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This study investigates the impact of women directors on a firm’s sustainable growth rate. Using data from 2003 to 2017 for Chinese listed firms, we found a positive relationship between women directors and a sustainable growth rate. Our study also contributes to institutional theory by providing evidence that this positive relationship is more effective in legal-person-controlled firms than state-controlled firms. In comparison, women independent directors have a stronger influence than women executive directors on sustainable growth. Similarly, board gender diversity with three or more female directors substantially affects firms’ sustainable growth, consistent with critical mass theory. Our study’s findings are robust in terms of alternative estimations techniques, variable specifications, and different identification strategies, such as two-stage least squares and propensity score matching. Our study provides novel evidence on women directors’ role in increasing firms’ sustainable growth rate by adding a new dimension to the ongoing debate in the gender diversity literature.

This study investigates the relationship between gender diversity on the board and dividend payouts in China using a large sample over the period 2003–2017. Our results provide robust and strong evidence showing that gender diversity on the board is positively associated with cash payments of dividends. The empirical outcomes confirm that gender diversity on the board facilitates corporate governance and subsequently promotes dividend payouts. We demonstrate that gender diversity on the board has the greatest effect when the board has critical mass participation (three or more female directors) compared with only their token participation. However, independent female directors increase dividend payouts, while female executive directors do not have a significant impact. Furthermore, we extend the literature on the relationship between dividend payments and government ownership by providing evidence that gender diversity has a higher impact on dividend payouts for state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises. After controlling the endogeneity problems, our findings are reliable and robust. JEL classifications: G30, G35