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Providing appropriate monetary rewards is an efficient way for mobile crowdsensing to motivate the participation of task participants. However, a monetary incentive mechanism is generally challenging to prevent malicious task participants and a dishonest task requester. Moreover, prior quality-aware incentive schemes are usually failed to preserve the privacy of task participants. Meanwhile, most existing privacy-preserving incentive schemes ignore the data quality of task participants. To tackle these issues, we propose a privacy-preserving and data quality-aware incentive scheme, called PACE. In particular, data quality consists of the reliability and deviation of data. Specifically, we first propose a zero-knowledge model of data reliability estimation that can protect data privacy while assessing data reliability. Then, we quantify the data quality based on the deviation between reliable data and the ground truth. Finally, we distribute monetary rewards to task participants according to their data quality. To demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of PACE, we evaluate it in a real-world dataset. The evaluation and analysis results show that PACE can prevent malicious behaviors of task participants and a task requester, and achieves both privacy-preserving and data quality measurement of task participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the advancement of smartphones, mobile crowdsourcing has become a new computing paradigm to efficiently support novel mobile applications. Achieving good service quality of these applications, however, necessitates the participation of large number of smartphones, which can be obtained via providing suitable incentives to smartphone users. Nonetheless, most existing incentive mechanisms assume a centralized platform for recruiting smartphones, which is prone to expose the privacy of both smartphones and task requesters. In this context, this article studies a distributed truthful incentive mechanism (DTIM) for mobile crowdsourcing, where multiple auction rounds can be conducted locally in each smartphone and task requester. Specifically, in each auction round, the participating smartphones act as the sellers and submit bids to compete for their intended crowdsourcing tasks. The task requesters, on the other hand, act as the buyers that decide on the sellers and corresponding payments, depending on their submitted bids. Finally, based on the offered payment, each smartphone selects a buyer for trading to optimize its utility. It is shown that the proposed incentive mechanism is strategy-proof, budget balanced, individually rational, and computationally efficient. Numerical results provided corroborate the beneficial properties of the scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emerging mobile crowdsensing applications are able to facilitate people's life in various aspects. A key factor to ensure that these applications can provide high-quality service is the sufficient participation of normal smartphone users. Therefore, a lot of effort has been made to design incentive mechanisms to motivate users to participate. Most of these works assume that users are associated with homogeneous costs across the whole sensing area, based on which many utility optimization models are proposed. In this paper, we consider the scenario where smartphone users have heterogeneous costs across the sensing area, i.e., users in different regions have different cost distributions. In this scenario, traditional mechanisms may generate sensing holes and recruit insufficient users in some regions with higher costs, which may lead to unsatisfactory service. To accommodate this issue, we propose two optimization models, which aim at maximizing the user cardinality and the sensing utility function for each region of the whole sensing area, respectively. We then design effective incentive mechanisms, which possess the desirable properties, including computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness, and good competitiveness. By conducting extensive experiments on the real-world geographical dataset, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms in achieving the good quality of service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mobile crowdsensing systems aim to provide various novel applications by employing pervasive smartphones. A key factor to enable such systems is substantial participation of normal smartphone users, which requires effective incentive mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate incentive mechanisms for online scenarios, where users arrive and interact with a task requester in a random order, and they have preferences (e.g., photographing) or limits (e.g., travel distance) over the sensing tasks. In existing online mechanisms, the task requester has limited power in assigning tasks to the selected users, i.e., it has to pay for all of the tasks specified by the selected users, although some of these tasks are of little value. To accommodate this, we investigate a more flexible setting, where the requester can actively assign most valuable tasks to the selected users. We design two online incentive mechanisms motivated by a sampling-accepting process and weighted maximum matching. We prove that the designed mechanisms achieve computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty, and constant competitiveness. By carrying out extensive experiments on two real-world geographical datasets, we demonstrate the practical applicability of the proposed mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Off-the-shelf smartphones have boosted large scale participatory sensing applications as they are equipped with various functional sensors, possess powerful computation and communication capabilities, and proliferate at a breathtaking pace. Yet the low participation level of smartphone users due to various resource consumptions, such as time and power, remains a hurdle that prevents the enjoyment brought by sensing applications. Recently, some researchers have done pioneer works in motivating users to contribute their resources by designing incentive mechanisms, which are able to provide certain rewards for participation. However, none of these works considered smartphone users’ nature of opportunistically occurring in the area of interest. Specifically, for a general smartphone sensing application, the platform would distribute tasks to each user on her arrival and has to make an immediate decision according to the user’s reply. To accommodate this general setting, we design three online incentive mechanisms, named TBA, TOIM and TOIM-AD, based on online reverse auction. TBA is designed to pursue platform utility maximization, while TOIM and TOIM-AD achieve the crucial property of truthfulness. All mechanisms possess the desired properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, and profitability. Besides, they are highly competitive compared to the optimal offline solution. The extensive simulation results reveal the impact of the key parameters and show good approximation to the state-of-the-art offline mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]