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Frequency of codes underpinning governance themes Footnotes 1 B Article impact statement b : Understanding perceived governance constraints can inform improved governance for effective conservation. Using an interactive governance approach to map respondents' narratives of governance challenges against the different orders of governance, our findings highlighted an overall pattern weighted toward first- and second-order governance and the (predominantly social) context of the system to be governed. Keywords: Caribbean; environmental governance; governability; interactive governance; perceptions; Caribe; gobernanza ambiental; gobernanza interactiva; gobernabilidad; percepciones; ; ; ; EN Caribbean environmental governance governability interactive governance perceptions Caribe gobernanza ambiental gobernanza interactiva gobernabilidad percepciones 1 14 14 10/04/22 20221001 NES 221001 INTRODUCTION The plight of coral reefs globally is a long-standing concern in environmental science and conservation research. [Extracted from the article]

The social-ecological change in the Arctic is accelerated by the multifaceted effects of climate change and globalization. Among other things, this means changing human-ecosystem dynamics through altered availability, co-production, and governance of ecosystem services (ES). A group of species illustrative of this change are whales, migratory species that have played an important part in the culture and subsistence of Arctic communities for millennia. This study explores the changing human-nature interactions and whale ES governance by combining ES and interactive governance theories. A multi-method approach is applied to assess qualitatively the qualitative governability of whale ES in three Arctic coastal locations: Húsavík in Iceland, Andenes in Norway, and Disko Bay in Greenland. Based on a literature review, stakeholder mapping, observations, and analysis of 54 semi-structured stakeholder interviews, the study finds that whale ES governance involves multiple actors with differing preferences and values and that much of it happens outside of formal institutions, necessitating inclusive approaches to improve it. The study reveals some whale ES governance deficiencies and potentials, such as a mismatch between governance scales and a need for more formal governance practices based on scientific research and stakeholder inputs. Governance frameworks were present for provisioning whale ES related to whaling, but they were lacking for non-consumptive whale ES, such as whale watching. Addressing these issues can help to direct marine resource management toward sustainability by making it more inclusive, adaptive, and reflective of stakeholder needs and values. This goal could be advanced by applying the governance principles that view humans as an integral part of social-ecological systems, e.g., ecosystem stewardship and ecosystem-based management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The social-ecological change in the Arctic is accelerated by the multifaceted effects of climate change and globalization. Among other things, this means changing human-ecosystem dynamics through altered availability, co-production, and governance of ecosystem services (ES). A group of species illustrative of this change are whales, migratory species that have played an important part in the culture and subsistence of Arctic communities for millennia. This study explores the changing human-nature interactions and whale ES governance by combining ES and interactive governance theories. A multi-method approach is applied to assess qualitatively the qualitative governability of whale ES in three Arctic coastal locations: Húsavík in Iceland, Andenes in Norway, and Disko Bay in Greenland. Based on a literature review, stakeholder mapping, observations, and analysis of 54 semi-structured stakeholder interviews, the study finds that whale ES governance involves multiple actors with differing preferences and values and that much of it happens outside of formal institutions, necessitating inclusive approaches to improve it. The study reveals some whale ES governance deficiencies and potentials, such as a mismatch between governance scales and a need for more formal governance practices based on scientific research and stakeholder inputs. Governance frameworks were present for provisioning whale ES related to whaling, but they were lacking for non-consumptive whale ES, such as whale watching. Addressing these issues can help to direct marine resource management toward sustainability by making it more inclusive, adaptive, and reflective of stakeholder needs and values. This goal could be advanced by applying the governance principles that view humans as an integral part of social-ecological systems, e.g., ecosystem stewardship and ecosystem-based management.

