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Reassessing the reasons for the German military success over France in War of 1870 up to the Battle of Sedan, we rely on publications of contemporary artillery generals, such as Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen and put the topic into the broader context of warfare since the 1866 German War. We reject the idea of success, being simply based on armament or a special 'soldierly spirit', but argue that the main reason for military success was based on reorganization of the Prussian artillery, which paved the way to the future 'battle of combined arms' and the dominance of fire over thrust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article combines linguistic discourse analysis with role theory to create a role-theoretic discourse analysis framework for German security policy. To illustrate this, we employ topos analysis on 30 plenary minutes of parliamentary debates regarding the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, conducted by German Members of Parliament between 2001 and 2014. We interpret their perception of Germany's roles in light of key behavioral norms related to German security policy. The parliamentary discourse, shaped by topoi, sets the stage for decisions on German military operations abroad. The use of topoi is influenced by dominant thought patterns, particularly the perspective on Germany's role in security policy held by the political elite. Political decisions, in turn, reflect behavioral preferences guided by these viewpoints. Our research reveals how changes in German security policy are mirrored in the discourse. This discourse is structured around five categories of topoi for legitimizing or delegitimizing military operations abroad: necessity, obligation, self-interest, capability and preparedness, and solution. An evaluation of the use of topoi through the lens of role theory indicates that perceptions of Germany's role have evolved over time, encompassing roles such as a "civilian power," a "normal state," and an "agenda-setting role" in sync with its foreign military engagements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, German public health authorities launched various infection control procedures. In line with this, anti-pandemic infection control was also implemented for German military and police deployments. The presented study assessed the impact of this increased infection control effort on deployment-associated infections in a holistic approach. To do so, the results of post-deployment assessments offered to German soldiers and police officers at the Department of Tropical Medicine and Infectious Diseases of the Bundeswehr Hospital Hamburg obtained during the pandemic period were compared to the results recorded during the pre-pandemic period in an exploratory, hypothesis-forming comparative study. In total, data from 1010 military deployments and 134 police deployments, predominantly to the African or the Eastern Mediterranean WHO regions, were included in the analyses. In the main results, a significant decrease in gastroenteritis in deployed soldiers (20.1% versus 61.3%, p < 0.0001) and at least a trend in the same direction in deployed police officers (25.7% versus 35.4%, p = 0.4026) were shown for the pandemic period, while no consistent tendency into the one or the other direction was detectable for febrile illness on deployment. In contrast to the finding of less frequently reported deployment-associated gastroenteritis, the detection rates of enteric microorganisms after deployment, including poor hygiene-related colonization with apathogenic protozoa, remained unchanged. Regarding non-enteric infections, the numbers of serologically confirmed malaria cases on deployment and as expected, due to increased airway protection, Mycobacterium tuberculosis-specific immune-conversion dropped significantly with p = 0.0037 and p = 0.009, respectively. As a side finding, soldiers and police officers with post-deployment medical assessments were more likely to be older and male during the pandemic compared to the pre-pandemic period. In summary, only minor changes in deployment-associated infection and colonization rates were seen in response to the increased infection control procedures during the pandemic period, apart from respiratory infections. In particular, the clinical finding of less gastroenteritis on deployment was not matched by a concordant decline in poor hygiene-related enteric colonization with apathogenic protozoa in the soldiers' guts, indicating that the fecal–oral transmission risk remained basically the same. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Georg Stammer is certainly not one of those people who are immediately associated with the German military intelligence service. But his private address in Berlin's Courbierestraße became notorious, which soon also presented the English intelligence service with some puzzles and was also used by German agents (including Carl Hans Lody) as a cover address. After the end of World War I, Stammer was immediately involved in the reconstruction of intelligence structures and soonjoined the camouflaged naval intelligence service. Here he was mainly active for the development of counterespionage. From 1926 Stammer built up the industrial espionage of the Navy. After a few years in retirement, Stammer died in 1936 in Berlin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has seen the global growth of military-style reality television programming. These programmes, produced by militaries themselves or through collaboration with the entertainment sector, have proven to be an effective and increasingly powerful public relations conduit. Our article offers a theoretical treatment of reality television, both the aesthetic modes by which it invites the viewing subject as well as the political economy of its use in public relations. These dimensions