Search

This article deals with the discussion of abortion in a number of US presidential and vice-presidential debates, from a scaling perspective. The interest in scales, as (co)constructed and negotiated by participants in the course of interaction, is a component of occasioned semantics. I found that, in the political debates that I examined, there are a number of different scales anchored by the contrast between 'pro-life' and 'pro-choice' positions. These are as follows: (1) Stage of pregnancy, (2) Prescribed action, (3) Special circumstances, (4) Locus of enforcement and (5) Frequency. These scales are manipulated in various ways by the candidates to make their own stances seem reasonable and moral and their opponents' unreasonable and immoral. A position may be made to appear more moderate by adding a more extreme alternative to the scale, which is then rejected ('negative upgrading'). Also, common goals (in particular, reduction of abortion frequency) may be emphasized. The debaters also use 'negative downgrading' – rejection of a more moderate position – to suggest an opponent's unreasonableness. It is noted that the availability of several scales affords various ways of formulating the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a particular position. The article continues with a close examination of an extended debate sequence, illustrating the crucial role of implicature in the manipulation of scales, the attribution of attitude, and the practice of argumentation, and the possibility of dealing with implicature within a conversation analytic framework. The discussion is, at all points, grounded in and illustrated by the actual talk of the political candidates. It is suggested that viewing specific occasions of interaction in terms of the creation and negotiation of scales can yield a unique and revealing perspective on what is taking place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to initiate the topicalization of upgrading and downgrading (regrading) in conversational interaction; that is, to offer some fundamental considerations for viewing regrading as an object of study rather than as a taken-for-granted conversational practice. I begin by describing the conversation analytic conception and use of regrading and distinguishing three subtypes. I note further that regrading is a manifestation of scaling, the relationship between the two being reflexive. Regrading, from an interactional perspective, involves a positioning followed by a repositioning on a scale, and so is inherently sequential. I discuss the relationship of contrast and scaling, secondary scales, and certain sequential aspects of regrading. Through the examination of transcribed segments of talk, I comment on the prevalence of regrading as a conversational practice, and on scales as constituting, to a large extent, the underlying structure of talk. I want to claim that (1) Interaction consists, to some considerable extent, of movements, i.e. regrading, on various scales. (2) Understanding of those scales guides interpretation, especially implicature and implication. And (3) understanding word choices as scaling choices is a key to the analysis of how utterances function. • The paper seeks to topicalize regrading (upgrading/downgrading). • Various types of regrading are proposed. • Sequential regrading involves repositioning on a scale. • Interaction consists, to some considerable extent, of movements on various scales. • Understanding of those scales guides interpretation, especially implicature and implication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: There is a distinction between commonly known truth and truth as established for legal purposes. The latter requires proof. This distinction between ordinary truth and legal truth is available to speakers as a discursive resource (although differently available in different cultures). In this paper, after a brief discussion of some matters relating to evidence, proof, and truth, I analyze a short, generic story told by a lawyer in the Federal Trade Commission, in which the representatives of companies allegedly violating the law say “You can’t prove it.” The violation is relatively minor and there is some controversy about whether to include the charge in the case. The story, I argue, provides a motivation which goes beyond the strictly legal. The company representatives capitalize on the distinction between “mere truth” and legally established truth. I conclude with a discussion of the place of proof—the word, its variants, and the things which constitute proof—in conversation, including a discussion of sequential placement, deniability, nonverbal signals and implicature, and a distinction between “official” and “unofficial” communication. It is the disparity between their official and unofficial stances that gives the company representatives’ behavior its distinctive interactional force. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]