, we study an entrepreneurship business game, played in groups of three, in which master’s-level business studies students play the role of top managers. We manipulated the gender composition of the teams and assigned students randomly to teams based on gender. We do not find any significant relationship between new venture TMT gender diversity and R&D intensity, regardless of the number of female managers on TMTs, the profitability of firms or the stage of development and growth of the firm. Consequently, we do not find any gender differences; there are no gender differences regarding decision making in terms of firm risk-taking. Our findings may belie the common perception that women are, in general, more risk-averse than men. The implication of our study is that we do not support (or deny) the “business case” for female managers on TMTs. Likewise, we find no evidence of any negative effect either. Our evidence implies that the representation of top female managers should be based on criteria other than innovation behavior in the early stage of a new venture growth and development process. The study extends our understanding of the effects of TMT composition and contributes to research on innovation behavior and new venture teams.

Drawing from a sample of French companies that made up the SBF 120 index over the period 2006–2010 (before the enactment of the Cope–Zimmermann law on gender quotas on boards), this paper investigates the relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk-taking (measured by the variability of the return on assets). Using a generalized method of moments estimation, no evidence is found to support the assumption of a significant relationship between women on corporate boards and firm risk-taking. These results potentially can be relevant for policy makers and academic research.

Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to analyze the impact of board gender diversity (BGD) on firm performance without being able to establish a clear relationship. In this paper, we reassess the relationship between BGD and firm performance by using a quantile regression approach. Our results indicate that BGD matters only across a subset of the firm performance distribution. Moreover, when the possible endogeneity of the relationship between BGD and firm performance is taken into account, there are some conditions under which a positive and significant relationship is observed for the eight lowest quantiles.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate debt-like compensation and the value of excess cash holdings.Design/methodology/approachThe environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure score provided by Bloomberg is used as a proxy for the extent of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 379 firms that made up the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index over the period 2010-2015. In order to take into account the endogeneity problem between board gender diversity and ESG disclosure, a fixed effect model with lagged board variables is used.FindingsTwo main results arise from this study. First, no significant relationship is found between board gender diversity and ESG disclosure. Second, the evidence also partially confirms critical mass theory, as below three female directors the relationship between board gender diversity and ESG disclosure is not statistically significant. However, beyond that, no significant relationship was found.Research limitations/implicationsReasonable theoretical arguments drawn from stakeholder theory suggest that board gender diversity may have a positive effect on ESG disclosure. The empirical evidence presented neither supports, nor denies stakeholder theory. However, the results may be improved by enlarging the frontiers of this research in time and space, increasing the perimeter of qualitative data integrated in this investigation.Practical implicationsThis paper offers theoretical and empirical arguments for the feminization of corporate boards, not only in the name of equality between women and men and organizational justice, but also in the light of organizational performance (examined through the prism of governance). Transparency, analyzed using the proxy of ESG disclosure, is strongly and positively correlated with a feminization of boards, if the proportion of women is significant and sufficient to be able to prevent and surpass the “invisibilization” phenomenon, which is based on the marginalization of passive ultra-minorities, reduction to silence, marginalization (disqualification of women voice or exit strategy), assimilation or the endorsement of stigma.Originality/valueFirst, this makes a theoretical contribution to the diversity and governance literature by examining the effect of WOCB on ESG disclosure through the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 2010). Second, the authors contribute to the CSR literature (cf. Byron and Post, 2016) by documenting specifically the effect of board gender diversity on CSR disclosures through ESG. Indeed, ESG research mainly concentrates on firm financial performance (Galbreath, 2013). No study has examined the relationship between WOCB and ESG disclosure. Finally, from an empirical standpoint, an FE model with lagged board variables (Liuet al., 2014) is used to fully address the endogeneity problems in the relationship between WOCB and ESG disclosure that may occur because of differences in unobservable characteristics across firms or reverse causality (Boulouta, 2013).

In the contemporary business world, the diversity of boards in terms of gender has been examined by many researchers and those responsible for public policy. Although many studies have assessed the correlation between how a company performs financially and the gender diversity of its board, this research has tended to focus on larger companies and the results have been inconclusive. This paper will re-examine key elements of the existing discourse by focusing on a selection of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in France between 2009 and 2014. Panel data and the two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology was employed to assert empirical control over both the significance and direction of the correlation between the financial performance of an organisation and the diversity of its board. Unlike the literature, in our study of French SMEs, we found no notable correlation between how a company performs financially and how diverse its board is in terms of gender. This paper will examine the benefits firms can access by ensuring the gender diversity of their respective boards.