are explored through two case studies. First, we focus on the genesis of military-style reality TV in the United States, where, after 9/11, the US military seized on the genre to pioneer and field-test various themes in response to public exigency as the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq drew on. Second, we analyse the German military as both a latecomer and innovator to these new public relations endeavours. By reading the generic and aesthetic strategies in both cases, we argue that the genre's public relations function goes beyond the immediate task of recruitment to cultivate civic participation in militaristic fantasies through a mediasphere rife with invitations to 'go soldier'. Military reality TV, we argue, represents the militarization of civic identity and the gradual displacement of values from deliberative to authoritarian, cosmopolitan to nationalistic and diplomatic to combative. Jeux éliminatoires : L'essor mondial de la télé-réalité militaire et la formation du citoyen sujet [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

After regaining independence in 1918, Poland faced many fundamental and strategic challenges. One of them was the issue of border crossings on the German-Polish border in Silesia. It was a region dominated by modern heavy industry, to which both the modern states laid claim. The course of the border was to be decided by a plebiscite, but the parties to the conflict resorted to violence and military means. In a complicated international situation and without the possibility of open military intervention, Poland effectively used the strategic tool of special operations – known more widely today as unconventional warfare. Thanks to their skillful application, the German military advantage was effectively eliminated and strategic goals were achieved. Poles effectively cut lines of communication, making it impossible to support pro-German organizations in Silesia, and successfully organized insurgent forces that achieved the goals important for Poland's development policy. This paper tells the story of a special mission unit called the Destruction Group 'Wawelberg' and its use as a tool for implementing the state policy of unconventional warfare during the Third Silesian Uprising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The COVID-19 pandemic changed not only the working conditions but also the private conditions we live in. Health care professionals especially were confronted with multiple stressors, e.g., the risk of infection, lack of staff, and high workloads. Methods: To estimate some of the pandemic-related impacts this anonymous personnel survey was conducted in two German military hospitals (Hamburg and Berlin). This study presents a comparative analysis of the hospital staff in general vs. the psychiatric personnel (N = 685) at two measurement time points (MTPs) in April 2021 (n = 399) and December 2021 (n = 286). The survey contains the German version of the Covid Stress Scale (CSS) to assess the perceived level of pandemicrelated stress, the Patient Health Questionnaire (German Version: PHQ-D) to screen for three major mental disorders, and the adjustment disorder--New Module (ADNM) to estimate the problems of adaptation to change. Results: The results showed a process of adaptation over the two MTPs with significant stress reduction at MTP2 in the general staff. The psychiatric staff did not report significantly higher pandemic-related symptoms. Quite the contrary, not only did the CSS show significantly lower xenophobia, traumatic stress, and compulsive checking, but the PHQ also showed lower stress symptoms and somatic symptoms at both MTPs. Also, the ADNM scores delivered evidence for a more effective adaptation process in psychiatric personnel (e.g., depressive mood, avoidance, anxiety). Discussion: The presented results must be interpreted while taking the unique situations of German military clinics into account. The supply of protective material was sufficient and there was no dramatic shortage of psychiatric staff during the pandemic. The inpatients were quite often (40%) elective treatments for trauma-related disorders, which could be discontinued in the case of a COVID-19 infection. The results of this study showed good adaptative skills among the psychiatric staff in military hospitals, which could be interpreted as a sign of good resilience. This might have led to lower stress-related symptoms during the COVID-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Üsküdar Universitiy Journal of Social Sciences is the property of Uskudar University Journal of Social Sciences (JOSOC) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Even after the First World War, the British and German armies remained strongly influenced by Clausewitz, for whom personality rather than mass was the best means to reduce friction. This article explores how this was reflected in their military doctrine between the two world wars. The German regulations showed a clear alignment with Clausewitz's thinking. The British tended to focus on the characteristics Clausewitz had argued were necessary for the troops, rather than for their commanders. The campaigns of 1939/40 caused the Germans to place even greater emphasis on boldness, while the British focused on steadiness and caution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The capture of Sevastopol, on 4 July 1942, and the military developments of the following months marked a genuine peak of German military presence and power at the Black Sea. Until the autumn of 1944, this presence would be history, after a quasi-uninterrupted series of Red Army successes. In this article, the impact of these military and political developments on Romania and Bulgaria and the relations between the two neighbouring states west of the Black Sea is analysed. Thus, from the position of asymmetrical allies of the Third Reich, Romania and Bulgaria would finally almost simultaneously become allies of the Soviet Union, but still find themselves in asymmetrical positions compared to the new regional hegemon. The bibliography of the article includes important Romanian, Bulgarian and Western historiographical contributions, which vary in terms of typology and range, to which many documents from the Romanian military archives, partly original ones, are added. