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It is very complicated to give correct answer to the question “How to define human life?” Nowadays dilemmas consider the respect of human life from the birth to death involve not just biology but also other sciences like philosophy, theology, sociology, psychology, law and politics. These sciences evaluate the topic from different points of view. Integration of all of these perspectives could result with a proper definition. The principal purpose of this paper is to try to determine when a human individual begins. If this proves to be too difficult, we might have to settle for a specific stage in the reproductive process before which it would be impossible to say with any plausibility that a human individual exists. It is necessary to return the moral dimension of observation to the science of life. The point is to reconcile the universal ethical principles concerning the absolute value of life with the everyday challenges and dilemmas. It is our deepest conviction that life has an absolute value and that there always remains something indestructible and substantial in life, which may neither be evaluated by anything final, nor completely reduced to the material biological equivalent and the genetic substratum.

Stem cells are increasingly being used to model human development and disease in the form of self-organizing embryo models, brain organoids, and neurological chimeras. These new research directions are resurrecting old embryo debates around moral status and personhood. Hyun considers how these old questions are tackled in these new contexts.

William Simkulet has recently criticised Colgrove et al’s defence against what they have called inconsistency arguments—arguments that claim opponents of abortion (OAs) act in ways inconsistent with their underlying beliefs about human fetuses (eg, that human fetuses are persons at conception). Colgrove et al presented three objections to inconsistency arguments, which Simkulet argues are unconvincing. Further, he maintains that OAs who hold that the fetus is a person at conception fail to act on important issues such as the plight of frozen embryos, poverty and spontaneous abortion. Thus, they are morally negligent. In response, we argue that Simkulet has targeted a very narrow group of OAs, and so his criticisms are inapplicable to most OAs. We then explain why his responses to each of Colgrove et al’s objections do not succeed, even for this restricted group. Finally, we note that Simkulet fails to provide evidence for his claims regarding OAs’ supposed failures to act, and we show that OAs veritably do invest resources into these important issues. We conclude that Colgrove et al’s reasons for rejecting inconsistency arguments (en masse) remain intact.

Recent scientific advances have indicated that it may be technically feasible to sustain human embryos in vitro beyond 14 days. Research beyond this stage is currently restricted by a guideline known as the 14-day rule. Since the advances in embryo culturing there have been calls to extend the current limit. Much of the current debate concerning an extension has regarded the 14-day rule as a political compromise and has, therefore, focused on policy concerns rather than assessing the philosophical foundations of the limit. While there are relevant political considerations, I maintain that the success of extension arguments will ultimately depend on the strength of the justifications supporting the current 14-day limit. I argue that the strongest and most prevalent justifications for the 14-day rule-an appeal to individuation and neural development-do not provide adequate support for the limit of 14 days. I instead suggest that an alternative justification based on sentience would constitute a more defensible basis for embryo protection and that a consideration of such grounds appears to support an amendment to the current limit, rather than the retention of it. While these conclusions do not establish conclusively that the current limit should be extended; they do suggest that an extension may be warranted and permissible. As such, this paper offers grounds on which a reassessment of the 14-day rule may be justified.

When did we begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard argue that a new human organism comes into existence neither earlier nor later than the moment of gastrulation: 16 days after conception. Several critics have responded that the onset of the organism must happen earlier; closer to conception. This article makes a radically different claim: if we accept Smith and Brogaard’s ontological commitments, then human organisms start, on average, roughly nine months after conception. The main point of contention is whether the fetus is or is not part of the maternal organism. Smith and Brogaard argue that it is not; I demonstrate that it is. This claim in combination with Smith and Brogaard’s own criteria commits to the view that human organisms begin, precisely, at birth.

Islam gives legal precedence to purity of lineage and known parenthood of all children. In Islam treatment to infertility using IVF is permitted within validity of marriage contract with no genes mixing. The paper shows that the Qur'ān, the word of Allah, and science, the deeds of Allah are not in major conflicts in defining the start of human life. The Holy Qur'ān provides an elegant description of origin, developmental stages of intra-uterine life. The Hadith explains two positions one that believes human embryo get ensouled at conception and the other after 40 days of conception. The paper aims to find that Islam confers moral respect to human embryo, but it also clarifies the absence of full human rights to a developing foetus. In Islam, human embryonic use is probably permissible for therapeutic and reproductive purpose keeping intact the principles of Shari'ah.

