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The burgeoning use of private military and security company (PMSC) contractors in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War years has given rise to calls for regulation and oversight of PMSCs. The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries advocates a convention that bans states from outsourcing ‘inherently State functions’, including ‘direct participation in hostilities’, to PMSCs. Others, especially Western states and others behind the boom of the PMSC industry after the 2003 Iraq War, argue that codes of conduct and self-regulation are sufficient to regulate PMSCs. Treaty, principle and policy norms all encompass shared expectations about proper conduct, but treaty norms take form in hard law whereas principle norms are evinced in customary or soft law (or both) and policy norms are evinced in policy statements issued by international organisations and industry bodies. This article hypothesises that norms on PMSCs that are neither puritanical nor overly strong and yet appear to be both normative and concrete are the most likely to be institutionalised by a critical mass of state actors and by the PMSC industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work of private military and security contractors is extremely controversial from the point of view of international law and of practice. Sometimes there are doubts as to whether some of their activities should be considered legal activities or illegal mercenarism. Like any other entities using force, they can violate human rights as well as international humanitarian law. They provide their services to, amongst others, states and intergovernmental organisations, including the UN. This requires a precise definition of the rules under which such contractors operate, both with regard to the law of treaties and the domestic law of the entities using their services. A question also arises as to whether there is any legal limit to their services being used by intergovernmental organisations, i.e. entities deriving their competences from the will of their member states. The work of the UN is an interesting example here. The organisation uses such contractors, but on the other hand, it undertakes various activities to eliminate any potential threats in this respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scourge of Somali piracy has imperiled the free movement of commercial shipping vessels in the Gulf of Aden, a major conduit of global commerce. A "grand armada" of international naval forces sent to safeguard commercial vessels near Somalia has been unable to stem the growth of Somali pirate syndicates capable of brazen attacks and bolstered by the promise of multimillion dollar ransoms. This Comment explores the commercial shipping industry's increasing reliance on private military and security companies (PMSCs) to secure their vessels, cargo, and crews from pirate attacks. The International Maritime Organization and other groups have vehemently opposed PMSC employment aboard commercial vessels, citing the inevitable escalation of violence and excessive use of force that are part of the PMSC modus operandi. This Comment highlights the factual underpinnings that animate these concerns and suggests that the PMSC misconduct in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provide instructive, indeed critical, lessons regarding the responsible employment of PMSC forces to combat piracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the common claim that there are gaps in international law that undermine accountability of private military and security companies. A multi-actor analysis examines this question in relation to the commission of international crimes, violations of fundamental human rights, and ordinary crimes. Without this critical first step of identifying specific deficiencies in international law, the debate about how to enhance accountability within this sector is likely to be misguided at best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As non-state actors, PMSCs are not embraced by traditional state-dominated doctrines of international law. However, international law has itself failed to keep pace with the evolution of states and state-based actors, to which strong Westphalian notions of sovereignty are no longer applicable. It is argued that these structural inadequacies stand in the way of international regulation of PMSCs, rather than defects in international human rights and humanitarian law per se. By analyzing understandings of legal responsibility, where such structural issues come to the fore, it is argued that, rather than attempting to resolve the essentially ideological dispute about the inherent functions of a state, regulatory regimes should focus on the positive obligations of states and PMSCs, and the interactions between them. Applying the results of this analysis, current and proposed regulatory regimes are evaluated and their shortcomings revealed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of armed security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to widespread criticism of their insufficient control through international laws and conventions. This article suggests that one reason for this omission has been the (re)construction of actors who provide armed force for profit in international legal discourses. During most of the 20th century, armed persons who participated in foreign conflicts for monetary gain were identified as ‘mercenaries’. They were outlawed through international legal documents such as the United Nations (UN) Convention on Mercenarism and given restricted rights in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Today, the same types of actors are increasingly defined as ‘private security contractors’, and new discourses and international agreements are emerging that attribute to them legality and legitimacy. The aim of this article is to examine the changing legal constructions of armed security providers since the 1970s and the consequences with respect to their control. The article argues that the (re)construction of actors who supply armed force for money in international legal discourses has been made possible by three main discursive strategies: the distinction between persons and corporations providing armed force for profit, the changing focus from the motivations of these actors to their relationship to a ‘responsible command’, and the shift from a concern about the actors to one about certain activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study draws attention to one of the most significant but least examined aspects of the global security environment: the transnational private security business. The importance of private military companies (PMCs), which have tactical warfare capabilities equivalent to those of the militaries of developed countries, has increased since the inception of the Iraq War in 2003. The weakness of state security forces in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the need to downsize and outsource an already overtasked US military, has left security gaps in these countries. Some argue that filling these gaps with PMCs is an economically feasible, politically viable, and flexible option for US policymakers. Our study tests this argument by asking about the political effects of PMCs, profit-focused corporations that operate largely outside national and international law, on the sovereignty and legitimacy of the fragile states in which PMCs operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last fifteen years, functions traditionally performed by State security and military agencies have been outsourced to private military and security companies. States and other actors are hiring these companies to act in zones of armed conflict or post conflict situations. Iraq has been the most striking case in numbers and scale since the beginning of this process. The use of private security contractors raises some particularly sensitive issues regarding accountability and oversight. It has been claimed there is a vacuum in the law when it comes to the operations of these companies. However legislation already exists at both international and national levels: International Humanitarian Law, Iraqi and USA laws are applicable today to this sector. Nevertheless, as the Iraqi case shows, previous concepts and current legislations are insufficient and new developments are needed in order to adapt the law to the new realities arising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]