Small‐scale fisheries are subject to various governing institutions operating at different levels with different objectives. At the same time, small‐scale fisheries increasingly form part of domestic and international market chains, with consequent effects for marine environments and livelihoods of the fishery‐dependent. Yet there remains a need to better understand how small‐scale fisheries market chains interact with the range of governance institutions that influence them. In this paper, we examine how multiple governance systems function along market chains, in order to identify opportunities for improved multiscale governance. We use three small‐scale fisheries with varying local to global market chains operating in the Asia‐Pacific region to develop a framework for analysis. Drawing from Interactive Governance theory we identify governing systems that have come to operate at particular sections in each market chain. We recognize four institutions that shape the governance over the length of the chain; namely those centred on (a) government, (b) private sector and pricing, (c) decentralized multistakeholder management and (d) culture and social relations. The framework shows how diverse arrangements of these governing institutions emerge and take effect along market chains. In doing so, we seek to move away from prescribed "ideals" of universal governing arrangements for fisheries and their market chains, and instead illuminate how governing systems function interactively across multiple scales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High demand and prices in global markets for luxury seafood fished by coastal communities in low-income contexts causes overfishing. There are few alternatives for fishers to earn money, most institutions for controlling effort are weak, and markets are beyond the control of fishing states. The mismatch between desires for development and governance measures to enable that development is shared across many high-value low-income contexts. Using the sea cucumber fishery of Papua New Guinea as an example, this paper illustrates how the interactive governance framework provides a holistic approach to revealing governability limits and opportunities. Analysis of the system to be governed demonstrates that development for coastal communities is fundamental to the fishery as a motivating force and as a principle legitimising actions within the fishery and its management. This analysis highlights the fact that fisheries management is based on the assumption that an open fishery will lead to development, due to its economic value. However, money does not equal development. For this and other similar fisheries to increase development in coastal communities, issues not usually considered within the purview of the management of fisheries must be addressed, including gendered and intergenerational decision-making and income distribution, financial planning and government provision of infrastructure and services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines reproduction of marginality evident in fisheries. Uneven relations are widespread across geography and scale; between distant water fishing nations and coastal developing countries; between fishers on large-scale trawlers and smaller boats; between local elites and peasant operators; and between boat owners and crews working in poor and slave-like conditions. With inequality and social exclusion being such a pervasive phenomenon, we ask why do these relationships persist? Using governability, developed within the interactive governance approach, as an overarching basis for interpreting this issue, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility that marginality is not only a feature of ungovernability but might also occur in a highly governable system. To advance this insight, we apply theoretical tools associated with Marxist-Gramscian political ecology to the case of small-scale fisher exclusion brought on by the implementation of an individual transferable quota system in New Zealand’s commercial fishery. In particular, we identify social and economic relations that give rise to an accentuated capitalist structure whereby the quota-owning sector of the population (e.g., processing companies and Maori tribal organizations) control the ways in which fishers access economic benefits from their labor. Over the years, the quota system has gained acceptance as a resource management strategy, an intervention that is now ideologically hard to break away. The result is the reproduction of fishers’ exclusion, which contributes to a governable fishery, rather than an ungovernable one. This understanding casts a critical note on what we mean by governability, directing our attention to the ethical questions regarding how fisheries are to be governed and the risks that come with its pursuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a major concern in fisheries management around the world. Several measures have been taken to address the problem. In Lake Victoria, the alleviation of IUU fishing is implemented through the Regional Plan of Action (RPOA-IUU), which restricts use of certain fishing gear, as well as prohibits fishing in closed areas and during closed seasons. Despite the long-term efforts to monitor and control what goes on in the fisheries, IUU fishing has persisted in Lake Victoria. Inspired by interactive governance theory, this paper argues that the persistence of IUU fishing could be due to different images that stakeholders have about the situation, rather than the lack of management competency. Through structured interviews with 150 fisheries stakeholders on Ijinga Island in the southeastern part of Lake Victoria, Tanzania, using paired comparison questionnaires, the study elicits stakeholders’ perspective about the severity of different locally-pertinent fishing-related activities. The results show that while fisheries stakeholder groups agree on their judgments about certain fishing gears, some differences are also apparent. For instance, fisheries managers and scientists do not always agree with fishing people about what activities cause the most damage to fisheries resources and ecosystem. Further, they tend to consider some IUU fishing-related activities less damaging than some non-IUU fishing. Such disparity creates governability challenges, pointing to the need to revisit relevant regulatory measures and to make them consistent with the knowledge and judgments of all stakeholders. Based on these findings, we discuss governing interventions that may