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The objective of this research was to investigate the moderating effect of information technology (1T) infrastructure on the relationship between health care information management and quality performance within health care departments. The variables that were measured included both management and customer perceptions of quality, management of health care information (MOHCI), and IT infrastructure. This research focused on the determinants of departmental quality. The study conceptualized and developed measures for quality, MOHCI, and IT infrastructure variables. A significant relationship was observed between the management of health care information and quality performance. IT infrastructure exhibited a direct, rather than a moderating, effect on quality performance. The research also found/ that significant differences exist between customer and manager perceptions of quality.

This article investigates the relationship between quality assurance (QA) and perceptions of the importance of information technology (IT) for information management in the health care industry. This issue is important because effective information management is recognized as a necessary condition for quality management. The unit of analysis of the article is the health care functional department. Data from 34 health care departments were collected and used for the analysis. Four specific hypotheses were proposed and tested. Our results suggest that end-user perceptions of the importance of IT for information management depends on formalization of QA, perceived importance of QA, time since QA was embraced, and number of people in the QA function.

Problem definition: We study customer-centric privacy management in service systems. Academic/practical relevance: We explore the consequences of extended control over personal information by customers in such systems. Methodology: We adopt a stylized queueing model to capture a service environment that features a service provider and customers who are strategic in deciding whether to disclose personal information to the service provider—that is, customers’ privacy or information disclosure strategy. A customer’s service request can be one of two types, which affects service time but is unknown when customers commit to a privacy strategy. The service provider can discriminate among customers based on their disclosed information by offering different priorities. Results: Our analysis reveals that, when given control over their personal data, strategic customers do not always choose to withhold them. We find that control over information gives customers a tool they can use to hedge against the service provider’s will, which might not be aligned with the interests of customers. More importantly, we find that under certain conditions, giving customers full control over information (e.g., by introducing a privacy regulation) may not only distort already efficiently operating service system but might also backfire by leading to inferior system performance (i.e., longer average wait time), and it can hurt customers themselves. We demonstrate how a regulator can correct information disclosure inefficiencies through monetary incentives to customers and show that providing such incentives makes economic sense in some scenarios. Finally, the service provider itself can benefit from customers being in control of their personal information by enticing more customers joining the service. Managerial implications: Our findings yield insights into how customers’ individually rational actions concerning information disclosure (e.g., granted by a privacy regulation) can lead to market inefficiencies in the form of longer wait times for services. We provide actionable prescriptions, for both service providers and regulators, that can guide their choices of a privacy and information management approach based on giving customers the option of controlling their personal information.