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Seeing an embodied humanoid avatar move its arms can induce in the observer the illusion that its own (static) arms are moving accordingly, the kinematic signals emanating from this avatar thus being considered like those from the biological body. Here, we investigated the causal relationship between these kinaesthetic illusions and the illusion of body ownership, manipulated through visuomotor synchronisation. The results of two experiments revealed that the sense of body ownership over an avatar seen from a first-person perspective was intimately linked to visuomotor synchrony. This was not the case for kinaesthetic illusions indicating that when superimposed on the biological body, the avatar is inevitably treated at the sensorimotor level as one's own body, whether consciously considered as such or not. The question of whether these two bodily experiences (body ownership and kinaesthetic illusion) are underpinned by distinct representations, the body image, and the body schema, is discussed., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

In recent years, an increasing number of studies employed the full body illusion paradigm (i.e., the experimentally induced illusory ownership over a fake/virtual body) to investigate the role of body ownership in higher-level cognition. However, to date, no systematic review of this topic is present. To fill this gap, here we identified 102 papers classifiable in 4 cognitive domains and 12 subdomains. Overall, they manipulated the identity of the fake body, and/or its spatial perspective, and/or the kind of multisensory stimulation, and/or its spatiotemporal congruency. The effects were measured through implicit and/or explicit indices. In summary, results showed that participants' behavior shifted away from the self and/or towards that of the embodied fake/virtual body. The findings have been interpreted within various exploratory frameworks, with the most common being the Proteus effect, the cortical body matrix and the inverse model of motor control. Future studies should focus on building a unitary theoretical explanation of the effects, gaining solid neural evidence, creating standard experimental procedures, and exploring the practical applications., Competing Interests: Declarations of interest None, (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The social softness illusion (i.e., the tendency to perceive another person's skin as softer than our own) is thought to promote the sharing of social-emotional experiences because of the rewarding properties of receiving and giving social affective touch. Here we investigated whether the ability to distinguish someone else's body from our own modulates the social softness illusion. In particular, we tested whether the spatial perspective taken by the participants and seeing or not the touched arms could alter this illusion. Pairs of female participants were assigned the roles of either the giver (i.e., delivering the touches) or the receiver (i.e., being touched). We manipulated the location of the touch (palm or forearm), the spatial perspective of the receiver's body with respect to the giver's body (egocentric or allocentric perspective), and the vision of the touched body part (the giver could either see both her own and the receiver's body part, or she was blindfolded). Consistently with previous findings, the skin of another person was perceived as softer than the own one. Additionally, the illusion was present for both the forearm and the palm, and it was stronger in allocentric compared to the egocentric perspective (i.e., when the self-other distinction was clearer). These findings show that the mechanisms underpinning the ability to represent another person's body as distinct from our own modulates the social softness illusion, and thus support the role of the social softness illusion in fostering social relationships., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

The feeling of owning one's body underlies human self-awareness. Body-ownership illusions allow temporarily modulating body ownership, which has observable effects on the behavior and cognitive processes. However, the extent of those effects is unclear. Here, we investigated whether illusory ownership of a virtual body extended to ownership of the value/meaning of its actions. A variation of detection-of-deception procedure (Concealed Information Test) was performed by an embodied virtual avatar (first-person perspective, 1PP), or a non-embodied one (third-person perspective, 3PP), while the skin conductance responses (SCRs) were recorded from passively observing participants. Target stimuli (i.e., concealed information) evoked significantly larger SCRs than the neutral ones only when the avatar was embodied (in 1PP). Such pattern of SCR differences corresponds to that observed when participants perform the task themselves, thus suggesting that the sole experience of owning a virtual body can trigger physiological responses related to the subjective significance of the body's actions., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Recent findings suggest that body ownership can activate the motor system in the absence of movement execution. Here, we investigated whether such a process promotes motor recovery in stroke patients. A group of patients with left-hemisphere damage ( N = 12) and chronic motor deficits completed an immersive virtual reality training (three sessions of 15 min each week for 11 weeks). Patients sat still and either experienced (first-person perspective) or did not experience (third-person perspective) illusory ownership over the body of a standing virtual avatar. After the training, in which the avatar walked around a virtual environment, only patients who experienced the illusion improved gait and balance. We argue that representing the virtual body as their own allowed patients to access motor functioning and promoted motor recovery. This procedure might be integrated with rehabilitative approaches centered on motor execution. These findings also have an impact on the knowledge of the motor system in general.

