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After the end of World War II, various iterations of hegemony studies focused on such topics as the connection between hegemonic powers and the provision of international public goods, the causes of war during hegemonic transitions, and the stability of hegemonic orders. In this article, we discuss and forward the emergence of a new wave of international hegemony studies. This research program concerns itself with the politics of hegemonic orders and hegemonic ordering. It treats hegemonic orders as means, mediums, and objects of cooperation and contestation. It sees hegemons as not simply order makers but also order takers whose domestic political processes significantly interact with the dynamics of international order. It incorporates insights about how different dimensions of hegemonic orders interact to shape the costs and benefits of hegemony. In short, it treats hegemony and hegemonic orders as objects of analysis amenable to multiple theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

These are not happy times for liberal internationalists. No one can be sure how deep the crisis of liberal internationalism runs. However, in what follows, I argue that despite its troubles, liberal internationalism still has a future. The nature of the crisis is surprising. The threats to liberal internationalism were expected to come from rising non-western states seeking to undermine or overturn the postwar order. In the face of hostile, revisionist states, the United States and Europe were expected to stand shoulder to shoulder to protect the gains from 70 years of cooperation. But, in fact, liberal internationalism is more deeply threatened by developments within the West itself. The centrist and progressive coalitions that lay behind the postwar liberal order have weakened. Liberal democracy itself appears fragile and polarized, vulnerable to far right populism and backlash politics. In recent decades, the working and middle classes in advanced industrial democracies--the original constituencies and beneficiaries of an open and cooperative international order--have faced rising economic inequality and stagnation. Within the West, liberal internationalism is increasingly seen, not as a source of stability and solidarity among like-minded states, but as a global playing field for the wealthy and influential. Liberal internationalism has lost its connection to the pursuit of social and economic advancement within western countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores on the role of the U.S. in shaping the East Asian order around American military and economic dominance. It states that the U.S. system provides security, political partnerships, underwriting stability and alliances with Japan, South Korea and other partners across Asia. It stresses the rise of Chinese economic and military capabilities with explicit balance of power dynamic in multilateral trade and cooperation. It also notes that the American-led alliance system deepened the economic and security ties with the regions.

In this article the author discusses changes to the old order of global governance. He states that there has been a shift in power away from the United States, its allies in the west, and organizations such as the United Nations and the financial institutions set up by the Bretton Woods agreement. A number of topics are addressed including the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008-09, questions about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Security Council, and globalization and the World Trade Organization.

American-led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post-American? Will it be culturally non-Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the ambivalence of the U.S. regarding its roles and commitments to the rules-based international order. Efforts to establish international conventions; Refusal to be tied by the provisions of international agreements; Willingness to embrace unilateralism when its interests are threatened; Allegations that international deals are designed to benefit the U.S.

The article discusses the concept of global governance. The author identifies global governance as a collective effort to facilitate the advantages of exchange in the global system and mitigating its drawbacks. The article reviews the history of global governance from the 20th century to the early 21st century, the so-called American era of global governance, and the liberal internationalist project supported by emerging democracies.

The article focuses on the crisis faced by world's global and regional governance institutions. The United Nations failed to agree on a grand bargain reforms of the Security Council. The European Union members rejected the EU constitution. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization declined as a vehicle for strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Europe. The G-8 Summit has failed its role as a mechanism for collective action. The World Trade Organization to date did not succeed in formulating agreement on agricultural subsidies and other issues. The author argues that the reason for all the problems lies in the choices made by the U.S.

The crisis of the American-led international order would seem to open up new opportunities for rising states—led by China, India, and other non-Western developing countries—to reshape the global order. As their capacities and influence grow, will these states rise up and integrate into the existing order or will they seek to overturn and reorganize it? The realist hegemonic perspective expects today's power transition to lead to growing struggles between the West and the “rest” over global rules and institutions. In contrast, this essay argues that although America's hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal international characteristics of order—openness, rules, and multilateralism—are deeply rooted and likely to persist. And even as China seeks in various ways to build rival regional institutions, there are stubborn limits on what it can do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early years of the twenty-first century the narrative of “emerging powers” and “rising powers” seemed to provide a clear and powerful picture of how international relations and global politics were changing. Yet dramatic changes in the global system have led many to conclude that the focus on the BRICS and the obsession with the idea of rising powers reflected a particular moment in time that has now passed. The story line is now about backlash at the core; and, with the exception of China, rising powers have returned to their role as secondary or supporting actors in the drama of global politics. Such a conclusion is profoundly mistaken for three sets of reasons: the continued reality of the post-Western global order; the need to understand nationalist backlash as a global phenomenon; and the imperative of locating and strengthening a new pluralist conception of global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]