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In recent years, there has been a growing trend toward the development of smart buildings that rely on cyber-physical systems (CPS) to optimize occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. To ensure the reliable and efficient operation of CPS with designed control strategies, it is important to evaluate their performance under various scenarios before deploying them in the real world. This is where a Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed designed for studying sensor and control-related studies in smart buildings can be highly valuable. With the growing threat of cyber-attacks and physical faults targeting smart buildings, it is essential to ensure the security of building operations. A HIL testbed can emulate cyber-attack and physical fault scenarios, allowing researchers to develop and test threat detection and mitigation algorithms. This enables researchers to identify potential issues and optimize the algorithms in a safe and controlled environment before they are deployed in real-world settings, reducing the risk of failures that can negatively impact occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. Therefore, this paper developed a HIL testbed designed for cyber-physical energy systems (e.g. buildings automation system (BAS)) in smart commercial buildings. The HIL testbed is comprised of a real-time building and Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) emulator using Modelica-based dynamic models, a set of BAS controllers, and a BAS computer server. The data generation capability of the HIL testbed is demonstrated by tracking normal and faulty operating data in the BAS, as well as monitoring detailed network traffic in the local BAS network. This study further demonstrates the HIL testbed's capability by conducting case studies on real-time physical fault and cyber-attack experiments using a Department of Energy (DOE) prototype commercial building. It is anticipated that the fully functional HIL testbed will be utilized for a variety of sensor and control-related studies, including but not limited to testing, developing, validating of different HVAC control strategies, fault detection & diagnosis, energy monitoring and analysis, cyber security study, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• A holistic overview of commercial building automation systems on cyber security. • Review hardware and software architectures of building automation systems. • Review building automation system protocol-specific vulnerabilities. • Identify typical cyber-attack detection and defense approaches at three levels. • Categorize cyber resilient control strategies for buildings under cyber attacks. Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enable the smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among system components as well as with outside entities, such as the cloud, to enable low-cost remote management, optimized automation via outsourced cloud analytics, and increased building-grid integrations. As smart buildings move towards open communication technologies, providing access to BASs through the building's intranet, or even remotely through the Internet, has become a common practice. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber resilient control strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols (i.e., BACnet, KNX, LonWorks, and Modbus) are reviewed, followed by a discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. The impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber resilient control strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• A flexible and extensible simulation-based framework for modeling cyber threats on GEBs. • Dynamic models of network-based building energy and control system and associated cyber-attacks. • A list of key performance indexes (KPIs) to quantify threats impact on building and grid services. • An Evaluation of cyber-attack impacts during the attack period and the post-attack period. Grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEBs) are not only exposed to passive threats (e.g., physical faults) but also active threats such as cyber-attacks launched on the network-based control systems. The impact of cyber-attacks on GEB operation are not yet fully understood, especially as regards the performance of grid services. To quantify the consequences of cyber-attacks on GEBs, this paper proposes a modeling and simulation framework that includes different cyber-attack models and key performance indexes to quantify the performance of GEB operation under cyber-attacks. The framework is numerically demonstrated to model and evaluate cyber-attacks such as data intrusion attacks and Denial-of-Service attacks on a typical medium-sized office building that uses the BACnet/IP protocol for communication networks. Simulation results show that, while different types of attacks could compromise the building systems to different extents, attacks via the remote control of a chiller yield the most significant consequences on a building system's operation, including both the building service and the grid service. It is also noted that a cyber-attack impacts the building systems during the attack period as well as the post-attack period, which suggests that both periods should be considered to fully evaluate the consequences of a cyber-attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]