Search

In July 2023, cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) were reported at 2 shelters for stray cats in Seoul, South Korea. The cause of infection was suspected to be improperly sterilized raw food made from domestic duck meat, which was manufactured in South Korea. All viruses isolated from cats at the shelters and from the raw food belonged to HPAI A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b. The gene constellation of all viruses was most similar to that of viruses isolated in Korea in November 2022. Of note, the viruses isolated from infected cats harbored mutations E627K or D701N in polymerase basic 2, which are indicative of adaptation to mammals. Postmortem examination revealed systemic pathologic lesions and the presence of widespread virus in different tissues. Thus, consumption of raw duck meat contaminated with HPAI virus likely caused systemic symptoms and death in cats, indicating the introduction of mammal-adapted mutations of the virus.

Testing of ducks in Tennessee, United States, before introduction of highly pathogenic influenza A(H5N1) virus demonstrated a high prevalence of antibodies to influenza A virus but very low prevalence of antibodies to H5 (25%) or H5 and N1 (13%) subtypes. Antibody prevalence increased after H5N1 introduction.

Since early 2024, a multistate outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 has been affecting dairy cattle in the USA. The influenza viral RNA concentrations in milk make it an ideal matrix for surveillance purposes. However, viral RNA detection in multi-component fluids such as milk can be complex, and optimization of influenza detection methods is thus required. Raw bulk tank milk and mastitis milk samples were artificially contaminated with an avian influenza strain and subjected to five extraction methods. HCoV-229E and synthetic RNA were included as exogenous internal process controls. Given the high viral load usually observed in individual raw milk samples, four out of five tested methods would enable influenza detection in milk with normal texture, over a time window of at least 2 weeks post-onset of clinical signs. Nevertheless, sample dilution 1:3 in molecular transport medium prior to RNA extraction provided the best results for dilution of inhibitory substances and a good recovery rate of influenza RNA, that reached 12.5 ± 1.2% and 10.4 ± 3.8% in two independent experiments in bulk milk and 11.2 ± 3.6% and 10.0 ± 2.9% on two cohorts of mastitis milk samples. We have also shown compatibility of an influenza RT-qPCR system with synthetic RNA detection for simultaneous validation of the RNA extraction and RT-qPCR processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We reviewed information about mammals naturally infected by highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus subtype H5N1 during 2 periods: the current panzootic (2020–2023) and previous waves of infection (2003–2019). In the current panzootic, 26 countries have reported >48 mammal species infected by H5N1 virus; in some cases, the virus has affected thousands of individual animals. The geographic area and the number of species affected by the current event are considerably larger than in previous waves of infection. The most plausible source of mammal infection in both periods appears to be close contact with infected birds, including their ingestion. Some studies, especially in the current panzootic, suggest that mammal-to-mammal transmission might be responsible for some infections; some mutations found could help this avian pathogen replicate in mammals. H5N1 virus may be changing and adapting to infect mammals. Continuous surveillance is essential to mitigate the risk for a global pandemic.

Simple Summary: A concerning highly pathogenic avian influenza caused widespread outbreaks among birds and wildlife at a global level. First identified in South America in October 2022 and linked to migratory birds, there's growing concern about virus spillover during bird migrations between the poles. The Arctic tern's migration from the Arctic to Antarctica raises concerns about its role in transmission. Even in Antarctica's seemingly untouched environment, diverse wildlife is at risk from the new strain of highly pathogenic avian influenza. Surveillance efforts started in the South Shetland Islands in January 2023, focusing on areas where penguins, birds, and marine mammals normally gather. Following Antarctic Treaty guidelines, observations and sample collection were conducted, revealing no signs of the virus in the region during that time lapse. These findings not only contribute to confirming the absence of the virus in Antarctica during the specified period but also emphasize the necessity for sustained surveillance and monitoring to safeguard the Antarctic ecosystem. In January 2023, an active surveillance initiative was undertaken in the South Shetland Islands, Antarctica, with the specific objective of ascertaining evidence for the presence of avian influenza, and specifically the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5N1 (HPAIV H5N1). The investigation encompassed diverse locations, including Hanna Point (Livingston Island), Lions Rump (King George Island), and Base Escudero (King George Island), with targeted observations on marine mammals (southern elephant seals), flying birds (the kelp gull, snowy sheathbill and brown skua), and penguins (the chinstrap penguin and gentoo penguin). The study encompassed the examination of these sites for signs of mass mortality events possibly attributable to HPAIV H5N1, as well as sampling for influenza detection by means of real-time RT-PCR. Two hundred and seven (207) samples were collected, including 73 fecal samples obtained from the environment from marine mammals (predominantly feces of southern elephant seals), and 77 cloacal samples from penguins of the genus Pygoscelis (predominantly from the gentoo penguin). No evidence of mass mortality attributable to HPAIV H5N1 was observed, and all the collected samples tested negative for the presence of the virus, strongly suggesting the absence of the virus in the Antarctic territory during the specified period. This empirical evidence holds significant implications for both the ecological integrity of the region and the potential zoonotic threats, underscoring the importance of continued surveillance and monitoring in the Antarctic ecosystem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2022, we observed a substantial die-off of wild migratory waterbirds on Maliy Zhemchuzhniy Island in the Caspian Sea, Russia. The deaths were caused by highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4.b virus. Continued surveillance of influenza viruses in wild bird populations is needed to predict virus spread over long distances.

Since early 2024, a multistate outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 has been affecting dairy cattle in the USA. The influenza viral RNA concentrations in milk make it an ideal matrix for surveillance purposes. However, viral RNA detection in multi-component fluids such as milk can be complex, and optimization of influenza detection methods is thus required. Raw bulk tank milk and mastitis milk samples were artificially contaminated with an avian influenza strain and subjected to five extraction methods. HCoV-229E and synthetic RNA were included as exogenous internal process controls. Given the high viral load usually observed in individual raw milk samples, four out of five tested methods would enable influenza detection in milk with normal texture, over a time window of at least 2 weeks post-onset of clinical signs. Nevertheless, sample dilution 1:3 in molecular transport medium prior to RNA extraction provided the best results for dilution of inhibitory substances and a good recovery rate of influenza RNA, that reached 12.5 ± 1.2% and 10.4 ± 3.8% in two independent experiments in bulk milk and 11.2 ± 3.6% and 10.0 ± 2.9% on two cohorts of mastitis milk samples. We have also shown compatibility of an influenza RT-qPCR system with synthetic RNA detection for simultaneous validation of the RNA extraction and RT-qPCR processes.

