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The paper explores the long-term trajectory and the recent acceleration of the conflict over the rule of law in the EU. It focusses on the motivation of the two governments in Hungary and Poland to challenge European core values increasingly aggressively even directly at EU level despite the threat of significant material costs to both countries. Putting forward a Gramscian understanding, we argue that this radicalization is the result of a counter-hegemonic strategy that aims at replacing the liberal order with a new, nationalist, ultraconservative, Christian order on domestic and European levels. The paper traces core elements of this strategy which are either disputed or underestimated in existing literature, most importantly the pursuit of a core ideology and the massive and long-term investment into winning moral and cultural leadership through the penetration of civil society which precedes and complements electoral strategies and autocratic institution building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to understand the factors that shape populist radical right parties’ economic policies. While there is a good understanding of how these parties’ core ideology of nativism and authoritarianism shapes social policies, we know less about economic policies. With few exceptions, the insights of this literature have also not travelled to East-Central Europe, despite the strength of the populist right in this region. Instead, authors writing on the region focus on the social coalitions forged by populist parties as an explanation for policies. These authors however do not focus on the role of populism in policymaking. Our paper therefore asks whether the ideological literature can travel to economic policies as well, and specifically to the cases of Hungary and Poland. Drawing on the evidence of financial market reforms under the Fidesz and PiS rule in Hungary and Poland, and a congruence analysis testing the predictive power of existing approaches, we show that a combination of ideological and material factors is needed to explain observed economic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Great Financial Crisis ushered unorthodox financial policies that would have been unfathomable before 2008. Perhaps unexpectedly, some of the boldest measures on this unorthodox spectrum were adopted in semi-peripheral and therefore theoretically vulnerable countries such as some of the European Union's new member states from East-Central Europe. Why did policy makers in some of these countries (Hungary, Romania) embark on rolling back financialization and resort to financial repression in ways that targeted foreign banks in contexts in which this seemed a very risky strategy? Why did such bold moves generally re-established state-finance relations in some countries (Hungary) while comparably milder ones left them generally unaltered in others (Romania)? Finally, why have some countries refrained altogether from such forms of financial unorthodoxy (Latvia)? The paper explains the varieties of policy responses in these countries, with three factors: the role of finance in the national growth model, the capacity of the state to protect itself against adverse bond market reactions and international constraints and opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the quiet politics of informal business-state interaction explains the political determinants of growth regimes. Building on the business power literature within the study of comparative capitalism, it shows that the noisy politics of elections often leads to changes of government but rarely to fundamental changes in the growth regime. Rather, growth models can be traced to the interactions and interests of dominant corporations within a country and its policymaking elites. The argument is developed through a comparative case study research design, using the case of foreign direct investment–led (FDI-led) growth in Ireland and Hungary. FDI-led growth regimes are a universe of cases that rely on state-led industrial and enterprise policies targeting the capital investment of foreign-owned multinational firms. Despite periods of noisy electoral politics challenging basic tenets of the FDI-led growth model in both Hungary and Ireland, the continuity of FDI-oriented growth is traced to the corporate politics of business-state elite deals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article belongs to the special cluster, "Politics and Current Demographic Challenges in Central and Eastern Europe," guest-edited by Tsveta Petrova and Tomasz Inglot. We explore housing finance and policy in East Central Europe to understand the connection between housing, in particular independent household formation, and the demographic crisis. The combination of high debt-free homeownership rates with illiquid housing finance and limited rental markets produces conditions where housing restricts independent household formation and likely has a restrictive effect on fertility. We first assess the housing regime type in East Central Europe and demonstrate that it closely corresponds to the "difficult housing regime" in Southern Europe, which has well-established negative effects on independent household formation and fertility. Then we present a detailed case study of Hungary, which is a country with very low fertility rates and substantial changes in housing finance and policy over time. In particular, the issue was recently politicized through housing policies centered on household formation to counter the demographic crisis. We present a detailed analysis of policies related to access to housing for young adults through increased access to markets or state housing support schemes. These policies attempted to reduce dependence on families, but after the crisis, we find that these policies reinforce, rather than challenge, dependence on families for housing solutions, thereby limiting independent household formation. While these policies may serve a rhetorical role demonstrating a state response to the demographic crisis, we claim that their impact on fertility can be at most minimal because of stringent restrictions in access that concentrates on upper-middle-income households and limited financial commitment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the critical Hungarian case, this article analyses the fate of embedded neoliberal capitalism in the wake of the global financial crisis. The changes include policies to combat foreign dominance in the financial, energy, and retail sectors, and efforts to reform and retrench the hitherto relatively generous welfare state. Nevertheless, the article finds no less evidence of continuity than of change: the politicisation of fighting dependency is combined with the quiet politics of subsidising foreign direct investment in manufacturing, and the noisy politics of protecting pensioners and middle-class families parallels the erosion of future-oriented social investment. Notwithstanding the radical turn in development rhetoric, the actual path correction has merely shifted the pattern of dependency without breaking out of it: financing socio-economic development in Hungary (as in other Visegrád states) is still largely dependent on foreign sources, albeit of a more diversified nature, including not only manufacturing FDI, but the EU's structural funds and migrant labour's remittances as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]