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Indonesia, like many other countries, has encountered a slew of social, political, economic, and public health challenges in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to these challenges, the Indonesian government implemented security measures by instituting large-scale social restrictions (Indonesian: Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar) and, later, micro-scale social restrictions (Pemberlakukan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat) to restrict people’s mobility and virus transmission. Using securitisation theory as a framework, this article examines how the nationwide dilemma between public health and economic security arose. Based on official documents, government papers, and political speeches, this study reveals how the country’s COVID-19 responses were largely defined by carefully constructed and flexible measures known as the ‘gas and brake’ policy (Kebijakan Gas dan Rem), which were aimed at resolving the health-economic dilemma. This policy is deemed appropriate given the country’s limited public health and economic resources, despite the fact that many argue that such an approach reflects indecisiveness and a lack of coordination among the country’s authorities. This article also demonstrates that policymakers in Indonesia use this policy to resolve the securitisation dilemma by reinforcing the hierarchical ordering of security sectors as a readjustment strategy. The policy is used to justify tightening or easing social restrictions by changing the security narrative throughout the pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing manifestation of Islamic teachings in post-Suharto Indonesia is reflected in the emergence of Islamic revivalist movements that have such religio-political aspirations as the domestic application of sharia-based laws and the re-establishment of the caliphate. However, the extent to which these movements interpret, implement, and frame this sharia varies from one movement to another. This paper examines one of these movements, the primary goal of which is to mobilize public support, particularly of youths in Indonesia, against dating. This movement is called the Indonesia Tanpa Pacaran or Indonesia Without Dating (ITP). It is a form of cultural activism that is centered on the issues of dating, which is framed as a by-product of Western modernity. Dating is thus not only labelled as forbidden in Islam; the movement also challenges its common practice among youths and attempts to offer guidance to them on the perceived ideal Islamic-based relations between unmarried male and female youths. Employing the perspective of framing in social movements, this paper shows that the ITP's anti-dating activism is an inextricable part of its larger religio-political goal of implementing sharia in the country. Furthermore, the paper also demonstrates the strong connection between ITP and the already banned Islamic revivalist movement that calls for the re-establishment of the caliphate -- Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious radicalism in the form of violent extremism is against the principles of human rights and democracy. Religious radicalism also opposes the existence of the modern state of Indonesia and, arguably, also of other Southeast Asian countries. The global political commitment initiated by the United Nations, namely Responsibility to Protect, states that several countries in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, are at high risk of atrocities. Civilians in Marawi in the Philippines have experienced atrocities carried out by the Maute family-led militant group backed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In 2017, for more than five months, the restoration of regional security and stability in Marawi by the Philippine security apparatus caused many casualties. This study aimed to identify, map and analyze the narrative structure of the goals and backgrounds of the actors involved in the Marawi case and its impacts on Muslim communities in Indonesia. The research focused on a narrative analysis that united various factors contributing to violent religious extremism. This study employed a narrative perspective that was multidimensional, consisting of the narratives of marginalization, invitation, symbolic violence, and violent extremism. It demonstrated that the narrative of marginalization and calls for Jihad served as the basis of solidarity among the members of the Maute militant group in Marawi. The narrative aimed at solidarity for jihad in Marawi had more influence on groups belonging to ISIS, such as Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), and East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]