Introduction: The 2022-2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreak in the United States (U.S.) is the largest and most costly animal health event in U.S. history. Approximately 70% of commercial farms affected during this outbreak have been turkey farms. Methods: We conducted a case-control study to identify potential risk factors for introduction of HPAI virus onto commercial meat turkey operations. Data were collected from 66 case farms and 59 control farms in 12 states. Univariate and multivariable analyses were conducted to compare management and biosecurity factors on case and control farms. Results: Factors associated with increased risk of infection included being in an existing control zone, having both brooders and growers, having toms, seeing wild waterfowl or shorebirds in the closest field, and using rendering for dead bird disposal. Protective factors included having a restroom facility, including portable, available to crews that visit the farm and workers having access and using a shower at least some of the time when entering a specified barn. Discussion: Study results provide a better understanding of risk factors for HPAI infection and can be used to inform prevention and control measures for HPAI on U.S. turkey farms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The continuous evolution of H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) is a major concern for accurate diagnosis. We encountered some challenges in subtyping and sequencing a recently isolated H5N1 HPAIV strain using classical diagnostic methods. Oropharyngeal, conjunctival, and cloacal swabs collected from a dead white-tailed eagle (Haliaeetus albicilla albicilla) were screened via real-time RT-PCR targeting the influenza A virus matrix (M) gene, followed by virus isolation. The hemagglutination inhibition test was applied in order to subtype and antigenically characterize the isolate using anti-A/duck/Hong Kong/820/80 (H5N3) reference serum or anti-H5N1 cross-clade monoclonal antibodies (mAbs). Sequencing using previously reported universal primers was attempted in order to analyze the full-length hemagglutinin (HA) gene. Oropharyngeal and conjunctival samples were positive for the M gene, and high hemagglutination titers were detected in inoculated eggs. However, its hemagglutination activity was not inhibited by the reference serum or mAbs. The antiserum to a recently isolated H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strain inhibited our isolate but not older strains. A homologous sequence in the previously reported forward primer and HA2 region in our isolate led to partial HA gene amplification. Finally, next-generation sequencing confirmed the isolate as H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV, with genetic similarity to H5N1 strains circulating in Japan since November 2021. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus triggers infectious diseases, resulting in pulmonary damage and high mortality in domestic poultry worldwide. This study aimed to analyze miRNA expression profiles after infection with the HPAI H5N1 virus in resistant and susceptible lines of Ri chickens.For this purpose, resistant and susceptible lines of Vietnamese Ri chicken were used based on the A/G allele of Mx and BF2 genes. These genes are responsible for innate antiviral activity and were selected to determine differentially expressed (DE) miRNAs in HPAI-infected chicken lines using small RNA sequencing. A total of 44 miRNAs were DE after 3 days of infection with the H5N1 virus. Computational program analysis indicated the candidate target genes for DE miRNAs to possess significant functions related to cytokines, chemokines, MAPK signaling pathway, ErBb signaling pathway, and Wnt signaling pathway. Several DE miRNA-mRNA matches were suggested to play crucial roles in mediating immune functions against viral evasion. These results revealed the potential regulatory roles of miRNAs in the immune response of the two Ri chicken lines against HPAI H5N1 virus infection in the lungs.

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx have been circulating in poultry and wild birds worldwide since 2014. In South Korea, after the first clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAI viruses were isolated from wild birds in October 2021, additional HPAIV outbreaks occurred in poultry farms until April 2022. In this study, we genetically characterized clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV isolates in 2021–2022 and examined the pathogenicity and transmissibility of A/mandarin duck/Korea/WA585/2021 (H5N1) (WA585/21) in chickens and ducks. Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAI viruses caused 47 outbreaks in poultry farms and were also detected in multiple wild birds. Phylogenetic analysis of HA and NA genes indicated that Korean H5N1 HPAI isolates were closely related to Eurasian viruses isolated in 2021–2022. Four distinct genotypes of H5N1 HPAI viruses were identified in poultry, and the majority were also found in wild birds. WA585/21 inoculated chickens showed virulent pathogenicity with high mortality and transmission. Meanwhile, ducks infected with the virus showed no mortality but exhibited high rates of transmission and longer viral shedding than chickens, suggesting that they may play an important role as silent carriers. In conclusion, consideration of both genetic and pathogenic traits of H5N1 HPAI viruses is required for effective viral control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are globally challenging due to widespread circulation and high mortality rates. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) strains like H5N1 have caused significant outbreaks in birds. Since 2003 to 14 July 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) has documented 878 cases of HPAI H5N1 infection in humans and 458 (52.16%) fatalities in 23 countries. Recent outbreaks in wild birds, domestic birds, sea lions, minks, and etc., and the occurrence of genetic variations among HPAI H5N1 strains raise concerns about potential transmission and public health risks. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current understanding and new insights into HPAI H5N1. It begins with an introduction to the significance of studying this virus and highlighting the need for updated knowledge. The origin and evaluation of HPAI H5N1 are examined, shedding light on its emergence, and spread across different geographic regions. The genome organization and structural biology of the H5N1 virus are explored, providing insights into its molecular composition and key structural features. This manuscript also delves into the phylogeny, evolution, mutational trends, reservoirs, and transmission routes of HPAI H5N1. The immune response against HPAI H5N1 and its implications for vaccine development are analyzed, along with an exploration of the pathogenesis and clinical manifestations of HPAI H5N1 in human cases. Furthermore, diagnostic tools and preventive and therapeutic strategies are discussed, highlighting the current approaches and potential future directions for better management of the potential pandemic.

