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Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Securities and Exchange Commission permits companies to redact proprietary information from material contract filings, so long as the redacted information (1) would cause competitive harm if disclosed, and (2) the information is legally immaterial. Because these joint criteria are inherently contradictory, we examine whether legally immaterial redacted information is economically material to investors. We find that firms' stock price discovery process is significantly slower and insider trading is significantly greater after companies file redacted contracts compared to nonredacted contracts. We then examine the impact of the 2019 FAST Act, which reduced the SEC's oversight of redacted contracts. Companies redact more frequently and insider trading (but not speed of stock price discovery) is more pronounced after the FAST Act. Taken together, these findings suggest that at least some redacted information is economically material to investors and that reducing SEC oversight of redacted information may not be in investors' best interests. JEL Classifications: M41. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the determinants and trading performance of outside directors' equity deferrals, which represent the choice to convert part or all of their annual cash compensation into deferred company stock. Using a large sample of S&P 1500 firms that allowed directors to defer their cash fees into equity between 1999 and 2009, we find significant associations between equity deferral choices and specific features of the director compensation plans, proxies for directors' outside wealth diversification, and future firm stock market performance. Trading performance analyses indicate that outside directors earn substantial abnormal returns from their deferrals, with a significant proportion of the deferral transactions occurring during blackout periods. These results are consistent with companies structuring director equity deferral plans to circumvent U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5's trading restrictions. This paper was accepted by Mary E. Barth, accounting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]