Search

This article traces the expansion (and contraction) of the Aboriginal and Tortes Strait Islander franchise for Commonwealth, state and territory elections, and to a lesser extent local government elections; it outlines the arguments made for (and against) Aboriginal enfranchisement; and it examines alternative accounts of what drove the expansion (and contraction) of the vote. It pulls together data on Aboriginal enrolment, political awareness and party support, particularly in the Northern Territory. And it examines divergent views about the consequences of Aborigines having the vote: claims that the franchise is an empty formality; claims that it has allowed Aborigines to be manipulated; and claims that it has generated benefits--symbolic, expressive and instrumental.

This paper does three things. First, it offers a critique of the academic literature on the One Nation vote, focusing on the limitations of the work of political geographers and the methodological shortcomings of survey researchers. Second, it re-examines data from the 1998 Australian Election Study in order to explore the demographic and attitudinal forces that both drove the One Nation vote and distinguished it from the votes secured by the Labor Party, the Liberal and National parties and the Australian Democrats; this highlights the importance of gender, geography and class, of political alienation and of attitudes to Aborigines and immigration. Third, it suggests that the basis of One Nation's mobilisation did not lie in concerns about economic insecurity so much as in opposition to `new class' values, particularly around race. In doing so, it challenges common understandings of the Party's constituency and of its distinctiveness.

Measuring party support in Australia by constructing a 'two-party preferred' vote has had a profound effect, not only on the way political scientists, journalists, and politicians understand electoral 'swing' and predict electoral outcomes, but also on their understanding of the party system, their thinking about electoral fairness, and their views about which party or parties can legitimately claim government. This article traces the origins - the maternity as well as the paternity - of the 'two-party preferred'. It documents its spread from federal to state elections, even as voting systems in some states have switched from exhaustive preferential to optional preferential. It discusses its wide-ranging impact, and its implications for notions of electoral fairness and the legitimacy of election outcomes. It evaluates various criticisms of the concept - technical, pragmatic, and conceptual. And it notes the implications for marginal seat campaigning of the commonly observed 'uniform swing'- implications completely at odds with the idea that marginal seats matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What impact did the emergence of public opinion polls have on politicians and newspaper journalism? Based on interviews in the 1980s with American journalists and congressmen from the 1930s and 1940s, Susan Herbst argued that while “traditional” methods of assessing public opinion remained ubiquitous, attempts to quantify public opinion were also widespread. This paper offers a critique of her methods, questions the notion of a “transition”, and reports a different set of findings. Based on an exhaustive examination of the Australian metropolitan press during the 1951 referendum, it shows the limited impact of polls on political journalism—indeed, on political calculus more generally—and how heavily Australian journalists and politicians relied on “rational” measures of long standing not discussed by Herbst—results of earlier referenda and of previous elections, as well as the betting odds. It also shows the importance of a range of “traditional” sources—the reception accorded party leaders at campaign rallies, politicians and campaign organisers' reports, the extent to which the referendum had divided parties, judgments about the popularity of state governments, and the activities of key interest groups—some of which, again, are not noted by Herbst. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 1951 referendum campaign to ban communism produced a massive shift of public opinion, from Yes to No. This article attempts to explain why. It examines the political appeals and rhetoric of the Liberal and Labor Party leaders, their coverage across the entire metropolitan press, and their use of radio. Breaking with earlier interpretations, it argues that Evatt's campaign encompassed wider issues than civil liberties, suggests that Menzies' campaign was damaged by unruly meetings and shows that neither side appealed exclusively to ‘reason’ or to ‘passion’. Ultimately, the success of the No campaign rested on its capacity to mobilise most Labor voters and to attract some Liberals. This was an extraordinary achievement, but it was secured using routine forms of electioneering. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]