Under Chinese law, the juridical status of the embryo and the foetus is unclear, mainly because the existing legislation can be subject to diverse interpretations due to its ambiguous language. Lack of clarity with the law has led to different understandings amongst Chinese legal scholars. However, although there has been no consensus, there has been a clear tendency to deprive embryos and foetuses of legal status or personhood, thereby excluding them from entitlement to fundamental rights, an understanding reinforced by the Confucian view of the beginning of life. It is expected that in the near future the Chinese courts will face issues involving embryos and foetuses more often, such as disputes over in vitro embryos. The lack of legal precedent could result in contradictory resolutions, therefore, the law should clarify the legal status of embryos and foetuses and accord to prenatal life special respect and treatment.

The 14-day rule restricts the culturing of human embryos in vitro for the purposes of scientific research for no longer than 14 days. Since researchers recently developed the capability to exceed the 14-day limit, pressure to modify the rule has started to build. Sophia McCully argues that the limit should be extended to 28 days, listing numerous potential benefits of doing so. We contend that McCully has not engaged with the main reasons why the Warnock Committee set such a limit, and these still remain valid. As a result, her case for an extension of the 14-day rule is not persuasive.

Progesterone is the ovarian steroid produced by the granulosa cells of follicles after the LH peak at mid-cycle. Its role is to sustain embryo endometrial implantation and ongoing pregnancy. Other biological effects of progesterone may exert a protective function in supporting pregnancy up to birth. Luteal phase support (LPS) with progesterone is the standard of care for assisted reproductive technology. Progesterone vaginal administration is currently the most widely used treatment for LPS. Physicians and patients have been reluctant to change an administration route that has proven to be effective. However, some questions remain open, namely the need for LPS in fresh and frozen embryo transfer, the route of administration, the optimal duration of LPS, dosage, and the benefit of combination therapies. The aim of this review is to provide an overview of the uterine and extra-uterine effects of progesterone that may play a role in embryo implantation and pregnancy, and to discuss the advantages of the use of progesterone for LPS in the context of Good Medical Practice.

As the largest family of E3 ligases, the Skp1-cullin 1-F-box (SCF) E3 ligase complex is comprised of Cullins, Skp1 and F-box proteins. And the SCF E3 ubiquitin ligases play an important role in regulating critical cellular processes, which promote degradation of many cellular proteins, including signal transducers, cell cycle regulators, and transcription factors. We review the biological roles of the SCF ubiquitin-ligase complex in gametogenesis, oocyte-to-embryo transition, embryo development and the regulation for estrogen and progestin. We find that researches about the SCF ubiquitin-ligase complex at the beginning of life are not comprehensive, thus more in-depth researches will promote its eventual clinical application.

I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analysing the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that the difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns means one may claim abortion is morally permissible while also claiming infanticide is not morally permissible, without inconsistency between the two claims.

The somatic integration definition of life is familiar from the debate on the determination of death, with some bioethicists arguing that it supports brain death while others argue that some brain-dead bodies exhibit sufficient somatic integration for biological life. I argue that on either interpretation, the somatic integration definition of life implies that neither the preimplantation embryo nor the postimplantation embryo meet the somatic integration threshold condition for organismal human life. The earliest point at which a somatic integration determination of life could be made would be the beginning of the fetal stage, 9 weeks postfertilization. Bioethical implications are considered, specifically with respect to the moral status of the postimplantation embryo in embryo research and abortion.

