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But at the same time, Japan would neither explicitly include nor explicitly exclude the possibility of Japan providing at least rear-area support for US military operations during a Taiwan contingency, as well as permitting US use of its military assets in Japan for the defense of Taiwan. Since the PRC did not exist at the time of the Cairo Declaration and since Japan recognized the PRC government as the sole legal Government of China in 1972, Japan appeared to obliquely accept that Taiwan was part of China. In response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's August 2022 visit to Taiwan, Chinese missile firings, with some landing in Japan's claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), vividly confirmed for many Japanese the notion that "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.". [Extracted from the article]

Recent naval ship visits and exchanges of goodwill between China and Japan suggest an improvement in the two countries' bilateral relationship, which had been steadily deteriorating since the late 1990s. In the longer term, however, Sino-Japanese relations will likely be tested or constrained by five key sets of issues: (1) territorial and resource disputes, (2) nationalism and issues of mutual antipathy, (3) Taiwan's political status, (4) the rapid rise of China's military power, and (5) the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The manner in which these issues are managed or resolved will likely play a major role in shaping the Sino-Japanese relationship and thus the overall geopolitical environment in East Asia. A key complicating factor in the relationship, however, is the persistence of divergent worldviews: Chinese leaders appear to be more consistently persuaded by realist notions of international politics, whereas Japanese leaders tend to favor liberal-institutionalist values. The two countries may use these different lenses to view the same incident or issue, potentially creating misunderstanding and miscalculation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The East China Sea is one of the last unexplored high-potential resource areas located near large markets. But the development of oil and gas in much of the area has been prevented for decades by conflicting claims to boundaries and islets in the area by China, Taiwan, and Japan. Competition between China and Japan for gas resources in the East China Sea is intensifying and hampering improved relations. However, conflict is not inevitable. A compromise--joint development--is motivated by the realization that a positive China-Japan relationship is simply too important to be destroyed by these disputes. Although both agree in principle on joint development, the two sides have different interpretations of what joint development means or implies, and what area should be jointly developed. The article spells out three basic agreements in principle that are necessary before details of any solution can be negotiated. The alternative to a solution is continued mutual suspicion, unstable relations, unmanaged and undeveloped resources, and an increasing frequency and intensity of incidents, fueling nationalist sentiments and resultant political conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]