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyzes the character and development of the Swedish Brigade, a small military volunteer unit in the Finnish Civil War of 1918, in the context of the European counter-revolution. Volunteers in the various civil wars following the Russian Revolution have been studied extensively before, but have largely focused on countries that participated in the First World War. This case study of the 'White' Swedish Brigade aims to highlight the importance of volunteers from neutral countries, and their specific role in the transnational counter-revolutionary movement. The Brigade was an ostensibly politically neutral unit, with a socially heterogeneous make-up. Heavily supported by the Swedish right-wing media, it was widely romanticized as a heroic effort to restore Sweden's honour by supporting the Finnish fight against the old Russian enemy, and defending the former Swedish province as a bulwark of Swedish culture, law and order against barbarism. While its political culture was steeped in a romanticized Finno-Swedish history and culture, shared by many of the volunteers, the brigadiers were quickly confronted by the realities of poor equipment and organization, political division, and above all an exceptionally brutal civil war and the morally degrading violence it entailed. Brigade archive documents and memoirs show that this quickly changed the character of the actual volunteer unit to contrast heavily with the right-wing press's romantic imagination. Additionally, through contacts with the Finnish and German military, and in the face of a Left Swedish critique of the Brigade as reactionary butchers, many of the volunteers reconceptualized their role in the civil war, not as one of heroic and historical significance for Sweden, but as part of a vicious European struggle against Bolshevism. This seems to some extent confirmed by their post-war history, which raises interesting questions about these volunteers' roles among the new Right of interwar Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Apart from million fold death and suffering, the battle of Stalingrad is also a testament to the failure of the military elite who did not oppose the criminal Nazi regime even when its unscrupulous actions were directed against subordinate soldiers and their own person. This happened upon the Volga not for the first and by far not the last time. On the contrary, Stalingrad was to become the writing on the wall for a German warfare that increasingly lacked military sensibility and ideological alternatives. In this respect, it is not completely without justification that today the historical place is generally regarded as a code for the turn of World War II in the European theatre. The efficacy of the Battle of Stalingrad in the German culture of remembrance has various causes. The course of military events was just one of them. In particular, because the German military planning and conduct of operations needs to be viewed with scepticism, the staging of the collapse of the 6th Army became all the more important. From the very beginning, "Stalingrad" was more of a "felt" turn of the war than an actual one. This was another reason why the perishing of an entire German army put the Nazi regime under pressure for an explanation which they wanted to solve primarily with pathos. The heroisation of "fighting to the last" worked surprisingly well until 1945 and was reflected in the Germans persevering until the end of the war despite the increasingly obvious defeat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this paper, we estimate the effects of mandatory military and alternative community service by exploiting the post‐cold war decrease in the need for soldiers causing a substantial number of potential conscripts not to be drafted into the German military. The study is based on retrospective survey information for 655 men from the 1970 to 1984 birth cohorts collected in 2009/10 and after, using previously unavailable information on degree of fitness in the military's medical exam as a control variable. We test for the effects of mandatory service on wages, employment, volunteer work, marriage/partnership status, and satisfaction with various aspects of life. Whilst many estimates are not statistically significant, for the younger birth cohorts 1976 to 1984, we find some evidence of a lower hourly wage due to mandatory military service, which shows a negative point estimate of −15% with a large confidence interval of between −30 and −0.2%. This interval estimate is consistent with previous findings for the United States, Denmark, and the Netherlands. However, we also find statistically significant estimates for both military and alternative community service to increase participation in volunteer work, a hitherto rarely explored effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The activity of the German Military Mission in Romania in 1940 consisted mainly of training the Romanian armed forces in accordance with the new techniques of war. The efficiency of this military mission was strongly reflected among the Romanian armed forces from the perspective of the Romanian soldier’s training and morale. These defining aspects are addressed in the present article, using the method of historiographical investigation and comparative analysis. The objective historical analysis of Romanian-German relations during the German Military Mission in Romania highlights a legal issue, because between the