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The use of arm's-length bodies to deliver certain services, to regulate certain sectors or to assume responsibility for particularly salient political issues is neither new in historical terms or a feature unique to the UK in comparative terms. What is particularly distinctive, however, is the Coalition Government's attempts since 2010 to reduce the number of ‘quangos’ while also strengthening the capacity of the core executive and sponsor departments to control and co-ordinate this dense and fragmented sphere of delegated governance. Drawing upon the findings of the first research project to analyse the current Public Bodies Reform Agenda, this article provides an account of the ‘filling-in’ of the ‘hollowing out’. It argues that when viewed through a historical lens, the Coalition Government has adopted a distinctive approach to ‘the quango problem’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For centuries, the capacity of British ministers to appoint individuals to positions on the boards of agencies, boards and commissions was viewed as little more than one element of the ‘spoils of war’ in a highly majoritarian polity. This article examines how the politics of patronage has evolved in recent decades and argues that it is possible to identify a silent revolution that has gradually but consistently constrained the reach and discretion enjoyed by ministers in deploying their patronage powers. What is particularly distinctive about British political history since 2007 is the introduction of a far-reaching ladder of legislative scrutiny that ranges from informal pre-appointment hearings, at one end of the ladder, to a statutory veto over the minister's preferred candidate, at the other. However, this ‘outlawing of the spoils’ has evolved in a typically British way with reforms being implemented on an ad hoc and incremental basis, that is, frequently without any advance consultation or planning but rather dependent on non-formal, informal and discretionary elements to counter problems as they arise. The result is a complex and frequently overlapping mixture of regulatory and scrutiny processes that arguably offer little in terms of principled underpinning or constitutional logic. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The delegation of functions to a range of quasi-autonomous bodies has formed a major challenge to the operation of representative democracy, in both administrative and democratic terms, since the formation of the modern state. These challenges have been more pronounced within Westminster-style democracies that are founded on the logic of ministerial departments and the convention of individual ministerial responsibility to Parliament. Towards the end of the twentieth century, these challenges became more pronounced as the centrifugal dynamics of New Public Management led to what has been termed the 'unravelling' or 'unbundling' of the state. In many countries around the world concerns regarding a 'democratic deficit' and patronage stimulated reform campaigns demanding territorial devolution in the belief that new regional democratic structures could increase accountability and transparency. This was particularly true in the UK where proponents of devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland claimed that such a reform would lead to a 'bonfire of quangos'. This article draws upon theories derived in relation to multi-level governance in order to frame an analysis of how devolution has altered the sphere of delegated governance. This reveals a complex pattern of resource dependencies, motivations and incentives that have led to markedly different reform trajectories but certainly not the 'end of the quango state'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]