One of the most controversial topics in modern bioethics, science, and philosophy is the beginning of individual human life. In the seemingly endless debate, strongly stimulated by recent technologic advances in human reproduction, a synthesis between scientific data and hypothesis, philosophical thought, and issues of humanities has become a necessity to deal with ethical, juridical, and social problems. Furthermore, in this field there is a temptation to ask science to choose between opinions and beliefs, which neutralize one another. The question of when human life begins requires the essential aid of different forms of knowledge. Here we become involved in the juncture between science and religion, which needs to be carefully explored. Modern bioethics and science are strongly concerned for the respect of human life at both ends of its existence (birth and death), but other sciences (eg. Philosophy, technology, psychology, sociology, law, and politics) consider the beginning of human life according to different points of view. However, bioethical topics like this one cannot be treated from only one perspective (eg. Biological, philosophical, or religious) because conclusions might be not good enough or reductive. This reality should be regarded in all its richness: An embryo gives a biologist and a geneticist substance for consideration, but because we are talking about the beginning of human life, it requires philosophical-anthropological consideration and confrontation with theology; in its protection we have to include ethics and law. In experiencing and investigating social behavior, other disciplines, such as the history of medicine and sociology, have to be included. It is hard to answer the question when human life should be legally protected. At the time of conception? At the time of implantation? At the time of birth? In all countries (except Ireland and Liechtenstein) juridical considerations are based on Roman law. Roman civil law says that the fetus has right when it is born or if it is born-nasciterus. Few countries agree with definition of beginning of human personality at the time of conception. The majority does not grant legal status to the human embryo in vitro (i.e., during the 14 days after fertilization). Thus, even in the absence of legal rights, there is no denying that the embryo constitutes the beginning of human life, a member of the human family. Therefore, whatever the attitude, every country has to examine which practices are compatible with the respect of that dignity and the security of human genetic material. The question when a human life begins and how to define it, could be answered only through the inner-connecting pathways of history, philosophy, medical science and religion. It has not been easy to determine where ne of the most controversial topics in modern bioethics, science, and philosophy is the beginning of individual human life. In the seemingly endless debate, strongly stimulated by recent technologic advances in human reproduction, a synthesis between scientific data and hypothesis, philosophical thought, and issues of humanities has become a necessity to deal with ethical, juridical, and social problems. Furthermore, in this field there is a temptation to ask science to choose between opinions and beliefs, which neutralize one another. The question of when human life begins requires the essential aid of different forms of knowledge. Here we become involved in the juncture between science and religion, which needs to be carefully explored. Modern bioethics and science are strongly concerned for the respect of human life at both ends of its existence (birth and death), but other sciences (eg. Philosophy, technology, psychology, sociology, law, and politics) consider the beginning of human life according to different points of view. However, bioethical topics like this one cannot be treated from only one perspective (eg. Biological, philosophical, or religious) because conclusions might be not good enough or reductive. This reality should be regarded in all its richness: An embryo gives a biologist and a geneticist substance for consideration, but because we are talking about the beginning of human life, it requires philosophical-anthropological consideration and confrontation with theology; in its protection we have to include ethics and law. In experiencing and investigating social behavior, other disciplines, such as the history of medicine and sociology, have to be included. It is hard to answer the question when human life should be legally protected. At the time of conception? At the time of implantation? At the time of birth? In all countries (except Ireland and Liechtenstein) juridical considerations are based on Roman law. Roman civil law says that the fetus has right when it is born or if it is born-nasciterus.Few countries agree with definition of beginning of human personality at the time of conception. The majority does not grant legal status to the human embryo in vitro (i.e., during the 14 days after fertilization). Thus, even in the absence of legal rights, there is no denying that the embryo constitutes the beginning of human life, a member of the human family. Therefore, whatever the attitude, every country has to examine which practices are compatible with the respect of that dignity and the security of human genetic material. The question when a human life begins and how to define it, could be answered only through the inner-connecting pathways of history, philosophy, medical science and religion. It has not been easy to determine where ne of the most controversial topics in modern bioethics, science, and philosophy is the beginning of individual human life. In the seemingly endless debate, strongly stimulated by recent technologic advances in human reproduction, a synthesis between scientific data and hypothesis, philosophical thought, and issues of humanities has become a necessity to deal with ethical, juridical, and social problems. Furthermore, in this field there is a temptation to ask science to choose between opinions and beliefs, which neutralize one another. The question of when human life begins requires the essential aid of different forms of knowledge. Here we become involved in the juncture between science and religion, which needs to be carefully explored. Modern bioethics and science are strongly concerned for the respect of human life at both ends of its existence (birth and death), but other sciences (eg. Philosophy, technology, psychology, sociology, law, and politics) consider the beginning of human life according to different points of view. However, bioethical topics like this one cannot be treated from only one perspective (eg. Biological, philosophical, or religious) because conclusions might be not good enough or reductive. This reality should be regarded in all its richness: An embryo gives a biologist and a geneticist substance for consideration, but because we are talking about the beginning of human life, it requires philosophical-anthropological consideration and confrontation with theology; in its protection we have to include ethics and law. In experiencing and investigating social behavior, other disciplines, such as the history of medicine and sociology, have to be included. It is hard to answer the question when human life should be legally protected. At the time of conception? At the time of implantation? At the time of birth? In all countries (except Ireland and Liechtenstein) juridical considerations are based on Roman law. Roman civil law says that the fetus has right when it is born or if it is born-nasciterus. Few countries agree with definition of beginning of human personality at the time of conception. The majority does not grant legal status to the human embryo in vitro (i.e., during the 14 days after fertilization). Thus, even in the absence of legal rights, there is no denying that the embryo constitutes the beginning of human life, a member of the human family. Therefore, whatever the attitude, every country has to examine which practices are compatible with the respect of that dignity and the security of human genetic material. The question when a human life begins and how to define it, could be answered only through the inner-connecting pathways of history, philosophy, medical science and religion. It has not been easy to determine where to draw the fine line between the competence of science and methaphysics in this delicate philosophical field. To a large extent the drawing of this line depends on one’s fundamental philosophical outlook. The point at which human life begins will always be seen differently by different individuals, groups, cultures, and religious faiths. In democracy there are always at least two sides, and the center holds only when the majority realizes that without a minority democracy itself is lost. The minority in turn must realize its best chance lies in persuasion by reason and thoughtfulness rather than fanaticism.