Sensory attenuation (i.e., the phenomenon whereby self-produced sensations are perceived as less intense compared to externally occurring ones) is among the neurocognitive processes that help distinguishing ourselves from others. It is thought to be rooted in the motor system (e.g., related to motor intention and prediction), while the role of body awareness, which necessarily accompanies any voluntary movement, in this phenomenon is largely unknown. To fill this gap, here we compared the perceived intensity, somatosensory evoked potentials, and alpha-band desynchronization for self-generated, other-generated, and embodied-fake-hand-generated somatosensory stimuli. We showed that sensory attenuation triggered by the own hand and by the embodied fake hand had the same behavioral and neurophysiological signatures (reduced subjective intensity, reduced of N140 and P200 SEP components and post-stimulus alpha-band desynchronization). Therefore, signals subserving body ownership influenced attenuation of somatosensory stimuli, possibly in a postdictive manner. This indicates that body ownership is crucial for distinguishing the source of the perceived sensations., (Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Body ownership (the feeling that one's body belongs to oneself) is commonly studied with Rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm that allows inducing a temporary illusory feeling of ownership of a life-sized rubber hand. However, it remains unclear whether illusory ownership of the fake hand relies on the same mechanisms as ownership of one's own real hand. Here, we directly compared ownership of the own hand (OH) and fake hand (FH) in the same set of conditions within immersive virtual reality. We obtained behavioral (proprioceptive drift) and subjective (questionnaire) measures of ownership and disownership for virtual OH, FH and object (Obj) that were located congruently or incongruently with the participant's real hand and were stimulated synchronously or asynchronously with the real hand. Both OH and FH (but not Obj) were embodied after synchronous stimulation in both locations. Crucially, subjective ownership of the OH was stronger than of the FH in congruent location after synchronous stimulation. It was also present after asynchronous stimulation, being stronger when the virtual OH was subjectively more similar to the real hand. The results suggest that the detailed appearance of the body might act as an additional component in the construction of body ownership.

Currently, it is still debated whether, how and to what extent movements contribute to the sense of body ownership (i.e., the feeling that one's body belongs to oneself). To answer this question, here we examined if a prolonged increase of the amount of movements affects body ownership. Specifically, we administered the rubber hand illusion paradigm within a natural condition of long-term motor practice, namely in expert pianists. We compared the illusory effects of both static (visuotactile stimulation) and dynamic (active/passive movements) versions of that paradigm in a group of expert pianists and a group of non-musicians. The illusion was measured behaviorally (proprioceptive drift) and subjectively (questionnaire). Our results showed that pianists were significantly less susceptible to any type of the illusion, compared to the non-musicians. Moreover, they did not experience the illusion in general (presenting neither the proprioceptive drift, nor the subjective feeling of ownership). These findings suggest that the increased amount of motor-related afferent and efferent signals does affect the construction and the coherence of body ownership, thus showing the role of movements in this process.

The sense of body ownership, i.e., the belief that a specific body part belongs to us, can be selectively impaired in brain-damaged patients. Recently, a pathological form of embodiment has been described in patients who, when the examiner's hand is located in a body-congruent position, systematically claim that it is their own hand (E+ patients). This paradoxical behavior suggests that, in these patients, the altered sense of body ownership also affects their capacity of visually discriminating the body-identity details of the own and the alien hand, even when both hands are clearly visible on the table. Here, we investigated whether, in E+ patients with spared tactile sensibility, a coherent body ownership could be restored by introducing a multisensory conflict between what the patients feel on the own hand and what they see on the alien hand. To this aim, we asked the patients to rate their sense of body ownership over the alien hand, either after segregated tactile stimulations of the own hand (out of view) and of the alien hand (visible) or after synchronous and asynchronous tactile stimulations of both hands, as in the rubber hand illusion set-up. Our results show that, when the tactile sensation perceived on the patient's own hand was in conflict with visual stimuli observed on the examiner's hand, E+ patients noticed the conflict and spontaneously described visual details of the (visible) examiner's hand (e.g., the fingers length, the nails shape, the skin color…), to conclude that it was not their own hand. These data represent the first evidence that, in E+ patients, an incongruent visual-tactile stimulation of the own and of the alien hand reduces, at least transitorily, the delusional body ownership over the alien hand, by restoring the access to the perceptual self-identity system, where visual body identity details are stored., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The relation between sense of body ownership and sense of agency is still highly debated. Here we investigated in a large sample of healthy participants the associations between several implicit and explicit indexes of the two senses. Specifically, we examined the correlations between proprioceptive shift (implicit measure) and questionnaire on the subjective experience of ownership (explicit measure) within the rubber hand illusion paradigm (body ownership), and intentional binding (implicit measure), attenuation of the intensity of auditory outcomes of actions (implicit measure) and questionnaire on the subjective experience of authorship (explicit measure) within the Libet's clock paradigm (sense of agency). Our results showed that proprioceptive shift was positively correlated with the attenuation of auditory outcomes. No significant correlations were found between the explicit measures of the two senses. We argue that the individual spatiotemporal constraints subserving the integration of sensory-related signals (implicit signature) would be common to both senses, whereas their subjective experience (explicit signature) would rely on additional processes specific for any given sense., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

We investigated whether agency triggered by body ownership shares similar temporal constraints with agency induced by actual movements. We compared agency over the movements of the own hand, a fake hand and an embodied fake hand when they pressed a button delivering a stimulus to the participant's body after 500, 1000 or 2000 ms. In the first two delays, the movement of the embodied fake hand was misattributed to the participant's own will and the stimulus intensity was attenuated, as it happened when the own hand delivered the stimulus. With the longest delay, the movement of the embodied fake hand was neither misattributed to the participant's will nor the stimulus intensity was attenuated, as it happened when the fake non-embodied hand delivered the stimulus. By showing that illusory and veridical agency arise under similar temporal constraints, we further demonstrated that body ownership per se acts upon agency attribution., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

