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Fish stocks, as common pool resources, are more and more managed by giving fishermen exclusive access rights as Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ). These have been widely discussed, with focus on social, economic and ecological issues. While equity aspects have been of great concern, there is very limited analysis about how to assess issues of equity and fair distribution when introducing ITQs. This paper applies an existing framework for assessing equity in resource use systems to tradable quota systems in fisheries. The framework defines the perspectives of distributive fairness, the stakeholders who are bound by fair practice rules, and instruments of fairness, and identifies metrics to assess equity in practice. We assess if the framework provides practical guidance for evaluating whether a given ITQ system operates under an equitable framework programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hoff, A., Frost, H., Ulrich, C., Damalas, D., Maravelias, C. D., Goti, L., and Santurtún, M. 2010. Economic effort management in multispecies fisheries: the FcubEcon model. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 67: 1802–1810.Applying single-species assessment and quotas in multispecies fisheries can lead to overfishing or quota underutilization, because advice can be conflicting when different stocks are caught within the same fishery. During the past decade, increased focus on this issue has resulted in the development of management tools based on fleets, fisheries, and areas, rather than on unit fish stocks. A natural consequence of this has been to consider effort rather than quota management, a final effort decision being based on fleet-harvest potential and fish-stock-preservation considerations. Effort allocation between fleets should not be based on biological considerations alone, but also on the economic behaviour of fishers, because fisheries management has a significant impact on human behaviour as well as on ecosystem development. The FcubEcon management framework for effort allocation between fleets and fisheries is presented, based on the economic optimization of a fishery's earnings while complying with stock-preservation criteria. Through case studies of two European fisheries, it is shown how fishery earnings can be increased significantly by reallocating effort between fisheries in an economically optimal manner, in both effort-management and single-quota management settings. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]