It is often assumed that if the fetus is a person, then abortion should be illegal. Thomson1 laid the groundwork to challenge this assumption, and Boonin2 has recently argued that it is false: he argues that abortion should be legal even if the fetus is a person. In this article, I explain both Thomson’s and Boonin’s reason for thinking that abortion should be legal even if the fetus is a person. After this, I show that Thomson’s and Boonin’s argument for legalised abortion fail; they have not given us good reason for thinking abortion should be legal.1 Finally, I argue that—if we play Boonin’s game—abortion should be illegal. When discussing the ethics and politics of abortion, whether the fetus is a person is usually central.3 4.2 However, Thomson1 long ago challenged this view. She argued that abortion is permissible even if the fetus is a person. To do so, she asks us to consider a case in which you (the reader) are non-consensually taken to a hospital and hooked up to a famous violinist. The violinist, if he is to survive, needs to filter his blood through your body. After 9 months, he will be fine and you can unplug yourself and go on your way. If you unplug yourself prior to this, however, he will die. Is it permissible to unplug yourself? Thomson thinks the answer is ‘yes’. And this, she thinks, shows that abortion is permissible even if the fetus is a person. While the majority of her article focuses on the ethics of abortion, it is clear that she also aims to show that abortion should be legal if the fetus is a person; she would no doubt reject the view that the state is right to coerce you into …

This account of the moral status of the human fetus makes four interlocking claims, which together comprise the Fetal Life Moral Status Thesis: (1) life as a human organism begins at the fetal stage of development; (2) the non-organismal life of the human embryo begins at fertilization; (3) the human fetus has intrinsic moral status as a human being; and (4) the human embryo has extrinsic moral status as a non-organismal human individual. The somatic integration definition of human life functions as a premise in two supporting arguments: the Fetal Life Argument and the Fetal Moral Status Argument. These arguments are articulated, objections are considered, and the resulting account of the moral status of the human fetus is applied to the problem of abortion.

Study Objectives Evidence for the association between screen time and insufficient sleep is bourgeoning, and recent findings suggest that these associations may be more pronounced in younger compared to older children, and for portable compared to non-portable devices. However, these effects have yet to be investigated within the beginning of life. Importantly, there are no data for the relationship between screen exposure and objectively measured infant sleep. This study examined the moderating role of age for both touchscreens’ and television’s relationship with sleep, using auto-videosomnography within a big-data sample of infants. Methods The sleep of 1074 infants (46% girls) aged 0–18 months was objectively assessed using computer-vision technology in this cross-sectional study. Sleep was additionally reported by parents in an online survey, as was infant exposure to screens. Results Age significantly moderated the relationship between daytime touchscreen exposure and sleep with a distinct pattern for younger infants, in which screen exposure was associated with decreased daytime sleep, but with a proposed compensatory increase in nighttime sleep consolidation. Compared to touchscreens, television exposure was less likely to be associated with sleep metrics, and age moderated this relationship only for daytime and 24-hour sleep duration. Conclusions In young infants, a daytime-nighttime sleep “trade-off” emerged, suggesting that the displacement of daytime sleep by screens may lead to greater accumulation of sleep homeostatic pressure, which in turn facilitates more consolidated nighttime sleep.

New techniques to generate and culture embryo‐like structures from stem cells require a more fine‐grained distinction of potential to define the moral status of these structures.[Image: see text]

I appreciate all of the commentaries for their careful and thoughtful engagement with my article. Because of limited space, I can only focus on some criticisms and cannot develop my responses as fully as I would like. This is probably best for the reader anyway. John Keown worries about the ‘dualism’ of the third objection against expressivism. By this I think he means that critics of the expressivist argument at the beginning of life view a certain class of human beings as ‘non-persons’ and therefore not worthy of protection (‘dualism’ thus refers to two classes of human beings). Obviously, a pro-life stance will take issue with classifying the unborn as non-persons, as defenders of selective abortion and other biotechnologies do, but I did not think it relevant to get into the weeds on this issue. Keown claims that the worrisome dualism views those with intellectual disabilities, whether ‘newborns or adults’, as non-persons who lack a right not to be killed. However, I do not think defenders of either selective abortion or assisted suicide are committed to this. Many would insist (whether they are justified in doing this is another matter) that once you are born, you are a person and therefore cannot …