IntroductionThe 2022–2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreak in the United States (U.S.) is the largest and most costly animal health event in U.S. history. Approximately 70% of commercial farms affected during this outbreak have been turkey farms.MethodsWe conducted a case-control study to identify potential risk factors for introduction of HPAI virus onto commercial meat turkey operations. Data were collected from 66 case farms and 59 control farms in 12 states. Univariate and multivariable analyses were conducted to compare management and biosecurity factors on case and control farms.ResultsFactors associated with increased risk of infection included being in an existing control zone, having both brooders and growers, having toms, seeing wild waterfowl or shorebirds in the closest field, and using rendering for dead bird disposal. Protective factors included having a restroom facility, including portable, available to crews that visit the farm and workers having access and using a shower at least some of the time when entering a specified barn.DiscussionStudy results provide a better understanding of risk factors for HPAI infection and can be used to inform prevention and control measures for HPAI on U.S. turkey farms.

In January 2023, an active surveillance initiative was undertaken in the South Shetland Islands, Antarctica, with the specific objective of ascertaining evidence for the presence of avian influenza, and specifically the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5N1 (HPAIV H5N1). The investigation encompassed diverse locations, including Hanna Point (Livingston Island), Lions Rump (King George Island), and Base Escudero (King George Island), with targeted observations on marine mammals (southern elephant seals), flying birds (the kelp gull, snowy sheathbill and brown skua), and penguins (the chinstrap penguin and gentoo penguin). The study encompassed the examination of these sites for signs of mass mortality events possibly attributable to HPAIV H5N1, as well as sampling for influenza detection by means of real-time RT-PCR. Two hundred and seven (207) samples were collected, including 73 fecal samples obtained from the environment from marine mammals (predominantly feces of southern elephant seals), and 77 cloacal samples from penguins of the genus Pygoscelis (predominantly from the gentoo penguin). No evidence of mass mortality attributable to HPAIV H5N1 was observed, and all the collected samples tested negative for the presence of the virus, strongly suggesting the absence of the virus in the Antarctic territory during the specified period. This empirical evidence holds significant implications for both the ecological integrity of the region and the potential zoonotic threats, underscoring the importance of continued surveillance and monitoring in the Antarctic ecosystem.

IntroductionThe 2022–2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreak in the United States (U.S.) is the most geographically extensive and costly animal health event in U.S. history. In 2022 alone, over 57 million commercial and backyard poultry in 47 U.S. states were affected. Over 75% of affected poultry were part of the commercial table egg production sector.MethodsWe conducted a case–control study to identify potential risk factors for introduction of HPAI virus onto commercial table egg operations. Univariate and multivariable analyses were conducted to compare farm characteristics, management, and biosecurity factors on case and control farms.ResultsFactors associated with increased risk of infection included being in an existing control zone, sightings of wild waterfowl, mowing or bush hogging vegetation less than 4 times a month, having an off-site method of daily mortality disposal (off-site composting or burial, rendering, or landfill), and wild bird access to feed/feed ingredients at least some of the time. Protective factors included a high level of vehicle washing for trucks and trailers entering the farm (a composite variable that included having a permanent wash station), having designated personnel assigned to specific barns, having a farm entrance gate, and requiring a change of clothing for workers entering poultry barns.DiscussionStudy results improve our understanding of risk factors for HPAI infection and control measures for preventing HPAI on commercial U.S. table egg farms.

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) profoundly impacted several seabird populations during the summers of 2021 and 2022. Infection spread rapidly across colonies, causing unprecedented mortality. At Foula, Shetland, 1500 breeding adult great skuas Stercorarius skua, totalling about two tonnes of decomposing virus-laden material, died at the colony in May−July 2022. Carcasses were left where they died as Government policy was not to remove dead birds. The factors influencing risk of further spread of infection are uncertain, but evidence suggests that HPAI can persist in water for many months in cool conditions and may be a major transmission factor for birds living in wetlands. We investigated risk of further spread of infection from water samples collected from under 45 decomposing carcasses and in three freshwater lochs/streams by sampling water in October 2022, by which time the great skua carcasses had rotted to bones, skin, and feathers. No viral genetic material was detected four months after the mortality, suggesting a low risk of seabird infection from the local environment when the seabirds would return the next breeding season. These findings, although based on a relatively small number of water samples, suggest that the high rainfall typical at Shetland probably washed away the virus from the decomposing carcasses. However, limitations to our study need to be taken on board in the design of environmental monitoring at seabird colonies during and immediately after future outbreaks of HPAI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021/2022, the re-emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) occurred in Europe. The outbreak was seeded from two sources: resident and reintroduced viruses, which is unprecedented in the recorded history of avian influenza. The dominant subtype was H5N1, which replaced the H5N8 subtype that had predominated in previous seasons. In this study, we present a whole genome sequence and a phylogenetic analysis of 57 H5N1 HPAI and two low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H5N1 strains collected in the Czech Republic during 2021/2022. Phylogenetic analysis revealed close relationships between H5N1 genomes from poultry and wild birds and secondary transmission in commercial geese. The genotyping showed considerable genetic heterogeneity among Czech H5N1 viruses, with six different HPAI genotypes, three of which were apparently unique. In addition, second-order reassortment relationships were observed with the direct involvement of co-circulating H5N1 LPAI strains. The genetic distance between Czech H5N1 HPAI and the closest LPAI segments available in the database illustrates the profound gaps in our knowledge of circulating LPAI strains. The changing dynamics of HPAI in the wild may increase the likelihood of future HPAI outbreaks and present new challenges in poultry management, biosecurity, and surveillance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The continuous evolution of H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) is a major concern for accurate diagnosis. We encountered some challenges in subtyping and sequencing a recently isolated H5N1 HPAIV strain using classical diagnostic methods. Oropharyngeal, conjunctival, and cloacal swabs collected from a dead white-tailed eagle (Haliaeetus albicilla albicilla) were screened via real-time RT-PCR targeting the influenza A virus matrix (M) gene, followed by virus isolation. The hemagglutination inhibition test was applied in order to subtype and antigenically characterize the isolate using anti-A/duck/Hong Kong/820/80 (H5N3) reference serum or anti-H5N1 cross-clade monoclonal antibodies (mAbs). Sequencing using previously reported universal primers was attempted in order to analyze the full-length hemagglutinin (HA) gene. Oropharyngeal and conjunctival samples were positive for the M gene, and high hemagglutination titers were detected in inoculated eggs. However, its hemagglutination activity was not inhibited by the reference serum or mAbs. The antiserum to a recently isolated H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strain inhibited our isolate but not older strains. A homologous sequence in the previously reported forward primer and HA2 region in our isolate led to partial HA gene amplification. Finally, next-generation sequencing confirmed the isolate as H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV, with genetic similarity to H5N1 strains circulating in Japan since November 2021.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of hemagglutinin type H5 and clade 2.3.4.4b have widely spread within the northern hemisphere since 2020 and threaten wild bird populations, as well as poultry production. We present phylogeographic evidence that Iceland has been used as a stepping stone for HPAIV translocation from northern Europe to North America by infected but mobile wild birds. At least 2 independent incursions of HPAIV H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b assigned to 2 hemagglutinin clusters, B1 and B2, are documented for summer‒autumn 2021 and spring 2022. Spread of HPAIV H5N1 to and among colony-breeding pelagic avian species in Iceland is ongoing. Potentially devastating effects (i.e., local losses >25%) on these species caused by extended HPAIV circulation in space and time are being observed at several affected breeding sites throughout the North Atlantic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx have been circulating in poultry and wild birds worldwide since 2014. In South Korea, after the first clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAI viruses were isolated from wild birds in October 2021, additional HPAIV outbreaks occurred in poultry farms until April 2022. In this study, we genetically characterized clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV isolates in 2021–2022 and examined the pathogenicity and transmissibility of A/mandarin duck/Korea/WA585/2021 (H5N1) (WA585/21) in chickens and ducks. Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAI viruses caused 47 outbreaks in poultry farms and were also detected in multiple wild birds. Phylogenetic analysis of HA and NA genes indicated that Korean H5N1 HPAI isolates were closely related to Eurasian viruses isolated in 2021–2022. Four distinct genotypes of H5N1 HPAI viruses were identified in poultry, and the majority were also found in wild birds. WA585/21 inoculated chickens showed virulent pathogenicity with high mortality and transmission. Meanwhile, ducks infected with the virus showed no mortality but exhibited high rates of transmission and longer viral shedding than chickens, suggesting that they may play an important role as silent carriers. In conclusion, consideration of both genetic and pathogenic traits of H5N1 HPAI viruses is required for effective viral control.