contribute to addressing IUU fishing in Lake Victoria and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Natural resource governance is expected to respond effectively and timely to dynamic environmental conditions, also in a manner that reflects social and political complexity of the system that it aims to govern. Values, images and principles that resource users and governing actors hold about how the world works represent a fundamental part of that complexity. These elements have indefinite form and meaning, may be incommensurable, competing and incompatible, and they often go unnoticed in governance discourse. This paper examines how values, images and principles are represented in a fisheries setting, and explores their diversity and ubiquity as well as the potential differences in the way they are conceived by various stakeholders. These characteristics are shown to give rise to the difficulties in policy planning and implementation, and create implications to power relations and overall governability of a fisheries system. The paper posits that governance challenges could be lessened if stakeholders'' values, images, and principles are made explicit, understood, and articulated into the policy and decision-making process. It concludes with suggestions about future research steps. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Marine protected areas (MPAs) are often met with reluctance by affected stakeholders, and in some instances outright objection. Some argue that this is due to insufficient understanding of the functions of MPAs. Others suggest that it could be because of a perception that they are losing more than they are gaining. It is also possible that stakeholders are generally supportive of the idea but think that the MPA should be located elsewhere. We argue that it is images people have about what the MPA is and does that determine how they react. Drawing from three MPA case studies in Spain, we illustrate the importance of critical examination of stakeholders' images and what they imply for the governance of MPAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interactive governance theory proposes that fisheries can be compared according to their governability, or their overall capacity for governance. Central to governance capacity in fisheries is institutional adaptability, the ability of humans to modify their organizations and reflect on the rules and values that guide them in response to change. In this paper, I suggest a preliminary synthesis of interactive governance theory, resilience thinking and adaptive co-management in order to refine the understanding of institutional adaptation as a key component of fisheries governability. I use the case of patron–client relationships in the Junagadh fishery to show how governability analysis is a valuable perspective from which to understand institutional characteristics that have contradictory implications for adaptation in fisheries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poverty is a pervasive issue in small-scale fisheries. Not only does it affect a substantial population, it is also a complex problem that is difficult to define, explain and solve. Thus, poverty in small-scale fisheries constitutes what in the planning literature is sometimes identified as a ‘wicked problem’. This paper applies the interactive governance framework to identify the limits of, and conditions for, governability and how they affect poverty, using the Lake Victoria small-scale fisheries in Tanzania as an illustrative case. More specifically, the paper first uses the three systems model of the interactive governance framework, i.e., the system-to-be-governed, the governing system, and the governing interaction, to explore poverty as a ‘wicked problem’ involving challenges pertaining to governability. Secondly, the paper suggests ‘governance elements’ that are fundamental for addressing poverty through the first, second, and third orders of governance. The paper emphasizes the importance of social values as crucial entry points in addressing poverty in small-scale fisheries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governability is seen as an adjustment process between governing needs and governing capacities. Understanding these two aspects and the interplay between them in a governance setting would pave a way for managing the pervasive difficulties confronting fisheries. In this study, we demonstrate how to operationalize the concept of governability by applying governability assessment framework to an inland fishery in the Southeast Arm of Lake Malawi. First, the needs and the demands of the natural and socio-economic aspects of the lake fishery system are examined according to four properties – diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale. Similarly, the capacities of the governing system are assessed. The characteristics of the governing interactions between these systems are next explored to provide a basis for improving governability. Assessment findings produce a systematic and holistic image of the fishery, and offer some insights into key governance issues and processes. In the Southeast Arm fishery, these include taking a close look at the internal, normative drivers of illegal fishing to ease the socio-economic complexity and streamlining the institutional structure to boost governing capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Inspired by Rittel and Webber [Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences 1973;4:155–69], it is argued that fisheries and coastal governance is confronted with problems that are inherently “wicked.” Problems are wicked (as opposed to “tame”) when they are difficult to define and delineate from other and bigger problems and when they are not solved once and for all but tend to reappear. Wicked problems have no technical solution, it is not clear when they are solved, and they have no right or wrong solution that can be determined scientifically. Instead, for wicked problems governance must rely on the collective judgment of stakeholders involved in a process that is experiential, interactive and deliberative. In this paper, the wicked problem is identified as a governability issue, recognizing that there are limitations to how rational and effective fisheries and coastal governance can possibly be. The paper offers a framework which could help us locate the wicked problems within the fisheries and coastal governance system, as well as examine their governability. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]