The aim of the study was to study the initial moment of a person's life, which is important for a clear determination of when it begins to be protected by the legislation of Ukraine, and differentiation from legal or illegal abortions, as well as to propose an approach to determine the initial moment of life that is more consistent with the logic than exists in the current one the legislation of Ukraine. Today, the initial moment of life in Ukraine determines the beginning of childbirth, and the final - death of the brain, that is, the criteria for determining the beginning and end of life are different - the beginning of childbirth and brain death; we offer to connect the initial and final moments of life with the brain - from the formation and beginning of the functioning of the human brain to his death, that is, the only criterion is the brain) and a more humane approach to determining the initial moment of life than exists now (life if we take into account our proposals the legislator will be protected at earlier stages - from the 12th week of pregnancy). We examined the results obtained by other scientists, as well as normative acts, in particular, the Law of Ukraine «Basics of the Legislation of Ukraine on Health Protection» № 2801-XII of November 19, 1992. As a result of the study, individual proposals were made to improve the legislation of Ukraine in the field of protecting the human right to life. It is proposed to amend Part 1 of Art. 50 of the Law of Ukraine «Basics of the Legislation of Ukraine on Health Protection», in particular, replace in the text «The operation of artificial termination of pregnancy (abortion) can be performed at the request of a woman in health facilities during pregnancy for a period not exceeding 12 weeks».

Common-sense morality seems to dictate that newborn babies strictly outrank non-human animals on an ordered list of subjects of moral consideration. This is best described as the view that newborn babies have a higher moral status than any non-human animal. In this article, I will argue that this common-sense claim about the special moral status of newborn babies makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that fetuses, including pre-conscious fetuses, also have a higher moral status than any non-human animal-indeed, as high as newborn babies. While this conclusion does not quite entail that abortion is generally seriously immoral, it does seem to follow that it would be no less difficult to justify (even relatively early) abortion than it would be to justify killing a newborn.

Fetal “heartbeat” bills have become the anti-abortion legislative measure of choice in the US war on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). In 2019, Georgia House Bill 481 (HB 481) passed by a narrow margin banning abortions upon detection of embryonic cardiac activity, as early as six weeks gestation. The purpose of this study was to distinguish and characterise the arguments and tactics used by legislators and community members in support of Georgia’s early abortion ban. Our data included testimony and debate from House Health and Human Services and the Senate Science and Technology Committees; data were transcribed verbatim and coded in MAXQDA 18 using a constant comparison method. Major themes included: the use of the “heartbeat” as an indicator of life and therefore personhood; an attempt to create a new class of persons – fetuses in utero – entitled to legal protection; and arguments to expand state protections for fetuses as a matter of state sovereignty and rights. Arguments were furthered through appropriation by misrepresenting medical science and co-opting the legal successes of progressive movements. Our analysis provides an initial understanding of evolving early abortion ban strategy and its tactics for challenging established legal standards and precedent. As the battle over SRHR wages on, opponents of abortion bans should attempt to understand, deconstruct, and analyse anti-abortion messaging to effectively combat it. These data may inform their tactical strategies to advance sexual and reproductive health, rights, and justice both in the US context and beyond.

The amazing and almost unimaginable advances that have unfolded over the past decades in biotechnologies (heritable germline editing in particular) have brought bioethical issues to the forefront, sparking public debate and increasing attention worldwide. Such mind-blowing progress has already resulted in major improvement and enhancements for humans, and holds the potential for even more. Technology and bioengineering have begun to take over in the life sciences industry. Man's capacity to genetically engineer the biological world is nothing short of mind-boggling in its current magnitude, and may even evolve, in a not too distant future, into attempts to fuse man and machine into a cohesive bioengineered entity; a "super human being", endowed with enhanced cognitive and physical capabilities and impervious to disease, may be not too far down the road. That will not come without caveats, however. In fact, scientific advancements at such an accelerated pace have already negatively affected our cultural, ethical, and legal values and our ability to harness the opportunities and face the dangers posed by such developments. As a matter of fact, science seems to consistently outpace public morals, ethics and policymaking, which calls for a high degree of caution and common answers.

