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A consistent finding reported in the literature is that epistemically suspect beliefs (e.g., paranormal beliefs) are less frequently endorsed by individuals with a greater tendency to think analytically. However, these results have been observed predominantly in Western participants. In the present work, we explore various individual differences known to predict epistemically suspect beliefs across both Western and Eastern cultures. Across four studies with Japanese (n = 666) and Western (n = 650) individuals, we find that the association between thinking style and beliefs varied as a function of culture. Specifically, while Westerners who scored higher on measures of Type-2 analytic thinking tended to endorse epistemically suspect beliefs less, this association was not observed in Japanese samples, suggesting that the often-observed negative association between analytic thinking and epistemically suspect beliefs may be exclusive to Western individuals. Additionally, we demonstrate that a tendency to think holistically (specifically with regards to causality) is positively associated with the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs within both samples. Overall, we discuss how various individual differences predict the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs across cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has demonstrated a link between illusory pattern perception and various irrational beliefs. On this basis, we hypothesized that participants who displayed greater degrees of illusory pattern perception would also be more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. We find support for this prediction across three experiments (N = 627) and four distinct measures of pattern perception. We further demonstrate that this observed relation is restricted to illusory pattern perception, with participants displaying greater endorsement of non-illusory patterns being no more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. Additionally, this relation is not a product of a general proclivity to rate all statements as profound and is not accounted for by individual differences in analytic thinking. Overall, we demonstrate that individuals with a tendency to go beyond the available data such that they uncritically endorse patterns where no patterns exist are also more likely to create and endorse false-meaning in meaningless pseudo-profound statements. These findings are discussed in the context of a proposed framework that views individuals' receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit as, in part, an unfortunate consequence of an otherwise adaptive process: that of pattern perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background and aims: Scratch cards are a popular form of lottery gambling available in many jurisdictions. However, there is a paucity of research that examines associations between individual differences in thinking style, participation in scratch card gambling, and problem gambling severity. Methods: In three studies, we sought to examine the relationships among these variables in large, online samples of participants. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI), the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale, and self-reported their frequency of scratch card gambling. Results: Throughout all three studies, specific associations were reliably established. Specifically, negative associations were observed between participants' CRT and PGSI scores, as well as between participants' CRT scores and scratch card gambling frequency. In addition, we found a positive association between problem gambling severity and scratch card gambling frequency. Finally, problem gambling severity was shown to correlate positively with participants' willingness to pay for irrelevant information in a scratch card gambling scenario. Discussion and conclusions: Overall, we observed that problem gambling severity is associated with an individuals' thinking style and scratch card gambling behavior. This study adds to the existing literature examining problem gambling, and highlights the role of thinking style in understanding gambling behavior and problematic gambling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Navigating social systems efficiently is critical to our species. Humans appear endowed with a cognitive system that has formed to meet the unique challenges that emerge for highly social species. Bullshitting, communication characterised by an intent to be convincing or impressive without concern for truth, is ubiquitous within human societies. Across two studies (N = 1,017), we assess participants' ability to produce satisfying and seemingly accurate bullshit as an honest signal of their intelligence. We find that bullshit ability is associated with an individual's intelligence and individuals capable of producing more satisfying bullshit are judged by second-hand observers to be more intelligent. We interpret these results as adding evidence for intelligence being geared towards the navigation of social systems. The ability to produce satisfying bullshit may serve to assist individuals in negotiating their social world, both as an energetically efficient strategy for impressing others and as an honest signal of intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]