two countries there were no alliance treaties or military conventions as the legal basis for Romania’s participation alongside Germany in the war, most of the subordination of the Romanian armed forces to the German echelons of command being done by verbal agreement. At the same time, the German Military Mission had a dominant influence on the activities of the General Headquarters and the General Staff, minimising their responsibilities for the design and command of the Romanian armed forces in the theatre of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Military sociology in Germany showed itself in the studies after the Second World War, and as in most countries of the world, American sociological models formed the basis of early German Military Sociology. In particular, the work of Janowitz and Huntington has had a significant impact on German Military Sociology. In addition, research centers funded by the German Armed Forces and publicly-funded foundations, often affiliated with a German political party, carried out military sociological research at certain times. The studies carried out in these centers were not limited to applied research on urgent military problems, but also basic, theory-oriented research on the relationship between the army and society. In this article, the foundational motives, academic institutionalization adventure and basic methodological and theoretical orientation of German Military Sociology are examined. In addition, compared to its Anglo-Saxon counterpart, inadequacies of German Military Sociology through the eyes of German military sociologists are discussed. This study aims to contribute to military sociology studies, which are few in number in Turkish literature. It is also evaluated that along with the American Military Sociology, German Military Sociology can also offer an alternative for research in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dennis Showalter's influence on the scholarship of the First World War is unmatched among American historians. His work is especially important for two reasons. First, it studies the German Army using primary sources and original research, a particularly valuable contribution given the mythic and just plain false associations that many amateur scholars place on the German military. Second, Dennis's career involved long stretches of teaching cadets and military officers. His work thus combined an appreciation of the problems of the past with the challenges of the present day. The second half of this essay renders homage to that tradition by examining patterns in Dennis's writings of the First World War that remain relevant to an understanding of war in our own time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Second, it shows that the violence in these German military brothels existed within a broader framework of pervasive and ongoing sexualized violence that accompanied German occupation, which impacted all aspects of the German occupation regime in Rostov-on-Don. After this, soldiers waited in the main floor hall until a woman was available, at which point they would accompany them upstairs to the woman's assigned "cabinet."[24] Voronina reported that there were sometimes brawls involving soldiers in the downstairs hall, but that the commandant quickly calmed the men down.[25] As soon as one soldier left, a woman would immediately proceed to her next client. "In her work at the casino", Voronina explained, "she saw the only hope of escape from physical torture and begged [that I] help her get a job as a 'waitress.'" Knowing how the "waitresses" at the "casino" were treated, Voronina worked hard to calm the girl down and convince her not to work in the brothel.[69] Fear of deportation for forced labor seems to have been the animating motivation for many Rostov residents to volunteer to work in the city. On Christmas Eve 1942, in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, a soldiers' brothel opened its doors for business.[2] Set up and run by the occupying German army (the Wehrmacht), this establishment provided military men a place to pay for a brief sexual encounter with a local woman. [Extracted from the article]

During the Second World War, in 1941–1944, Nazi German troops held the frontal responsibility of the Arctic front in Finnish Lapland. In this paper, we present the first zooarchaeological study of the wartime faunal remains from German military camps in Lapland. This illustrates the supply situation of both the German soldiers and their multinational prisoners. The official military supply was substantially supplemented with local food sources, namely, with the local semi‐domesticated reindeer that dominates the bone assemblage. Bones of cattle, ovicaprines, and pig occur in lower numbers and appear to represent the German long‐distance supply chain stretching from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Ocean. The remains of reindeer and wild species remind of the close interactions with locals and of the prisoners' hunting activities to supplement their meager diet. Even if the reindeer bones dominate both the soldiers' and prisoners' faunal assemblages, there are notable differences in the body parts, with bones from meatier portions always found in the soldiers' food waste. Besides highlighting a tension between the military supply and everyday demands, the faunal remains can draw attention to wider anthropological questions that reach beyond the information available in historical documents, such as adaptations into an alien northern environment. This emphasizes the importance of zooarchaeological analyses of recent past faunal materials from superficially familiar contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As soon as the German military authority established temporary administration for the occupied Polish area in September 1939, its main administrative centre was located in Łódź. The decision was made in accordance with Hitler's will in order to degrade the status of Warsaw. Łódź was the headquarters of Chief of Administration Hans Frank, who was personally appointed by Hitler and later, after 26 October, became Governor-General. His headquarters still remained in Łódź after the establishment of the General Government (at the end of October and at beginning of November). It was there that he made his firsts decisions concerning the entire area of the General Government. Hans Frank only moved to Krakow on 7 November. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political claims about the real world are abundant in video games, and the medium persuades uniquely through procedural rhetoric, the rules of behavior contained in computational code. The transnational scope of the video game industry makes it productive ground for interrogating how a game's persuasion might influence international audiences with nationally situated politics. The 2012 third-person shooter Spec Ops: The Line, produced by the German studio Yager Development, depicts the international concern of a fictional conflict in the Middle East and the atrocities of failed military intervention. The game's core procedural rhetoric, which tasks players to push ahead at all costs, cautions an international audience about the futility of deploying military power abroad, a warning that mirrors particularly German political anxieties. The game's depiction of extreme violence—and the player's participation in it—raises further questions about the cultural status of the medium in the country and abroad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 27 June 1941 Hungary entered the war against the Soviet Union, fielding a 90,000-man strong force (consisting of the 'Carpathian Group' and the 'Rapid Corps') that was attached to Army Group South. This study examines two issues related to the participation of Hungarian troops in 1941. First it establishes how the subordination to Germany determined the use of Hungarian formations. A close Hungarian-German military cooperation developed prior to Operation Barbarossa, especially during the campaign against Yugoslavia in April 1941. The Rapid Corps and the Carpathian Group were placed under German subordination in July-August 1941. It led to friction as Hungary, which in the interwar period had prepared for a war against small and medium-sized neighbouring powers, was pressured to conduct operations against the much more advanced Red Army. Satisfying German demands provoked constant controversy about the extent of the Hungarian involvement in the operations on the Eastern Front, also within the Hungarian military elite. Due to these differences of opinion, the pro-German general Henrik Werth was relieved as the Chief of the General Staff in September 1941, and Lieutenant General Ferenc Szombathelyi was appointed in his place. The study then examines the first months of the Hungarian occupation of Soviet territories. In the summer of 1941, a unique opportunity presented itself to establish an independent Hungarian occupation administration. The Hungarian government tried to use this opportunity to implement its anti-Semitic plans and to enforce its economic interests. However, the Carpathian Group, which from August 1941 was incorporated into the German military command structure, increasingly became the executor of German occupation policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies identified service members of the United States (US) Armed Forces as a high-risk group for suicide. A significant increase in the suicide rate in the US Armed Forces was found in recent years. To date, there is no military suicide statistic available for the German Armed Forces. This study examined attempted and completed suicides in active service members of the German Armed Forces between 2010 and 2016 retrospectively, on the basis of archived personal and medical records in the central archives of the Medical Service of German Armed Forces. The primary goal was to establish a suicide-statistic for the German Armed Forces and to calculate and compare the suicides rates with the German population. Secondary every case's data was analysed the groups of attempted and completed suicides were compared. 262 attempted suicides and 148 completed suicides were included in this study (N = 410). The suicide rates of the German Armed Forces peaked over the years 2014–2015 with a suicide rate of 15–16/100.000 active military service members and exceeded the civilian suicide rate in Germany of around 12/100.000 people during those years, although no general trend could be determined. These service members were mostly young men (attempted suicide 81.7%, completed suicide 99.3%), at the age of 17 - <35 years old (87% attempted suicide, 68,3% completed suicide), and were employed less than 6 years in the German Armed Forces (attempted suicide 72.9%, completed suicide 46.3%). Service members with attempted suicides belonged mostly to the military North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-rank-group for other ranks (lowermost military professionals) OR-1 –OR-4 (48.1%) or to the rank-group OR-6 –OR-9 in the group of completed suicides (34.5%). Only in about one third of cases a psychiatric diagnosis could be found in the records. Most frequent diagnoses were neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders (International Classification of Diseases Tenth Revision^ICD-10: F4) in 46.8%, and affective disorders (ICD-10: F3) in 43.3% of all cases. In the majority of cases there were signs for potential stressors in the private sector (attempted suicide 90.6%, completed suicide 82.6%). No typical risk factors which would enable a specific prevention could be identified in this analysis. Therefore, should preventive strategies be aiming at a multi-level intervention program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As