Based on the resource dependency theory, this article investigates the relationships among board gender diversity, innovation, and firm performance. Specifically, this article examines the mediating role of innovation, which may explain how board gender diversity is related to firm performance. Using a sample of 120 SBF companies from 2009 to 2012, the results indicate a negative effect of board gender diversity on innovation. In addition, we do not find evidence of a mediating role of innovation within the board gender diversity-firm performance relationship.

International audience; Previous studies have found inconclusive results regarding the effects of board gender diversity on firm financial performance. This paper tackles this issue in the context of the French listed firms over the 2009-2011 period. Our results show evidence of a negative and significant effect of the percentage of female directors on financial firm performance. This suggests that adding more women in an indiscriminate fashion to boards of directors may be counter-productive and leads to lower firm performance. The effect on firm performance is, however, insignificant when the presence of women on corporate boards is measured using a dummy variable. We also document that accounting for the endogeneity issue is crucial to assess the nature of the relation between the variables under consideration.

In recent years, gender diversity in the boardroom and more generally within organizations, has gained considerable interest in public debate, academic research, government agenda, and corporate strategy. Previously considered as a social issue, gender diversity on boards of directors is increasingly perceived as a value-driver in organizational strategy and corporate governance for several reasons (Terjesen, Sealy and Singh, 2009). Firstly, as institutional investors begin to take into account board diversity, this matter progressively becomes part of their investment practices (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003). Fair employment practices for women are now part of the criteria of many social investment indices (e.g. FTSE4Good or Domini 400 Social Index). Secondly, board diversity is required by important stakeholders, such as customers or employees. The consideration of stakeholders’ preferences, aspirations, and concerns might be beneficial for firms through improved customer loyalty, and employee motivation (e.g. Powell, 1999). Thirdly, recent legislation and diversity initiatives worldwide have pointed out the importance of female representation on boards of directors. For example, the Norwegian government requires companies to appoint at least 40% of women. Spain and France have implemented the same affirmative actions by 2015 and 2017 respectively (Terjesen et al, 2009). Fourthly, board diversity issues have also been discussed by best practices in corporate governance. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (in the United States) or the Higgs Review (in the United Kingdom) encourages more diversity on corporate boards (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Dalton and Dalton, 2008). Finally, gender diversity is on companies’ agenda, since more women are in top management positions today. Therefore, the pipeline of female directors and women CEOs is expected to increase in the coming years (Helfat, Harris and Wolfson, 2006).

Cet article examine le lien entre la diversité des genres au conseil d’administration et la performance des firms à l’aide de la regression quantile. Cette approche dynamique permet en effet de capturer l’impact de la présence des femmes sur les différents quantiles de la distribution conditionnelle de la performance, au lieu de sa moyenne. Nos résultats, à partir d’un échantillon de firmes faisant partie du SBF 120, montrent que l’impact de la diversité des genres sur la performance varie en function des quantiles et depend de la mesure de performance en question. En particulier, la diversité des genres influence négativement le Q de Tobin et positivement le taux de rendement de l’actif investi.JEL classification : G30; G34; J16, This article examines the link between board gender diversity and firm performance from a dynamic perspective through quantile regression, which allows us to capture the potential impact of female representation at different points of the distributions of the performance measure. Our results from a panel of French listed companies (SBF 120) show that the impact of board gender diversity on firm performance differs across quantiles and depends on the measure of performance under consideration. Typically, board gender diversity affects negatively the Tobin’s Q and positively the return on asset when these variables are high and low, respectively.JEL classification: G30; G34; J16, Este artículo examina la relación entre la diversidad de género en el Consejo de Administración y el rendimiento de las empresas con la ayuda de la regresión cuantil. Este enfoque dinámico permite en efecto capturar el impacto de la presencia de las mujeres en los diferentes cuantiles de la distribución condicional del rendimiento en lugar de su media. Nuestros resultados, a partir de una muestra de empresas incluidas en el SBF 120, ponen de manifiesto que el impacto de la diversidad de género en el rendimiento varía según el cuantil y depende de la medida de este rendimiento. En particular, la diversidad de género influye negativamente el Q de Tobin y positivamente el coeficiente de rentabilidad de los activos invertidos.Clasificación JEL: G30; G34; J16