On March 25, 2024 an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A H5N1 was identified in dairy cows across multiple farms in the United States. Zoonotic cases originating in individuals with close contact to infected herds and poultry flocks have been subsequently identified. Spillover events such as this raise the specter of recent pandemics including COVID-19 and Mpox and may lead clinical laboratories to assess their capacity for diagnosis of HPAI H5N1. In this review, we detail the origins of the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b outbreak as well as the existing capacity to identify HPAI H5N1 as influenza A virus by commercially available assays. Furthermore, we highlight the absence of commercially available influenza A H5 subtyping assays and limitations associated with the current 510(k)-cleared assay. This outbreak also serves as an early opportunity to assess the new and unknown regulatory challenges faced by laboratory-developed tests in light of the FDA's final rule on in vitro diagnostic devices. National agencies along with public health and clinical laboratories all serve an essential role in the response to HPAI H5N1. To most effectively utilize each group's strength requires open communication and willingness to embrace novel approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2005, H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) has severely impacted the economy and public health in the Middle East (ME) with Egypt as the most affected country. Understanding the high-risk areas and spatiotemporal distribution of the H5N1 HPAIV in poultry is prerequisite for establishing risk-based surveillance activities at a regional level in the ME. Here, we aimed to predict the geographic range of H5N1 HPAIV outbreaks in poultry in the ME using a set of environmental variables and to investigate the spatiotemporal clustering of outbreaks in the region. Data from the ME for the period 2005-14 were analyzed using maximum entropy ecological niche modeling and the permutation model of the scan statistics. The predicted range of high-risk areas (P > 0.60) for H5N1 HPAIV in poultry included parts of the ME northeastern countries, whereas the Egyptian Nile delta and valley were estimated to be the most suitable locations for occurrence of H5N1 HPAIV outbreaks. The most important environmental predictor that contributed to risk for H5N1 HPAIV was the precipitation of the warmest quarter (47.2%), followed by the type of global livestock production system (18.1%). Most significant spatiotemporal clusters (P < 0.001) were detected in Egypt, Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. Results suggest that more information related to poultry holding demographics is needed to further improve prediction of risk for H5N1 HPAIV in the ME, whereas the methodology presented here may be useful in guiding the design of surveillance programs and in identifying areas in which underreporting may have occurred.

High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) profoundly impacted several seabird populations during the summers of 2021 and 2022. Infection spread rapidly across colonies, causing unprecedented mortality. At Foula, Shetland, 1500 breeding adult great skuas Stercorarius skua, totalling about two tonnes of decomposing virus-laden material, died at the colony in May−July 2022. Carcasses were left where they died as Government policy was not to remove dead birds. The factors influencing risk of further spread of infection are uncertain, but evidence suggests that HPAI can persist in water for many months in cool conditions and may be a major transmission factor for birds living in wetlands. We investigated risk of further spread of infection from water samples collected from under 45 decomposing carcasses and in three freshwater lochs/streams by sampling water in October 2022, by which time the great skua carcasses had rotted to bones, skin, and feathers. No viral genetic material was detected four months after the mortality, suggesting a low risk of seabird infection from the local environment when the seabirds would return the next breeding season. These findings, although based on a relatively small number of water samples, suggest that the high rainfall typical at Shetland probably washed away the virus from the decomposing carcasses. However, limitations to our study need to be taken on board in the design of environmental monitoring at seabird colonies during and immediately after future outbreaks of HPAI.