early as 1931, Gustave Bertrand of the French intelligence services received from the traitor Hans Thilo Schmidt documents concerning the Enigma cipher machine. This machine was intended to equip all the German military forces. This is the beginning of an epic that has probably changed the History. The main documents collected by Bertrand have not been destroyed and are available in the archives of the French Army (SHD). This article describes and analyzes each of these documents, including the evolution of the Enigma and its procedures related in these documents. In conclusion, the article lists the findings that come from reading these originals and first and foremost the impact of having a cipher message with its plaintext on the British attempt to recover Enigma rotors wiring. Oddly enough, it seems that this message was not used by the Poles to break the Enigma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public security is caused by various factors: from crime prevention to global security needs. Public security includes public relations regarding liquidation of dangerous consequences for human health and lives caused by criminal offences and natural disasters and elimination of reasons causing such consequences. According to A. Maslow, security is a primal need arising after struggle for survival; thus, other needs can be satisfied only after meeting the security need. The First and the Second World Wars as well as dislocation places of Russian military forces are the main reasons of Lithuanian territories contamination with explosives. Military conflicts and armed struggle are key factors in discussion regarding contaminated territories all over the world. Lithuanian territories contamination with explosives has been still a relevant problem because news is coming in of human encountering explosives remaining from war that was 70 year ago. These findings are threatening public security, health and life. Danger to security occurs due to the fact that explosives can be hit while digging ground and sometimes people do not recognize explosives or think that they are not dangerous. These thoughts can be denied by the numbers of dead or injured people, who treated war findings without precaution. Therefore, the aim of this article -- to discuss influence of contaminated territories with explosives on public security. In order to do this, the following objectives are identified: to discuss the concept of explosives and the risk to public; to describe the relevance of the problem in other countries in the world; to estimate the relevance of the problem of contamination with explosives in Kaunas city and Kaunas district. In order to discuss the danger of remaining explosives from war to public, concepts of explosive and explosions are described as well as danger of unexploded ordnances and their occurrences in Kaunas city and Kaunas district. These territories were chosen due to the fact that battles of the First and the Second World Wars took place more or less in these territories; in addition, separate German military troops and Russian military forces were dislocated there. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From October 1940, the activity of the German Military Mission to Romania had multiple consequences over the Romanian-German relations during the regime of Ion Antonescu. The presence of the German troops marked not only Romania's irreversible entry into the German sphere of influence and the beginning of the process of readjustment of the Romanian army to the requirements of modern warfare, but also Romania's involvement in the military plans of the Third Reich. The role of the German Military Mission as a "transmission belt" between the Wehrmacht and the Romanian army would become apparent during the preparations of the operations "Marita" and especially "Barbarossa". To this end, one of the most important tasks of the German Military Mission was to evaluate the combat capacity of the Romanian army in view of the projected operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The historiography of the German opposition to Hitler involved in the putsch on 20 July 1944 is very mature. Nevertheless we still lack a comprehensive view of the involvement in Nazi excesses of many major participants. This article presents new evidence and consolidates earlier knowledge about three key actors, Colonel Claus Schenk Count von Stauffenberg, Brigadier General Henning von Tresckow, and Fritz-Dietlof Count von der Schulenburg. It demonstrates that they were prima facie perpetrators of Crimes against peace, War crimes, and Crimes against humanity, as defined by international jurisprudence after 1945. The article should inform future studies of the conspiracy and of the mental trajectories of its participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the period immediately following the Second World War, during which Germany was occupied by the four victorious Allies, fierce competition erupted between them over the spoils of German military science and technology. Among this four-power squabbling, the British and Soviet authorities engaged in a particularly desperate struggle, especially over recruitment of expert German personnel, which they felt might give them the edge in any future conflict. This article explores the policies which arose from this struggle and shows that the first act of the Cold War arms race played out most vividly amongst the ruins of the Third Reich. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of College of Education is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Botulinum toxin is nowadays approved as an effective medication for various neurological disorders. The extreme toxicity of this toxin-inducing botulism, a severe lethal muscle-paralyzing illness, has been well known since the seminal works of the end of the 19th century. Because of this toxicity, botulinum toxin was one of the first agents to be considered for use as a biological weapon. The Second World War was a crucial period for the first attempts to weaponize this toxin even if many unknown factors about botulinum toxin still existed at the outbreak of the war. Using documents from the British National Archives and other published sources, we discuss the main points of the attempts to weaponize this toxin in German and Allied armies. During WW2, Allied intelligence services regularly reported a major German threat related to the potential use of botulinum toxin as a biological weapon, especially during the preparation of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion to liberate Europe. All these reports would ultimately prove to be inaccurate: botulinum toxin was not part of the German military arsenal even if some German scientists tried to use the results of the French pre-war military research. Misinformation spread by intelligence services stimulated military research at Porton Down facilities in England and at Camp Detrick in the USA. These studies led to a succession of failures and myths about the weaponization of botulinum toxin. Nevertheless, major progress (purification, toxoid) arose from the military research, providing useful data for the first steps of the therapeutic use of botulinum toxin in the post-war years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why to go back to 1985 to discuss present-day key concerns of international relations from the perspective of World War II history during the Cold War? The May 5, 1985 Bitburg cemetery celebrations, when US president altogether with German chancellor (Helmut Kohl) paid tribute to WWII veterans (of both sides of the conflict) was an example of the Ronald Reagan administration's public relations fiasco: the "Great Communicator" failed to refer to WWII history in a manner that would save him from harsh criticism. Importantly, the 1985 debate concerning the Bitburg ceremony and the moral aspects of a homage to German (Axis) WWII soldiers gave an incentive to "Historikerstreit" in Germany, a dispute regarding WWII history in a manner comparable to Holocaust responsibility as a collective burden carried by Germans. The Bitburg cemetery, since the 1930s a monument (Kolmeshöhe Ehrenfriedhof) to WWI German military victims, and then to their younger colleagues during WWII (Wehrmacht and, controversially, Waffen-SS) remained a broadly commented upon focal point of Cold War disputes, allowing such questions that might bring about a possibility of ground-breaking change in present-day political rivalries caused by failed (or successful) Cold War propaganda related to WWII choices. The Bitburg case presents itself as a particularly illustrative one and could also shed more light on the post-Soviet Russian effort to increase its influence by relying on the myths of the "Great Patriotic War". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following article explores the collective identifications (or self-perceptions) among members of the Danish-speaking minority in the Imperial German Army during the First World War, including views on German conscription and military service. Danish historians have traditionally portrayed the minority as soldiers who only served with reluctance, hoping for German defeat in the war and a 'reunification' between their home-region, North Schleswig, and the State of Denmark. However, the vast majority of Danish-speakers were well integrated in the German army and served as reliable soldiers throughout the course of the war. At first glance, this seems to constitute a contradiction, but this article will illustrate how members of the Danish minority, in order to serve as loyal soldiers, on the one hand reconciled ideas of both Danish and regional affiliation, as well as ancestral loyalty and civic rights, with feelings of coercion, discrimination and German enmity on the other. Furthermore, feelings of obligation, responsibility and civic duty was also connected with German military service. It will be argued that the key to understand the sometimes-contradictory self-perceptions of the Danish minority soldiers lays in how many-sided understandings of community encased or negotiated feelings of reluctance. If the war experiences of the Danish-speaking minority are viewed in a purely national perspective, it become difficult to explain the various forms of self-perception present in the source material: For instance, German military service could be justified as a way to secure Danish interests regionally within the German state, and a way to improve civic rights for the minority group. In this way, the self-perceptions of a minority soldiers could be Danish in terms of national affiliation, but to a high degree collective 'identity' also had the regional community at its centre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany was the first Western nation to formally implement an object designed to assist with the identification of wounded and dead soldiers, introducing theRekognitionmarke in 1869 following the trial of an identity disc system in 1866. A new design, the Erkennungsmarke, was introduced in 1878, shaping the systems utilized in later wars. The German experience of wearing identifying objects would later influence the identification systems of other European armies, including France and Britain; ultimately resulting in the addition of new articles within the 1906 Geneva Convention to reflect changing attitudes and expectations towards those who died fighting for their country. The Erkennungsmarke presented the possibility of identification, even where immediate burial was not possible, thus facilitating the development of German military burial cultures. This paper explores the development and use of Erkennungsmarken between 1866–1918, information which can assist with the identification of German soldiers recovered during archaeological