Jonathan Maurice, Marc Willinger, Paul Chiambaretto, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Montpellier Research in Management (MRM), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Université Montpellier 2 - Sciences et Techniques (UM2)-Université de Perpignan Via Domitia (UPVD)-Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School-Université de Montpellier (UM), Toulouse School of Management Research (TSM), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Toulouse School of Management (TSM), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Université de Perpignan Via Domitia (UPVD)-Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School-Université de Montpellier (UM), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Toulouse School of Management (TSM), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées, Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Université Montpellier 2 - Sciences et Techniques (UM2)-Université de Perpignan Via Domitia (UPVD), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)
National audience; This article provides a formal model of the value creation-appropriation dilemma in coopetition for innovation, that is, alliances among competing firms. The model determines the levels of cooperation that maximize the profit of each firm in an innovative coopetition agree¬ment regardless of the number of firms and their respective budget endowments dedicated to the coopetitive project. We answer the following questions: within an innovative coopetition agreement, will the partners cooperate more or less when their budget endowments change? What is the impact on profit? When is it profitable to accept a new partner into the agreement? What happens to the remaining firms when a partner withdraws from the agreement? We show that when the coopetitive budget of the focal firm increases, the focal firm allocates a larger part of this budget to value creation activities and increases its profit. In contrast, when a partnering firm increases its coopetitive budget, the focal firm reduces its budget for value creation activities to maintain a sufficient budget for value appropriation activities. We also show that the addition of a competitor with a large coopetitive budget to the innovative coopetition agreement decreases the cooperation of the focal firm but increases the profit of the initial partnering firms. In contrast, the exit of a partnering firm with a large coopetitive budget from the agreement intensifies the cooperation among the remaining firms but reduces their profit. competing firms. The model determines the levels of cooperation that maximize the profit of each firm in an innovative coopetition agreementregardless of the number of firms and their respective budget endowments dedicated to the coopetitive project. We answer thefollowing questions: within an innovative coopetition agreement, will the partners cooperate more or less when their budget endowmentschange? What is the impact on profit? When is it profitable to accept a new partner into the agreement? What happens to the remainingfirms when a partner withdraws from the agreement? We show that when the coopetitive budget of the focal firm increases, the focal firmallocates a larger part of this budget to value creation activities and increases its profit. In contrast, when a partnering firm increases itscoopetitive budget, the focal firm reduces its budget for value creation activities to maintain a sufficient budget for value appropriationactivities. We also show that the addition of a competitor with a large coopetitive budget to the innovative coopetition agreementdecreases the cooperation of the focal firm but increases the profit of the initial partnering firms. In contrast, the exit of a partnering firmwith a large coopetitive budget from the agreement intensifies the cooperation among the remaining firms but reduces their profit.