Much of the debate about the ethics of abortion has centered on whether the fetus is a person. In an attempt to sidestep this complex issue, I argue that, even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral. To arrive at this conclusion, I argue that giving a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and that if this is so, then killing the fetus is immoral. Roughly, this is because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome. Since abortion (in most cases) amounts to killing the fetus, this means that abortion (in most cases) is immoral. I defend the premises of this argument against a plethora of objections, concluding that they either do not work, or commit their proponent to a controversial position.

Moral status ascribes equal obligations and rights to individuals on the basis of membership in a protected group. Substance change is an event that results in the origin or cessation of individuals who may be members of groups with equal moral status. In this paper, two substance changes that affect the moral status of human embryos are identified. The first substance change begins with fertilization and ends with the formation of the blastocyst, a biological individual with moral status comparable to that ascribed to human organs. The second substance change begins at implantation and ends late in embryological development with the formation of the human body, an organism with moral status as a human being. The bioethical implications of each substance change are explored. The Two Substance Change theory is contrasted with continuity theories, which recognize no substance change in embryological development and with fertilization-only substance change theories.

This paper is a response to a recent paper by Bobier and Omelianchuk in which they argue that the critics of Giubilini and Minerva’s defence of infanticide fail to adequately justify a moral difference at birth. They argue that such arguments would lead to an intuitively less plausible position: that late-term abortions are permissible, thus creating a dilemma for those who seek to argue that birth matters. I argue that the only way to resolve this dilemma, is to bite the naturalist bullet and accept that the intuitively plausible idea that birth constitutes a morally relevant event is simply mistaken and biologically misinformed.

The substance view is an account of personhood that regards all human beings as possessing instrinsic value and moral status equivalent to that of an adult human being. Consequently, substance view proponents typically regard abortion as impermissible in most circumstances. The substance view, however, has difficulty accounting for certain intuitions regarding the badness of death for embryos and fetuses, and the wrongness of killing them. Jeff McMahan's time-relative interest account is designed to cater for such intuitions, and so I present a proposal for strengthening the substance view by incorporating McMahan's account - the

English law is unambiguous that legal personality, and with it all legal rights and protections, is assigned at birth. This rule is regarded as a bright line that is easily and consistently applied. The time has come, however, for the rule to be revisited. This article demonstrates that advances in foetal surgery and (anticipated) artificial wombs do not marry with traditional conceptions of birth and being alive in law. These technologies introduce the possibility of ex utero gestation, and/or temporary existence ex utero, and consequently developing human beings that are novel to the law. Importantly therefore, the concepts of birth and born alive no longer distinguish between human beings deserving of legal protection in the way originally intended. Thus, there is a need for reform; for a new approach to determining the legal significance of birth and what being legally alive actually encompasses.Investigating the law of birth is of crucial importance, because of the implications of affording or denying the subjects of new reproductive technologies rights and protections. A determination of the legal status of the subject of foetal surgery or an artificial womb will determine what can and cannot be done to each entity. Moreover, the status afforded to these entities will drastically impact on the freedoms of pregnant women.

The view that human beings begin to exist at fertilization (namely conceptionism) faces a serious challenge from the twinning argument, that identical twins coming from the same zygote must be numerically distinct from the zygote and so did not exist at fertilization. Recently, some philosophers have claimed that the twinning argument rests on a particular metaphysical theory of persistence, namely endurantism, on which a human being, for example, is wholly present at every moment of her existence. And we can easily refute the argument, they claim, by employing perdurantism or exdurantism, according to which a human being is a temporally extended entity with temporal parts or a momentarily existing stage who has other momentarily existing stages as counterparts. I argue that such claims are mistaken. The twinning argument does not rest on endurantism and can be formulated in terms of perdurantism to provide a good reason for perdurantists to reject conceptionism. And exdurantism does not have any advantage in defending conceptionism either, for it already concedes more than what the twinning argument aims to show.

A substantial proportion of human embryos spontaneously abort soon after conception, and ethicists have argued this is problematic for the pro-life view that a human embryo has the same moral status as an adult from conception. Firstly, if human embryos are our moral equals, this entails spontaneous abortion is one of humanity's most important problems, and it is claimed this is absurd, and a reductio of the moral status claim. Secondly, it is claimed that pro-life advocates do not act as if spontaneous abortion is important, implying they are failing to fulfill their moral obligations. We report that the primary cause of spontaneous abortion is chromosomal defects, which are currently unpreventable, and show that as the other major cause of prenatal death is induced abortion, pro-life advocates can legitimately continue efforts to oppose it. We also defend the relevance of the killing and letting die distinction, which provides further justification for pro-life priorities.

