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Distributed, consensus-based algorithms have emerged as a promising approach for the coordination of distributed energy resources (DER) due to their communication, computation, privacy and reliability advantages over centralized approaches. However, state-of-the-art consensus-based algorithms address the DER coordination problem in independent time periods and therefore are inherently unable to capture the time-coupling operating characteristics of flexible demand (FD) and energy storage (ES) resources. This paper demonstrates that state-of-the-art algorithms fail to converge when these time-coupling characteristics are considered. In order to address this fundamental limitation, a novel consensus-based algorithm is proposed which includes additional consensus variables. These variables express relative maximum power limits imposed on the FD and ES resources which effectively mitigate the concentration of the FD and ES responses at the same time periods and steer the consensual outcome to a feasible and optimal solution. The convergence and optimality of the proposed algorithm are theoretically proven while case studies numerically demonstrate its convergence, optimality, robustness to initialization and information loss, and plug-and-play adaptability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bi-level optimization constitutes the most popular mathematical methodology for modeling the deregulated electricity market. However, state-of-the-art models neglect the physical non-convex operating characteristics of market participants, due to their inherent inability to capture binary decision variables in their representation of the market clearing process, rendering them problematic in modeling markets with complex bidding and unit commitment (UC) clearing mechanisms. This paper addresses this fundamental limitation by proposing a novel modeling approach enabling incorporation of these non-convexities into bi-level optimization market models, which is based on the relaxation and primal-dual reformulation of the original, non-convex lower level problem and the penalization of the associated duality gap. Case studies demonstrate the ability of the proposed approach to closely approximate the market clearing solution of the actual UC clearing algorithm and devise more profitable bidding decisions for strategic producers than the state-of-the-art bi-level optimization approach, and reveal the potential of strategic behavior in terms of misreporting non-convex operating characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous work on the role of the demand side in imperfect electricity markets has demonstrated that its self-price elasticity reduces electricity producers’ ability to exercise market power. However, the concept of self-price elasticity cannot accurately capture consumers’ flexibility, as the latter mainly involves shifting of loads’ operation in time. This paper provides for the first time theoretical and quantitative analysis of the beneficial impact of demand shifting (DS) in mitigating market power by the generation side. Quantitative analysis is supported by a multiperiod equilibrium programming model of the imperfect electricity market, accounting for the time-coupling operational constraints of DS as well as network constraints. The decision making process of each strategic producer is modeled through a bi-level optimization problem, which is solved after converting it to a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and linearizing the latter through suitable techniques. The oligopolistic market equilibria resulting from the interaction of multiple independent producers are determined by employing an iterative diagonalization method. Case studies on a test market reflecting the general generation and demand characteristics of the GB system quantitatively demonstrate the benefits of DS in mitigating producers’ market power, by employing relevant indexes from the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uniform marginal pricing cannot generally support competitive equilibrium solutions in markets with non-convexities, yielding surplus sub-optimality effects. Previous work has identified non-convexities associated with the generation side of electricity markets and proposed different approaches to address surplus sub-optimality. This paper extends this concept to incorporate the demand side. Non-convexities of flexible demand (FD) are identified, including options to forgo demand activities as well as discrete and minimum power levels, and resulting surplus sub-optimality effects are demonstrated through simple examples and a larger case study. Generalized uplift and convex hull pricing approaches addressing these effects are extended to account for FD non-convexities. Concerning the former, generalized uplift functions for FD participants are proposed, and a new rule is introduced for equitable distribution of the total surplus loss compensation among market participants. Regarding the latter, it is demonstrated that convex hull prices are flattened at periods when FD is scheduled to eliminate surplus sub-optimality associated with the FD ability to redistribute energy requirements across time. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]