works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The physics, experimental setup, and analysis of results involved in Walther Bothe and Peter Jensen's mistaken 1941 measurement of the capture cross section for thermal neutrons by carbon are examined. Their experiment, while well‐conceived and executed, was corrupted by the presence of unappreciated impurities. This erroneous measurement was crucial as it prompted a decision by German military administrators to abandon graphite as a possible moderator for a nuclear pile in favor of heavy water, a decision which set their program back irreparably. In early 1941, Walther Bothe measured the cross‐section for capture of thermal neutrons by graphite as part of the wartime German nuclear program. The graphite contained impurities, which resulted in a large cross‐section and its rejection as a moderating material. This paper analyses the experiment and speculates on the nature of the impurities that may have been involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Amme Idaresi Dergisi is the property of Public Administration Institute for Turkey & the Middle East (TODAIE) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Following the end of World War II the U.S. Army Map Service distributed maps captured from the German military to research libraries across the United States, where they have remained largely hidden collections. One focus of the University of California Berkeley's German World War II captured maps digitization project has been the creation of detailed metadata for the German military map series. Data-rich catalog records with information about source maps and the need to do authority work for related corporate bodies provided entry points for exploring issues of provenance. The topographic map series that make up the bulk of this collection reflect the fragmentary nature of German cartographic history, with varying contributing corporate bodies, diverse source material, and a range of sophistication and technique. All of these characteristics evolved between 1936 and 1945 when the Nazi regime ramped up production of military maps. The authors make the case that it is worth the time and effort for libraries to invest in creating rich bibliographic descriptions for these map series. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sociology & Space / Sociologija i Prostor is the property of Institut za drustvena istrazivanja u Zagrebu (Institute for Social Research of Zagreb) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Which organisational activities promote effective military emulation? Which variables facilitate and impede the emergence of these activities? Drawing upon the academic literatures on military change and management studies, as well as semi-structured interviews within the British and German militaries, this article identifies five key organisational activities which promote effective inter-organisational doctrinal learning. In doing so, the article improves understanding of the contribution that management studies can make to multi-disciplinary scholarship on military learning. The article examines the variables which facilitate the emergence of activities which support effective inter-organisational doctrinal learning through a case study of Bundeswehr doctrinal absorptive capacity during ISAF. It also explores the impact of these activities on doctrine development. The article demonstrates the crucial importance of active and well-informed civilian oversight of the activities which support military learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the defensive war in September 1939, Uniejów and its region were the site of fierce fighting between the troops of the Polish Army "Poznań" and German 8th Army. The tactical significance of Uniejów was due to the bridge across the river Warta, which was of key importance for Polish troops marching from the state border to Warsaw. The fights took place on 6-7 September. The Detachment of Marian Frydrych, commanding officer of 60th Regiment of Wielkopolska Infantry of 25th Infantry Division prevented German troops of 30th Infantry Division from seizing and destroying the bridge, which meant safe crossing for Polish soldiers. The authors are the first in Polish historiography to make use of documents from German military archives and to present the fights from the German army perspective. It also was possible to clear up the question of defeating 1st Battalion of 29th Kaniov Rifle Regiment near Uniejów in the evening of 7 September. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Armeegruppe “Heinrici”, i.e. army-sized military formation that was named after its commander, Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici, was later retitled to the 1st Panzer Army (1. Panzerarmee) when General Walther Nehring took its command. During 10 to 23 March 1945, the army was involved in the first phase of the Battle of Moravská Ostrava during which fought against 4th Ukrainian Front, Soviet army group, that opened offensive with its goal to defeat German forces and to break into central Moravia. Based on the newly gained pieces of information in documents of German Military Archives (Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv) that enable the access to the decision-making process of German command, the study tries to describe the course of the battle from the point of view of German forces and to answer the question why did the Soviets failed to fulfil their task despite their numerical superiority in men and in equipment. The reasons were that German command was aware of Soviets aims and even the exact time of offensive of 4th Ukrainian Front; they also concentrated their units in the main direction of Soviet advancement; and especially they were able to relocated their units according to the development at the battlefield. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]