Production of human fertilized embryos by using germ cells derived from pluripotent stem cells (PSCs) entails ethical issues that differ fundamentally depending on the aim. If the aim is solely to conduct research, then embryo generation, utilization and destruction must respect for the human embryo as having the innate potential to develop into a human being. If the aim is human reproduction, this technology must never be used to manipulate human life, confuse social order, or negatively affect future generations. Researchers should distinguish the aims and then accordingly establish a consensus on the safeguards needed to proceed with scientifically significant and socially accepted research, or otherwise set a moratorium. Currently, in Japan, germ cell production from human PSCs is permitted, whereas fertilization of these germ cells is not. The Japanese Expert Panel on Bioethics in the Cabinet Office has proposed that all of the following conditions must be met to approve fertilization for research purposes: (1) the research is significant for the life sciences and medicine; (2) the benefits or anticipated benefits are socially accepted; (3) human safety is assured; and (4) safeguards are put in place. If fertilization is ethically approved, I recommend the following safeguards: limitation of the purpose to improving conventional ART as an initial step; permitted culture of human embryos until the appearance of the primitive streak; restriction of the number of embryos produced to the minimum necessary; prohibition of transplantation into a human or animal uterus; and provision of human-derived ova that are not required for ART treatment.

This article explores some of the complex ethical challenges that exist in the field of fetal diagnosis and treatment, especially surrounding maternal-fetal surgery. The rise of these new treatments force us to reconsider who or what is the fetus, what are our obligations to the fetus, and what are the limits to those obligations. In addition, we will consider provider and professional biases, disability issues, and how maternal-fetal surgery has, for a select group of women, changed the very experience of motherhood.

Opposition to induced abortion rests on the belief that fetuses have a moral status comparable to beings like us, and that the loss of such a life is tragic. Antiabortion, or pro-life, theorists argue that (1) it is wrong to induce abortion and (2) it is wrong to allow others to perform induced abortion. However, evidence suggests that spontaneous abortion kills far more fetuses than induced abortion, and critics argue that most pro-life theorists neglect the threat of spontaneous abortion and ought to do more to prevent it. Friberg-Fernros contends such an obligation would be implausibly strong, arguing that induced abortions are far worse than spontaneous abortions because while both involve the tragedy of the death of the fetus, induced abortion involves a second tragedy—one person killing another. I argue this two tragedies argument fails to explain what is morally relevant about induced abortion.

On the boundaries of life and, as a result, almost a question of metaphysics, still dividing science and continually fuelling debates, one question does seem to be legally insoluble, ie the question of the status of the human embryo. A comparatist look allows us to put into perspective the various national postures with regard to the embryo in order to confront them, by putting forward the areas where they converge or diverge. Although a very global approach allows us to note certain similarities, a more precise study of the question of abortion in particular reflects the evidence of the contextualisation of the embryo. It is what it is, subject or object, enjoying absolute or very relative protection, a simply legislative or constitutional status, only with regard to legal systems, but also moral and religious systems in which it takes its place.

For a long time, the legal condition of the child conceived, the embryo or the human fœtus, to use the language of biomedicine, was dominated by two main principles : one, having its roots in Roman law, made it possible to count it, by anticipation, among beings with a legal existence, so as to grant it its rights, as if it was already born (the infans conceptus maxim) : the other, protecting its life in utero, and so its chances of being born, by the penal incrimination of abortion. The legalisation of abortion by the ?Veil? law of 17 January 1975 upset this traditional approach of the law. The subsequent evolution of the legislation has accentuated the phenomenon. The promotion of the freedom of women to obtain an abortion has been accompanied by a correlated decline in the protection of the embryo. At the same time, abortion resting on medical techniques has become a means, precious for research, to obtain embryo or foetal cells or tissues. Eliminated on the one hand, the embryo has finally become on the other hand the object of medical and scientific stakes.

How raising the embryo's issue today ? Far from evidences and certainties, we have to face the confrontations to understand them. Embryo's issue crystalise all cultural and human tensions. Beyond ontological disagrement on the embryo being what can we expect for mankind today and tomorrow ? Through an anthropological thinking, embryo's issue challenges us in our common capability of decision.

A conceived child is the subject of abortion crimes protection in the Criminal code. Under Polish Law, legislators did not predict a legal definition of this term and there is a conflict in literature about the beginning of legislative life protection. At the same time, terminological inconsistency in normative acts should be indicated. More especially, the one in the Criminal code as well as in the legislative from January 7th 1993, which refers to family planning, protection of human fetus, and conditions of allowance on pregnancy termination. Derivative concept of interpretation, which is a basic tool for work on legislative texts, enables solving these doubts. It consists of using linguistic, system and functional directives. Looking at literature, judicature and linguistic meaning of the word „conception”, concludes that criminal law protects human life from the moment of conception. The Constitutional Tribunal in Poland explains that reassurance of protection is a basic rule of human life. Also, this doctrine should indicate the argument about genetic assessment.