Previous Bayesian phylogeographic studies of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) explored the origin and spread of the epidemic from China into Russia, indicating that HPAIV circulated in Russia prior to its detection there in 2005. In this study, we extend this research to explore the evolution and spread of HPAIV within Europe during the 2005-2010 epidemic, using all available sequences of the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) gene regions that were collected in Europe and Russia during the outbreak. We use discrete-trait phylodynamic models within a Bayesian statistical framework to explore the evolution of HPAIV. Our results indicate that the genetic diversity and effective population size of HPAIV peaked between mid-2005 and early 2006, followed by drastic decline in 2007, which coincides with the end of the epidemic in Europe. Our results also suggest that domestic birds were the most likely source of the spread of the virus from Russia into Europe. Additionally, estimates of viral dispersal routes indicate that Russia, Romania, and Germany were key epicenters of these outbreaks. Our study quantifies the dynamics of a major European HPAIV pandemic and substantiates the ability of phylodynamic models to improve molecular surveillance of novel AIVs.

In 2021/2022, the re-emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) occurred in Europe. The outbreak was seeded from two sources: resident and reintroduced viruses, which is unprecedented in the recorded history of avian influenza. The dominant subtype was H5N1, which replaced the H5N8 subtype that had predominated in previous seasons. In this study, we present a whole genome sequence and a phylogenetic analysis of 57 H5N1 HPAI and two low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H5N1 strains collected in the Czech Republic during 2021/2022. Phylogenetic analysis revealed close relationships between H5N1 genomes from poultry and wild birds and secondary transmission in commercial geese. The genotyping showed considerable genetic heterogeneity among Czech H5N1 viruses, with six different HPAI genotypes, three of which were apparently unique. In addition, second-order reassortment relationships were observed with the direct involvement of co-circulating H5N1 LPAI strains. The genetic distance between Czech H5N1 HPAI and the closest LPAI segments available in the database illustrates the profound gaps in our knowledge of circulating LPAI strains. The changing dynamics of HPAI in the wild may increase the likelihood of future HPAI outbreaks and present new challenges in poultry management, biosecurity, and surveillance.

• Two licensed vaccines provided protection against H5N1 viruses from Bangladesh. • Most H5N1 HPAIV from Bangladesh (2016–2018) had similar antigenicity. • Cartographic analysis shows a house crow isolate as an antigenic outlier. • Monitoring of HPAIV is crucial for early detection of vaccine resistant strains. H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have caused outbreaks in poultry in Bangladesh since 2007. While clade 2.2.2 and 2.3.4.2 HPAIVs have not been detected since 2012, clade 2.3.2.1a viruses have caused continuous outbreaks since 2012 despite the use of vaccines. In this study, we evaluated the efficacy of two H5 vaccines licensed in Bangladesh, RE-6 inactivated vaccine, and a recombinant herpesvirus of turkeys vaccine with an H5 insert (rHVT-H5), for protection against recent field viruses in chickens. We selected three viruses for efficacy tests (A/chicken/Bangladesh/NRL-AI-3237/2017, A/crow/Bangladesh/NRL-AI-8471/2017 and A/chicken/Bangladesh/NRL-AI-8323/2017) from 36 H5 viruses isolated from Bangladesh between 2016 and 2018 by comparing the amino acid sequences at five antigenic sites (A-E) and analyzing hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers with reference antisera. The RE-6 and rHVT-H5 vaccines both conferred 80–100% clinical protection (i.e. reduced morbidity and mortality) against the three challenge viruses with no significant differences in protection. In addition, both vaccines significantly decreased viral shedding from infected chickens as compared to challenge control chickens. Based on these metrics, the current licensed H5 vaccines protected chickens against the recent field viruses. However, the A/crow/Bangladesh/NRL-AI-8471/2017 virus exhibited antigenic divergence including: several unique amino acid changes in antigenic epitope sites A and B and was a serological outlier in cross HI tests as visualized on the antigenic map. The continuing emergence of such antigenic variants which could alter the dominant antigenicity of field viruses should be continuously monitored and vaccines should be updated if field efficacy declines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 A/goose/ Guangdong/1996 lineage (Gs/GD) is endemic in poultry across several countries in the world and has caused sporadic lethal infections in humans. Vaccines are important in HPAIV control both for poultry and in prepandemic preparedness for humans. This study assessed inactivated prepandemic vaccine strains in a One Health framework across human and agricultural and wildlife animal health, focusing on the genetic and antigenic diversity of field H5N1 Gs/GD viruses from the agricultural sector and assessing cross-protection in a chicken challenge model. Nearly half (47.92%) of the 48 combinations of vaccine and challenge viruses examined had bird protection of 80% or above. Most vaccinated groups had prolonged mean death times (MDT), and the virus-shedding titers were significantly lower than those of the shamvaccinated group (P = 0.05). The antibody titers in the prechallenge sera were not predictive of protection. Although vaccinated birds had higher titers of hemagglutination-inhibiting (HI) antibodies against the homologous vaccine antigen, most of them also had lower or no antibody titer against the challenge antigen. The comparison of all parameters and homologous or closely related vaccine and challenge viruses gave the best prediction of protection. Through additional analysis, we identified a pattern of epitope substitutions in the hemagglutinin (HA) of each challenge virus that impacted protection, regardless of the vaccine used. These changes were situated in the antigenic sites and/or reported epitopes associated with virus escape from antibody neutralization. As a result, this study highlights virus diversity, immune response complexity, and the importance of strain selection for vaccine development to control H5N1 HPAIV in the agricultural sector and for human prepandemic preparedness. We suggest that the engineering of specific antigenic sites can improve the immunogenicity of H5 vaccines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Asian lineage A/H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have been responsible for continuous outbreaks in Bangladesh since 2007. Although clades 2.2.2 and 2.3.4.2 HPAIVs have disappeared since poultry vaccination was introduced in 2012, clade 2.3.2.1a viruses have continued to be detected in Bangladesh. In this study, we identified A/H9N2 (n  = 15), A/H5N1 (n  = 19), and A/H5N1-A/H9N2 (n  = 18) mixed viruses from live bird markets, chicken farms, and wild house crows (Corvus splendens) in Bangladesh from 2016 to 2018. We analyzed the genetic sequences of the H5 HPAIVs, to better understand the evolutionary history of clade 2.3.2.1a viruses in Bangladesh. Although seven HA genetic subgroups (B1–B7) and six genotypes (G1, G1.1, G1.2, G2, G2.1, and G2.2) have been identified in Bangladesh, only subgroup B7 and genotypes G2, G2.1, and G2.2 were detected after 2016. The replacement of G1 genotype by G2 in Bangladesh was possibly due to vaccination and viral competition in duck populations. Initially, genetic diversity decreased after introduction of vaccination in 2012, but in 2015, genetic diversity increased and was associated with the emergence of genotype G2. Our phylodynamic analysis suggests that domestic Anseriformes, including ducks and geese, may have played a major role in persistence, spread, evolution, and genotype replacement of clade 2.3.2.1a HPAIVs in Bangladesh. Thus, improvements in biosecurity and monitoring of domestic Anseriformes are needed for more effective control of HPAI in Bangladesh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK and Europe have seen successive outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza across the 2020/21 and 2021/22 autumn/winter seasons. Understanding both the epidemiology and transmission of these viruses in different species is critical to aid mitigating measures where outbreaks cause extensive mortalities in both land- and waterfowl. Infection of different species can result in mild or asymptomatic outcomes, or acute infections that result in high morbidity and mortality levels. Definition of disease outcome in different species is of great importance to understanding the role different species play in the maintenance and transmission of these pathogens. Further, the infection of species that have conservation value is also important to recognise and characterise to understand the impact on what might be limited wild populations. Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b has been detected in great skuas (Stercorarius skua) across different colonies on islands off the shore of Scotland, Great Britain during summer 2021. A large number of great skuas were observed as developing severe clinical disease and dying during the epizootic and mortalities were estimated to be high where monitored. Of eight skuas submitted for post-mortem examination, seven were confirmed as being infected with this virus using a range of diagnostic assays. Here we overview the outbreak event that occurred in this species, listed as species of conservation concern in Great Britain and outline the importance of this finding with respect to virus transmission and maintenance.

Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses continue to spread around the globe and reassort with low pathogenic avian influenza viruses often resulting in morbidity and mortality to not only waterfowl, but also poultry. Our group previously developed two hemagglutinin (HA) based vaccines using a methodology termed computationally optimized broadly reactive antigen (COBRA). Each of these HA antigens, Human COBRA 2 (Hu-CO) and Human-Avian COBRA 2 (Hu-Av CO) elicit antibodies with hemagglutination-inhibition (HAI) activity against viruses from various clades, but not always the same viruses. Here, we have sought to identify residues in these two HA molecules that are critical for differential HAI activity against various H5Nx influenza viruses. The two HA antigens are remarkedly similar in the globular head region, except for 4 residues at amino acids 140, 141, 155, and 156. By mutating these amino acids in each HA antigen, chimeric HA proteins were used to elicit immune responses in mice. When the Asn-Thr pair at position 155–156 in the Hu-CO HA was converted to the Ser-Ala residues found in the Hu-Av CO HA, the elicited antibodies lost HAI activity against clade 2.3.2.1 H5Nx viruses, such as A/Hubei/01/2010. When this Asn-Thr motif was added at these positions in the Hu-Av CO HA molecule, HAI activity in the elicited sera against A/Hubei/01/2010 was significantly increased. We speculate that a putative N-linked glycosylation at this location in the Hu-CO HA antigen is a key driver in the elicitation of antibodies with HAI activity to different locations on wild-type H5 HA molecules resulting in differential neutralization of viral infection and protection in vivo against H5 influenza virus induced disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) risk management requires efficient surveillance of the infection in wild birds for early warning purposes. In this study, our aim was to describe the spread of continent‐wide infection cases using a fireworks model and therefore improve current surveillance systems. The fireworks model is a metaphor illustrating the spread of HPAI as a point source epizootic. The approach is based on early detection of the outbreak seeds (sparks from the fireworks) and uses a predictive model of the probability of the occurrence of new cases following a seed introduction; this then determines the spatiotemporal perimeter for intense surveillance investigations. For a case study, we used surveillance data on HPAI H5N1 in wild birds across Europe between 2005 and 2010 to describe the outbreaks and determine the success of the case detection used to inform management of the disease. The fireworks description assumes simultaneous introductions of 'seeds' of cases, which then 'explode' in local foci but do not merge into a progressive disease wave. This model fits the data well. Using this predictive approach for HPAI cases in EU countries, we found that the investigation radius needed to achieve a detection level of 90% of new cases after an outbreak ranged from 10 km to more than 300 km, depending on the outbreak pattern. Based on these findings, the fireworks approach can be a valuable method for identifying the perimeters and risk areas to be targeted for enhanced surveillance. The rationale of the fireworks approach is quite generic and can easily be adapted to different situations and contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous Bayesian phylogeographic studies of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) explored the origin and spread of the epidemic from China into Russia, indicating that HPAIV circulated in Russia prior to its detection there in 2005. In this study, we extend this research to explore the evolution and spread of HPAIV within Europe during the 2005–2010 epidemic, using all available sequences of the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) gene regions that were collected in Europe and Russia during the outbreak. We use discrete-trait phylodynamic models within a Bayesian statistical framework to explore the evolution of HPAIV. Our results indicate that the genetic diversity and effective population size of HPAIV peaked between mid-2005 and early 2006, followed by drastic decline in 2007, which coincides with the end of the epidemic in Europe. Our results also suggest that domestic birds were the most likely source of the spread of the virus from Russia into Europe. Additionally, estimates of viral dispersal routes indicate that Russia, Romania, and Germany were key epicenters of these outbreaks. Our study quantifies the dynamics of a major European HPAIV pandemic and substantiates the ability of phylodynamic models to improve molecular surveillance of novel AIVs.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage H5 clade 2.3.4.4b continue to have a devastating effect on domestic and wild birds. Full genome sequence analyses using 1369 H5N1 HPAIVs detected in the United States (U.S.) in wild birds, commercial poultry, and backyard flocks from December 2021 to April 2022, showed three phylogenetically distinct H5N1 virus introductions in the U.S. by wild birds. Unreassorted Eurasian genotypes A1 and A2 entered the Northeast Atlantic states, whereas a genetically distinct A3 genotype was detected in Alaska. The A1 genotype spread westward via wild bird migration and reassorted with North American wild bird avian influenza viruses. Reassortments of up to five internal genes generated a total of 21 distinct clusters; of these, six genotypes represented 92% of the HPAIVs examined. By phylodynamic analyses, most detections in domestic birds were shown to be point-source transmissions from wild birds, with limited farm-to-farm spread. • Three genetically distinct H5N1 viruses were detected from December 2021 to April 2022 in the U.S. • The first H5N1 virus reassorted with wild bird avian influenza viruses generating six major genotypes. • Most detections of H5N1 in domestic birds were shown to be point-source transmissions from wild birds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are globally challenging due to widespread circulation and high mortality rates. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) strains like H5N1 have caused significant outbreaks in birds. Since 2003 to 14 July 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) has documented 878 cases of HPAI H5N1 infection in humans and 458 (52.16%) fatalities in 23 countries. Recent outbreaks in wild birds, domestic birds, sea lions, minks, and etc., and the occurrence of genetic variations among HPAI H5N1 strains raise concerns about potential transmission and public health risks. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current understanding and new insights into HPAI H5N1. It begins with an introduction to the significance of studying this virus and highlighting the need for updated knowledge. The origin and evaluation of HPAI H5N1 are examined, shedding light on its emergence, and spread across different geographic regions. The genome organization and structural biology of the H5N1 virus are explored, providing insights into its molecular composition and key structural features. This manuscript also delves into the phylogeny, evolution, mutational trends, reservoirs, and transmission routes of HPAI H5N1. The immune response against HPAI H5N1 and its implications for vaccine development are analyzed, along with an exploration of the pathogenesis and clinical manifestations of HPAI H5N1 in human cases. Furthermore, diagnostic tools and preventive and therapeutic strategies are discussed, highlighting the current approaches and potential future directions for better management of the potential pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

