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Association of South-East Asian Nations(ASEAN)-India is a strategic collaboration standpoint on a compacted groundwork of mutual geographical, historical and civilizational relations. ASEAN is central to Act East Policy and a more comprehensive vision of the Indo-Pacific region. The year 2022 has marked 30 years of ASEAN-India relationships. India and ASEAN have respective dialogue mechanisms which convene the economic relationship between India and ASEAN commenced in 1992 as both regions documented each other's trade competencies. The relationship has since been supported by India's growing manufacturing facility and the rise of ASEAN's services area exports, specifically travel, transport, and commercial services. Manipur can become a gateway to the dynamic Southeast Asian economics, which can help the trade and commerce with our eastern neighbours flourish and must be pursued with commitment and determination by the central government. The Act East Policy is of added interest to the Northeast. The traded goods can reap an additional commercial advantage. Efforts ought to be directed to build up physical and institutional infrastructure. This paper critically analyzed the probable relationship of India's Act East policy with ASEAN and Manipur's Opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India and Australia have assumed a greater role in international affairs, emerging as regional powers with great power potential. Changes in the international environment, particularly the rise of China as a common source of concern and growing economic relations between the two countries in an era of increasingly complex interdependence, have provided an impulse for the two countries to enhance their bilateral ties. Part of that includes developing a robust maritime capability that can project force across blue water as well as on land, and which works in concert with allied maritime forces in assuring the defence of common interests. The paper provides an overview of the Indian–Australian relationship, focusing the analysis on India's changing maritime outlook, Australia's strategic priorities and a forecast of the possibilities for their developing a strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We explore the possibilities and limitations of models of the demand for military expenditures, as against additional kinds of cross-country analyses, with an empirical focus on the Indo-Pacific region. Our research bridges a gap between the Defence Economics and International Relations literatures by developing testable security alignment hypotheses and by testing these hypotheses in three ways: with demand modelling on total expenditures, with analyses on estimated stocks of imported armaments, and with qualitative analyses of trends in defence cooperation between states. We find consistent evidence across research methods of an increase in threat perceptions towards China since around 2012 and of balancing behaviour by US allies and by two non-allies. As compared to standard demand modelling, our hypothesis-based mixed methods approach allows for a clearer treatment of samples with mixed and shifting security alignments and of states that stabilise or reduce expenditures in the face of rising threat perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2023 marks the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Korea and India. On the occasion of this golden jubilee, this study aims to first understand the major determinants for Korea-India relations since the Cold War. It will then highlight the way forward for further strengthening bilateral cooperation between Korea and India from a Korean perspective. The study found that the economic aspect was the main driving force for relations between Korea and India until recently. With the emergence of the Indo-Pacific era, political and security dimensions have also become important driving forces, especially due to the China factor. However, despite upgrading their strategic partnership as "special" in 2015, the two countries have not yet formulated an action plan on how to strengthen and specifically cooperate within it. There is a need to establish a blueprint for how Korea and India will develop their special strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific era. In this situation, this study suggests four areas where Korea and India can promote and strengthen their relations in the coming years: minilateralism such as Korea, Australia, Indonesia, and India (KAII) in the Indo-Pacific area, para and city diplomacy, cooperation in the defense industry, and economic cooperation on major Chinese export items to India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past two decades, India and South Korea have sought to create a strategic convergence in their long-term cooperation. Defense cooperation, which has been discussed bilaterally, is a key area of their partnership, should it later be transformed to companionship. As some of their efforts have materialized, South Korea has become the fifth largest exporter of conventional arms to India. Markedly, Seoul and New Delhi are on the way to restyle their regional strategies towards each other to fit into their Indo-Pacific strategies. In the course, two sides have found valid points to explore stronger partnership than in the past. The stronger driver they have now is likely to sustain in the future as they already made some meaningful progress in the last decade. In this latest move, the two sides appear to be on the right trajectory; however, the future awaits a more productive joint effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) proposed by the Biden administration has gone through three major stages — conception, preparation and engagement, and initial negotiation — and focuses on four key pillars: Connected Economy, Resilient Economy, Clean Economy, and Fair Economy. In fact, this initiative supplements and reinforces the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy, while carrying forward and advancing the "America First" policy. It is a new attempt of the US to build an economic club exclusive of China in the Indo-Pacific and to lead in building a new structure for regional cooperation, as well as a diplomatic signal deliberately released by the Biden administration to its Eurasian allies during the Russia–Ukarine conflict. As the prospects of the IPEF are still of much uncertainty, it might exert few substantial impacts on China in the short term. However, we should still be alert to its long-term adverse influence on China–US relations, China's surrounding international environment and foreign relations, the development of regional economic cooperation and world economy, as well as the stability of international order. Given the domestic situation in the US and the attitude of the other members, the progress of IPEF negotiations in the four pillars may vary significantly in the coming period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy lead to an extensive alliance network against China? This article shifts focus to non-Quad Asian states—in particular, Indonesia, Vietnam, and South Korea—that face a strategic dilemma in the US-China competition and examines their positions regarding a rising China and the Indo-Pacific strategy. While reluctant to join the US strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, Asian middle powers now aim to tame, rather than contain, China despite their slight variations of response to the Indo-Pacific strategy. The US and its three partners—Japan, India, and Australia—have not been successful yet in recruiting new members to their coalition, mainly because of the declining hegemon's (seemingly) weakened commitment to a liberal international order and the rising challenger's (potential) opposition and punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]