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Globally, tobacco is responsible for the death of approximately 6 million individuals per year. In reaction, governments have enacted tobacco control policies that cope with the harmful effects of the drug. However, these policies have also created geographic price disparities and increased the effort needed to purchase legal tobacco products. The result was the creation of a new illicit tobacco market. While tobacco smuggling continues through conventional avenues, a new generation of traffickers have turned to a different source for the illicit distribution of tobacco -- the internet, specifically the darkweb. The purpose of this paper is to describe the size and scope of illicit trafficking of tobacco on cryptomarkets, and the diverse types of tobacco-related products available on the cryptomarkets. Our analysis will provide guidance for policymakers, researchers, and all interested in the illicit trade of tobacco. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Illicit markets capitalize on the vulnerabilities of trade systems. When these weaknesses involve mechanisms common to several aspects of transnational commerce, the effect of illicit behavior, and conversely of anti-crime policy, can be magnified. This study introduces a script-network method to estimate the impact of targeting illicit behavior within the context of an entire market system. Using the high-value art and antiquities market as a case study, we anticipate the effects of two anti-crime policy directives--movement control and monitoring financial transactions. In addition to advancing a new method, two original metrics are presented--one measures the complexity of sectors in a trade system (complexity) and the other anticipates the incentive to work around crime control efforts (transformity). In consideration of these system characteristics, our results suggest that maximum decoupling of illicit\legal trade is more likely with the introduction of safeguards targeting central trade functions that are associated with valuing and gifting objects. Network-oriented research could help the prevailing market reduction approach (MRA) to be more effective in reducing transnational illicit trade because network analytics are specially crafted for dealing with the statistical challenges that are inherent to studying transnational illicit market systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If as suspected, criminal enterprise feeds off legal trade, then anti-crime policy must target the points at which legal and illicit markets intersect. This study offers a strategy to pinpoint and calibrate the degree of fusion across an entire trade system. Legal and illicit processes and mechanisms essential to all sectors of an industry – development, financing, handling, possession and regulation – were dissected using a script methodology. Eigenvector centrality scores identified interlocking tools and actors. The results highlight the role played by supporting industries (e.g. insurers, auction houses, storage specialists, foundations and high net-worth buyers) and the need to target temporary markets, shipping activity and financial transactions with regulatory policing efforts. Vaccinating global economies from illicit activity is best achieved through a soft law approach aimed at identifiable mechanisms (faulty props) used by groups playing pivotal trade roles (bad actors). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transnational illicit markets are deeply embedded within legal trade systems and thus should be affected by shifting market conditions. Applying a stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM), this study tests whether variation in illicit market opportunity could account for changing relations within the small arms trade (2003–2008). Measures of market accessibility – changes in export activity, reporting transparency and the percent of the labour force that is armed – outperformed measures of weapon availability with the exception of involvement in armed conflict. Significant structural change in outdegree density and transitivity suggest the development of trade factions, and decreasing balance hints that leaders are emerging. With the pending de-escalation of US-led conflict in the Middle East, a flood of second-hand weaponry is about to enter the market. Continued research is required to further uncover how the legitimate trade infrastructure facilitates the illicit flow of goods. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]