H5N1 is a highly pathogenic influenza A virus (IAV) and poses a major threat to the public health. The nucleoprotein (NP) has a multiple functions during the viral life cycle, however, the precise role of NP mutants in viral replication and pathogenicity is not completely understood. Here, we attempted to identify five residues in NP that may contribute to viral replication or pathogenicity. Of these, K227R, K229R, and K470R viruses were successfully rescued by reverse genetic, but the K91R and K198R viruses were not viable. A mini-genome assay demonstrated that the NP mutations K91R and K198R significantly decreased the polymerase activity. Moreover, these two mutations resulted in disrupted cellular localization in mammalian cells. Importantly, mutation at position 470 of NP significantly increased its virulence in vitro and in vivo. These findings demonstrated that the NP protein plays a major role in influenza virulence and pathogenicity, which adds to the knowledge of IAV virulence determinants and may benefit IAV surveillance.

Continuous circulation of influenza A(H5N1) virus among poultry in Egypt has created an epicenter in which the viruses evolve into newer subclades and continue to cause disease in humans. To detect influenza viruses in Egypt, since 2009 we have actively surveyed various regions and poultry production sectors. From August 2010 through January 2013, >11,000 swab samples were collected; 10% were positive by matrix gene reverse transcription PCR. During this period, subtype H9N2 viruses emerged, cocirculated with subtype H5N1 viruses, and frequently co-infected the same avian host. Genetic and antigenic analyses of viruses revealed that influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.2.1 viruses are dominant and that all subtype H9N2 viruses are G1-like. Cocirculation of different subtypes poses concern for potential reassortment. Avian influenza continues to threaten public and animal health in Egypt, and continuous surveillance for avian influenza virus is needed.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 has resulted in large losses to the Indonesian poultry sector. Evidence suggests that live bird markets ( LBMs) play an important role in the epidemiology of the disease. Knowledge of the frequency and type of contact between the various poultry market players should allow animal health authorities to develop a better understanding of factors influencing virus transmission between Indonesian villages. A questionnaire-based cross-sectional survey was conducted in 17 LBMs on the neighbouring Indonesian islands of Bali and Lombok to investigate the movement patterns of poultry to and from markets. Using social network analyses, a network of contacts was created for each island from a total of 413 live poultry traders and 134 customers. Individual nodes with high degree and/or betweenness were identified in each network. The Lombok network was more dense and connected than the Bali network indicating that disease transmission would be more efficient in the Lombok network. Our findings indicate that whilst live poultry are typically transported over relatively short distances of approximately 10 km, it is not uncommon for traders and customers to travel in excess of 100 km to buy or sell poultry, which may facilitate the spread of disease over a large geographical area. This study highlights the different roles markets play in poultry movement networks and their potential for disease dissemination. The identification of highly influential market nodes allows authorities to target HPAI surveillance activities to locations where disease is more likely to be present, which is crucial in low-resource settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza ( HPAI) H5N1 in Asia, the haemagglutinin ( HA) gene of this virus lineage has continued to evolve in avian populations, and H5N1 lineage viruses now circulate concurrently worldwide. Dogs may act as an intermediate host, increasing the potential for zoonotic transmission of influenza viruses. Virus transmission and pathologic changes in HPAI clade 1.1.2 (H5N1)-, 2.3.2.1c (H5N1)- and 2.3.4.4 (H5N6)-infected dogs were investigated. Mild respiratory signs and antibody response were shown in dogs intranasally infected with the viruses. Lung histopathology showed lesions that were associated with moderate interstitial pneumonia in the infected dogs. In this study, HPAI H5N6 virus replication in dogs was demonstrated for the first time. Dogs have been suspected as a 'mixing vessel' for reassortments between avian and human influenza viruses to occur. The replication of these three subtypes of the H5 lineage of HPAI viruses in dogs suggests that dogs could serve as intermediate hosts for avian-human influenza virus reassortment if they are also co-infected with human influenza viruses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Long-term circulation of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses of clade 2.2.1 in Egyptian poultry since February 2006 resulted in the evolution of two distinct clades: 2.2.1.1 represents antigenic-drift variants isolated from vaccinated poultry and 2.2.1.2 that caused the newest upsurge in birds and humans in 2014/2015. In the present study, nine isolates were collected from chickens, ducks and turkeys representing the commercial and backyard sectors during the period 2009–2015. The subtyping was confirmed by hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test, RT-qPCR and sequence analysis. The Mean Death Time (MDT) and Intravenous Pathogenicity Index (IVPI) for all isolates were determined. Sequence analysis of the HA gene sequences of these viruses revealed that two viruses belonged to clade 2.2.1.1 and the rest were clade 2.2.1.2. Antigenic characterisation of the viruses supported the results of the phylogenetic analysis. The MDT of the isolates ranged from 18 to 72 h and the IVPI values ranged from 2.3 to 2.9; viruses of the 2.2.1.1 clade were less virulent than those of the 2.2.1.2 clade. In addition, clade-specific polymorphism in the HA cleavage site was observed. These findings indicate the high and variable pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses of different clades and host-origin in Egypt. The upsurge of outbreaks in poultry in 2014/2015 was probably not due to a shift in