There is no consensus on whether, and to what extent, actions contribute to constructing awareness of one's own body. Here we investigated at both physiological and behavioral level whether a prolonged limb immobilization affects body ownership. We tested a group of healthy participants, whose left-hand movements were prevented by a cast for one week, and a control group without any movement restriction. In both groups, we measured the strength of the rubber hand illusion (i.e., proprioceptive shift and questionnaire on ownership) and the physiological parameters known to be modulated by short-term arm immobilization (i.e., resting motor threshold, motor evoked potentials and force parameters) before and after the week of immobilization. Our results showed stronger illusory effects on the immobilized hand on both behavioral indexes and weaker illusory effects on the non-immobilized hand on the questionnaire. Additionally, the increased proprioceptive shift was positively correlated to the motor threshold of the contralateral hemisphere. Our findings show at both behavioral and physiological level that altering those movement-related signals which constantly stem from our own body parts, modulates the experience of those body parts as mine. This, in turn, supports the view of a direct role of actions in the developing and maintaining a coherent body ownership., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

A question still debated within cognitive neuroscience is whether signals present during actions significantly contribute to the emergence of human's body ownership. In the present study, we aimed at answer this question by means of a neuropsychological approach. We administered the classical rubber hand illusion paradigm to a group of healthy participants and to a group of neurological patients affected by a complete left upper limb hemiplegia, but without any propriceptive/tactile deficits. The illusion strength was measured both subjectively (i.e., by a self-report questionnaire) and behaviorally (i.e., the location of one's own hand is shifted towards the rubber hand). We aimed at examining whether, and to which extent, an enduring absence of movements related signals affects body ownership. Our results showed that patients displayed, respect to healthy participants, stronger illusory effects when the left (affected) hand was stimulated and no effects when the right (unaffected) hand was stimulated. In other words, hemiplegics had a weaker/more flexible sense of body ownership for the affected hand, but an enhanced/more rigid one for the healthy hand. Possible interpretations of such asymmetrical distribution of body ownership, as well as limits of our results, are discussed. Broadly speaking, our findings suggest that the alteration of the normal flow of signals present during movements impacts on human's body ownership. This in turn, means that movements have a role per se in developing and maintaining a coherent body ownership.

In anosognosia for hemiplegia, patients may claim having performed willed actions with the paralyzed limb despite unambiguous evidence to the contrary. Does this false belief of having moved reflect the functioning of the same mechanisms that govern normal motor performance? Here, we examined whether anosognosics show the same temporal constraints known to exist during bimanual movements in healthy subjects. In these paradigms, when participants simultaneously reach for two targets of different difficulties, the motor programs of one hand affect the execution of the other. In detail, the movement time of the hand going to an easy target (i.e., near and large), while the other is going to a difficult target (i.e., far and small), is slowed with respect to unimanual movements (temporal coupling effect). One right-brain-damaged patient with left hemiplegia and anosognosia, six right-brain-damaged patients with left hemiplegia without anosognosia, and twenty healthy subjects were administered such a bimanual task. We recorded the movement times for easy and difficult targets, both in unimanual (one target) and bimanual (two targets) conditions. We found that, as healthy subjects, the anosognosic patient showed coupling effect. In bimanual asymmetric conditions (when one hand went to the easy target and the other went to the difficult target), the movement time of the non-paralyzed hand going to the easy target was slowed by the 'pretended' movement of the paralyzed hand going to the difficult target. This effect was not present in patients without anosognosia. We concluded that in anosognosic patients, the illusory movements of the paralyzed hand impose to the non-paralyzed hand the same motor constraints that emerge during the actual movements. Our data also support the view that coupling relies on central operations (i.e., activation of intention/programming system), rather than on online information from the periphery., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Patients with visuospatial neglect tend to underestimate horizontal magnitudes in contralesional space. It has been recently hypothesised that this behaviour might be due to anisometry of space perception, by which horizontal stimuli would be progressively underestimated proceeding from the ipsi towards the contralesional side of space. We investigated the effects of modulating space perception through the Oppel-Kundt illusion (i.e. a filled space is perceived as more expanded than an empty space) on the behaviour of 28 neglect patients and 28 normal subjects. The two groups bisected lines on backgrounds of vertical lines evenly spaced or unevenly spaced, with distances which decreased progressively from one side of the page to the other. On the same backgrounds, they extended segments to the left or to the right so as to double them. Patients also had to cancel targets, the density of which was evenly distributed or horizontally increased from one side of the page to the other. Both groups were prone to the illusion. Neglect bias was modulated by the illusion in the expected direction. It was reduced when the illusion induced a perceptual distortion opposite to that thought to underlie neglect. On bisection and cancellation tasks, illusory effects were greater in patients with higher values of response bias on the Milner Landmark task. These findings, taken together with patients' anatomical data, suggest that a modulation of neglect through a visual illusion can normally be induced in patients with relatively intact visual input processes.