It is commonly argued that a serious right to life is grounded only in actual, relatively advanced psychological capacities a being has acquired. The moral permissibility of abortion is frequently argued for on these grounds. Increasingly it is being argued that such accounts also entail the permissibility of infanticide, with several proponents of these theories accepting this consequence. We show, however, that these accounts imply the permissibility of even more unpalatable acts than infanticide performed on infants: organ harvesting, live experimentation, sexual interference, and discriminatory killing. The stronger intuitions against the permissibility of these ‘pre-personal acts’ allow us to re-establish a comprehensive and persuasive reductio against psychological accounts of persons.

On 3 March 2018, a liquid nitrogen storage tank broke down at University Hospitals Fertility Center in Cleveland, Ohio. More than 950 patients lost over 4000 eggs and embryos (also called “preembryos”) that were frozen and stored for later use. The hospital's letter to patients pointed to human error. The Ohio Department of Health found the fertility center out of compliance, and inquests are still pending.

One argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human life extension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable. In this article, I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this argument. I argue that radical increases in life expectancy could, in principle, reduce the evolutionary potential of human populations through both biological and cultural mechanisms. I further argue that if life extension did reduce the evolvability of the species, this will be undesirable for three reasons: (1) it may increase the species' susceptibility to extinction risks, (2) it may adversely affect institutions and practices that promote well-being, and (3) it may impede moral progress.

When a human being comes into existence is crucial in bioethics. Conceptionism is the view that a human being comes into existence at conception. The twinning argument is an influential objection to this view. All versions of the twinning argument rely on a metaphysics of material objects, namely, endurantism. Given this, a strategy for defending conceptionism against the twinning argument is to deny endurantism and adopt an alternative metaphysics of material objects. A version of this strategy which has been debated in this journal is to adopt perdurantism, or the 'multiple occupancy view', on which monozygotic twins share the zygote region as a temporal part. We present a novel version of this strategy: conceptionists can evade the twinning argument by adopting an exdurantist metaphysics of material objects. We suggest reasons for thinking that this is a plausible and, indeed, preferable way for conceptionists to avoid the twinning argument.

In ‘Pro-life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’ Joona Rasanen argues that Christopher Kaczor’s objections to Giubilini and Minerva’s position on infanticide are not persuasive. We argue that Rasanen’s criticism is largely misplaced, and that he has not engaged with Kaczor’s strongest arguments against infanticide. We reply to each of Rasanen’s criticisms, drawing on the full range of Kaczor’s arguments, as well as adding some of our own.

Research into human development involves the use of human embryos and their derivative cells and tissues. How religions view the human embryo depends on beliefs about ensoulment and the inception of personhood, and science can neither prove nor refute the teaching of those religions that consider the zygote to be a human person with an immortal soul. This Spotlight article discusses some of the dominant themes that have emerged with regard to how different religions view the human embryo, with a focus on the Christian faith as well as Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish and Islamic perspectives.

One of the most controversial topics in modern bioethics, science, and philosophy is the beginning of individual human life. In the seemingly endless debate, strongly stimulated by recent technologic advances in human reproduction, a synthesis between scientific data and hypothesis, philosophical thought, and issues of humanities has become a necessity to deal with ethical, juridical, and social problems. Furthermore, in this field there is a temptation to ask science to choose between opinions and beliefs, which neutralize one another. The question of when human life begins requires the essential aid of different forms of knowledge. Here we become involved in the juncture between science and religion, which needs to be carefully explored.

As 2015 drew to a close, it was marked by a media frenzy surrounding advances in a new gene editing technology known as CRISPR (Clustered regularly-interspaced short palindromic repeats). Owing to ...

Although the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome has become commonplace, infanticide is still widely rejected. Generally, there are three ways of justifying the differentiation between abortion and infanticide: by referring to the differences between the moral status of the fetus versus the infant, by referring to the differences of the moral status of the act of abortion versus the act of infanticide, or by separating the way the permissibility of abortion is justified from the way the impermissibility of infanticide is justified. My argument is that none of these ways justifies the abortion of fetuses diagnosed with Down syndrome while simultaneously rejecting infanticide. Either the justification for abortion is consistent with infanticide, or it is implausible to justify abortion while rejecting infanticide. I conclude the article by making some preliminary remarks about how one might manage the situation posed by my argument.