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This paper tracks the rise of German dominance since Bismarck’s unification of Germany in 1871 and during the 20th century, when the Germans used their economic, demographic, and military power in addition to geopolitical theories, particularly the vital space theory, to support expansionism. The «German question» evolved in the wake of the two world wars as the European States’ main concern was how to maintain a peaceful, powerful Germany. Following the Ukrainian war, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared Germany’s goal to have the greatest army in Europe, modernize military industries, and allocate 100 billion Euros for the defense budget. Accordingly, as strong Germany, historically, has always sought to dominate its neighbors, the paper examines the possible scenarios for the rise of Germany and its dominance over the European Union. What will be the repercussions of Germany’s rise on the future of the European Union and its institutions, and the potential incentives for cooperation and collaboration among European nations? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

»Die militärischen Ursprünge der Arbeitsschutzgesetzgebung im deutschen Kaiserreich«. Prussia, and since its founding in 1871 the German Empire, were pioneers in the introduction of general conscription and one of the largest military powers in Europe. At the same time, the German Empire was seen as a pioneer in public social policy. Using the example of labor protection, this article examines whether and to what extent connections existed between general conscription, power ambitions of governments, and social protection. It seeks to determine what role military reasons played in the expansion of German labor protection by analyzing the military's influence on legislation between the early 19th century and the end of the First World War. This examination will show that military arguments have gained great importance over time but have never, with the exception of the First World War, been the dominant motive for welfare reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Die Kaiserlichen Schutztruppen waren im Unterschied zur Preußischen Armee und zur Marine der Kaiserlichen Kommandogewalt weitgehend entzogen. Dieser Bruch mit der konservativen Militärpolitik wurde dadurch ermöglicht, dass die politischen und militärischen Eliten in der Gründungsphase der Schutzgebiete und -truppen den absoluten Primat auf die kontinentale Sicherheit legten und ein ernsthaftes Engagement der etablierten Streitkräfte an der Peripherie entschieden ablehnten. Den Führungsspitzen der Armee und der Marine missfiel es aber grundsätzlich, dass die leitenden Stellen der zivilen Kolonialbehörden militärische Kernkompetenzen ausübten. Durch die ganze Institutionsgeschichte der Schutztruppe hindurch sollten sie daher in einem Konflikt mit den Kolonialbehörden über die konstitutionelle Stellung dieser militärischen Formation stehen. Zwar blieb die zivile Kontrolle über das Militär in den Kolonien auf dem Papier erhalten, sie konnte in ausgeprägten Bedrohungslagen dem Druck der Militärs jedoch nicht standhalten. So ignorierte der Kommandeur der ostafrikanischen Schutztruppe, von Lettow-Vorbeck, alle verfassungsrechtlichen Hindernisse und übernahm die militärische Macht im Schutzgebiet. Obwohl es sich dabei letztlich um einen Militärputsch handelt, war Lettow-Vorbecks Handlungsweise zutiefst in der preußischen Militärtradition verankert und machte es möglich, dass der Kommandeur zum Kriegshelden wurde. In contrast to the extra-constitutional position of army and navy in Imperial Germany, the German colonial troops were not under the exclusive command of the Kaiser. This contradicted Prussian military traditions. The specific constitutional position of Germany's colonial troops was largely the result of a lack of interest by army and navy. To the latter the colonial fringe was of little importance in a future war. Yet, as a matter of principle, the military authorities insisted on denying civilian administrators a say in military affairs. Consequently army and navy fought a long battle with the colonial office over the constitutional position of the colonial troops. In the end the notion of civilian control over the military in the colonies prevailed. But this victory over the traditions of Prussian militarism remained on paper. When crisis struck in summer of 1914, the military commander in German East Africa, von Lettow Vorbeck, ignored all constitutional obstacles and simply took control of the war effort. Although this action ended up in a coup it was deeply rooted in Prussian military tradition and therefore made it possible for Lettow Vorbeck to become a war hero. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October 1917 the German army and navy were able to mount a successful joint operation to seize the Baltic islands in the Gulf of Riga. Although undertaken by each service for motives of its own, and against disintegrating Russian resistance, Operation Albion was the kind of improvised operation at which the German army in particular excelled. The operation featured an interesting employment of aircraft, and marked about the only time in the First World War where the German army and navy were able to co-operate successfully. The landings secured the islands of Oesel, Moon and Dagö, thus giving the Germans the ability to use the port facilities at Riga. After the war, however, the German military establishment quickly forgot about this operation, and paid little if any attention to it in both its professional military publications and in the Kriegsakademie. Thus Albion was an unlearned lesson for the Germans in the interwar period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]