virulence from earlier viruses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bangladesh has been considered as one of the five countries endemic with highly pathogenic avian influenza A subtype H5N1 ( HPAI H5N1). Live-bird markets ( LBMs) in south Asian countries are believed to play important roles in the transmission of HPAI H5N1 and others due to its central location as a hub of the poultry trading. Food and Agriculture Organization ( FAO) of the United Nations has been promoting improved biosecurity in LBMs in Bangladesh. In 2012, by enrolling 32 large LBMs: 10 with FAO interventions and 22 without assistance, we assessed the virus circulation in the selected LBMs by applying standard procedures to investigate market floors, poultry stall floors, poultry-holding cases and slaughter areas and the overall biosecurity using a questionnaire-based survey. Relative risk ( RR) was examined to compare the prevalence of HPAI H5N1 in the intervened and non-intervened LBMs. The measures practised in significantly more of the FAO-intervened LBMs included keeping of slaughter remnants in a closed container; decontamination of poultry vehicles at market place; prevention of crows' access to LBM, market/floor cleaning by market committee; wet cleaning; disinfection of floor/poultry stall after cleaning; and good supply of clean water at market ( P < 0.05). Conversely, disposal of slaughter remnants elsewhere at market and dry cleaning were in operation in more of the FAO non-intervened LBMs ( P < 0.05). The RR for HPAI H5N1 in the intervened and non-intervened LBMs was 1.1 (95% confidence interval 0.44-2.76), suggesting that the proportion positive of the virus in the two kinds of LBM did not vary significantly ( P = 0.413). These observations suggest that the viruses are still maintained at the level of production in farms and circulating in LBMs in Bangladesh regardless of interventions, albeit at lower levels than in other endemic countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses (HPAI-H5N1) has resulted in the appearance of a number of diverse groups of HPAI-H5N1 based on the presence of genetically similar clusters of their haemagglutinin sequences (clades). An H5 antigen encoded by a recombinant baculovirus and expressed in insect cells was used for oil-emulsion-based vaccine prototypes. In several experiments, vaccination was performed at 10 days of age, followed by challenge infection on day 21 post vaccination (PV) with HPAI-H5N1 clades 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.3.2. A further challenge infection with HPAI-H5N1 clade 2.2.1 was performed at day 42 PV. High haemagglutination inhibition titres were observed for the recH5 vaccine antigen, and lower haemagglutination inhibition titres for the challenge virus antigens. Nevertheless, the rate of protection from mortality and clinical signs was 100% when challenged at 21 days PV and 42 days PV, indicating protection over the entire broiler chicken rearing period without a second vaccination. The unvaccinated control chickens mostly died between two and five days after challenge infection. A low level of viral RNA was detected by reverse transcription followed by a quantitative polymerase chain reaction in a limited number of birds for a short period after challenge infection, indicating a limited spread of HPAI-H5N1 at flock level. Furthermore, it was observed that the vaccine can be used in a differentiation infected from vaccinated animals (DIVA) approach, based on the detection of nucleoprotein antibodies in vaccinated/challenged chickens. The vaccine fulfilled all expectations of an inactivated vaccine after one vaccination against challenge with different clades of H5N1-HPAI and is suitable for a DIVA approach. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Genetic analysis of the complete haemagglutinin (HA) gene of fourteen Nigerian avian influenza isolates showed multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site (PQRERRRKR*GLF), characteristic of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). Substitution of Gln to Lys at position 322 (H5-specific numbering) was identified in one isolate. In some isolates, amino acid substitutions were observed across the HA gene, however the receptor binding, antigenic and glycosylation sites were conserved in all. Phylogenetic analysis revealed two clusters of the HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1c. Cluster I has close genetic relatedness (97.8-99.8%) with viruses circulating in some West Africa countries. Cluster II shared close identity (98.9-100.0%) with isolates from Europe, Côte d'Ivoire and Niger and viruses from this cluster were detected in five of the eleven states investigated in Nigeria. In view of the continuous HPAI outbreaks being recorded in Nigerian poultry and the zoonotic potential of the virus, extensive and continued characterization of HPAI isolates is advocated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus causes high mortality of infected birds, with infection in multiple organs, including in feathers. Feathers have been proposed as samples for diagnosis of HPAI infection in birds, and this study is part of a broader investigation validating the use of feathers for diagnostic purposes. To understand and characterize the morphological basis for feather infection, sections from 7 different skin tracts of ducks and chickens infected with 3 different clades of H5N1 HPAI virus from Indonesia and Vietnam were examined histologically. Results showed that in ducks, lesions and viral antigen were mainly detected in the epidermis of feathers and follicles, whereas in chickens, they were mostly found in the dermis of these structures. Abundant viral antigen was found in nearly all the feathers examined from chickens, and there was no apparent difference between virus isolates or skin tracts in the proportion of feathers that were antigen positive. By immunohistochemistry, the majority of feathers from most skin tracts from ducks infected with a Vietnamese H5N1 HPAI virus contained abundant levels of viral antigen, while few feathers were antigen positive from ducks infected with 2 Indonesian viruses. These results support and inform the use of feathers for diagnostic detection of H5N1 HPAI virus in birds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]